A. (§3.6) General Principles

LibraryInterpreting Oregon Law (OSBar) (2009 Ed.)

A. (§3.6) General Principles

As Judge Jack Landau observed in a 1996 Oregon Court of Appeals concurrence: "Neither this court nor the Supreme Court has developed any standards by which we should evaluate the probative value of one type of history or another." Jones v. GMC, 139 Or App 244, 270, 911 P2d 1243 (1996). That remains true. However, while a comprehensive set of guidelines explaining how legislative history should be applied to resolve statutory ambiguity does not exist in Oregon case law, the courts have from time to time provided limited explanations regarding the proper scope of legislative history and the weight to be given to particular types of legislative history.

This section examines four general principles: (1) legislative history should reflect the legislative thinking at the time when the statute was enacted, (2) the most useful legislative history reflects consistent themes relied on throughout the legislative process, (3) the most persuasive legislative history indicates that a large number of legislators were aware of it, and (4) legislative history cannot create ambiguity in an unambiguous statute.

It is important to note what the courts do not consider legislative history. Prior versions of the statute at issue, along with "the broad historical circumstances surrounding enactment" and "prior versions of other statutes...

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