3. [§ 3.31] Duty Defined By Statute

JurisdictionMaryland

3. [§ 3.31] Duty defined by statute

"Where there is an applicable statutory scheme designed to protect a class of persons . . . [a] well-settled Maryland common law rule . . . states that the defendant's duty ordinarily is prescribed by the statue or ordinance and that the violation of the statue or ordinance is itself evidence of negligence." Brooks v. Lewin Realty III, Inc., 378 Md. 70, 78, 835 A.2d 616, 620 (2003) (citing Brown v. Dermer, 357 Md. 344, 358-59, 744 A.2d 47, 55 (2000)); Maurer v. Penn. Nat'l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 404 Md. 60, 68, 945 A.2d 629, 634 (2007) ("violation of a relevant statute or ordinance may be evidence of negligence" but is not negligence per se); see also Ayala v. Lee, 215 Md. App. 457, 468, 81 A.3d 584, 591 (2013).

Additional cases include Weitzke v. Chesapeake Conference Association, 421 Md. 355, 388-95, 26 A.3d 931, 951-55 (2011); C & M Builders, LLC v. Strub, 420 Md. 268, 281-83, 22 A.3d 867, 874-76 (2011); Allen v. Dackman, 413 Md. 132, 143-44, 991 A.2d 1216, 1222-23 (2010); Polakoff v. Turner, 385 Md. 467, 473, 869 A.2d 837, 841 (2005) ("We reaffirm our holding in Brooks and hold that the standard for establishing a prima facie case based on a violation of the Baltimore City Housing Code as enunciated therein applies to all cases not final at the time Brooks was filed."); Moore v. Myers, 161 Md. App. 349, 363-64, 868 A.2d 954, 962-63 (2005) (quoting Brooks). "Under this principle, in order to make out a prima facie case in a negligence action, all that a plaintiff must show is: (a) the violation of a statute or ordinance designed to protect a specific class of persons which includes the plaintiff, and (b) that the violation proximately caused the injury complained of." Brooks, 378 Md. at 79, 835 A.2d at 621; Maurer, 404 Md. at 68-70, 945 A.2d at 634-35 (also noting that "influence of alcohol per se" statutory provisions pertain to driver, not to passenger).

The law in this regard was summarized thoroughly in Gourdine v. Crews, 405 Md. 722, 755, 955 A.2d 769, 789 (2008):

A duty may be established by statute "'when the plaintiff is a member of the class of persons the statute was designed to protect and the injury was of the type the statute was designed to prevent.'" Pendleton, 398 Md. at 466, 921 A.2d at 207, quoting Remsburg, 376 Md. at 584, 831 A.2d at 27; Erie Ins. Co. v. Chops, 322 Md. 79, 84, 585 A.2d 232, 234 (1991). Furthermore, the statute must "set forth mandatory acts clearly for the protection of a particular class of persons rather than the public as a whole." Id., quoting Remsburg, 376 Md. at 584, 831 A.2d at 27; Ashburn, 306 Md. at 635, 510 A.2d at 1087. See also Polakoff v. Turner, 385 Md. 467, 483, 869 A.2d 837, 847 (2005) ("To make out a prima facie case in a negligence action based on the breach of a statutory duty, a plaintiff must show '(a) the violation of a statute or ordinance designed to protect a specific class of persons which includes the plaintiff, and (b) that the violation proximately caused the injury complained of.'"); Brooks v. Lewin Realty III, Inc., 378 Md. 70, 78, 835 A.2d 616, 620-21 (2003) ("Moreover, where there is an applicable statutory scheme designed to protect a class of persons which includes the plaintiff, another well-settled Maryland common law rule has long been applied by this Court in
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