Public diplomacy in uniform.

• Author: Greenspan, Rachel
• Position: Report

Introduction

The necessity to fight a 'war of ideas' against extremism and to 'win hearts and minds' has led to an increasing need for the Pentagon to be involved in supporting public diplomacy efforts. Longer engagements abroad, such as the continued military mission in Afghanistan, have made outreach to local populations a necessary part of accomplishing military missions. In addition, the classification of Iraq and Afghanistan as either insecure or active combat zones makes it difficult for the U.S. Department of State (DOS) to carry out their regular activities, such as public diplomacy, without military support and protection. Since the abolishment of the US Information Agency (USIA) in 1999 and in the wake of the September 11th attacks the Pentagon has gotten progressively more involved in public diplomacy-type activities. Still, there is an ongoing debate about whether Americans should be represented abroad by people in civilian clothing or by soldiers in combat boots (Brian E. Carlson 2010).

There are three Department of Defense (DOD) activities that can be construed as overlapping with public diplomacy: Information Operations (IO), Psychological Operations (PSYOP), and Public Affairs (PA).

This paper looks at Department of Defense programs that could be construed as public diplomacy (PD) efforts and analyzes how they fit in with the State Department public diplomacy mandate. It seeks to understand why the DOD is engaging in these activities, what their mission is, and what groups they are targeting as an intended audience. The paper concludes by discussing whether DOD should or should not be involved in public diplomacy-related activities.

Military Communication with Foreign Audiences

The military uses several different tools to engage foreign audiences in order to advance US interests. These include: information operations (IO), psychological operations (PSYOP) and Public Affairs (PA). These activities all utilize the overarching concept of "strategic communications" (SC), which are defined as:

"... focused USG efforts to understand and engage key audiences in order to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of USG interests, policies, and objectives ..." (JP 3-13 2006, I-10)

Strategic communication as a concept was developed within the last ten years by military officials, such as General Petraeus, who recognized that the global war on terror could not be won with guns alone. Strategic communications is a learning process intended to take advantage of the value of relationships, experiential learning, and other factors that go into true, effective communication with foreign audiences (Brian E. Carlson 2010).

Interestingly, this type of military activity is not only conducted in conflict zones, but can also be used to forestall conflict in more peaceful regions. In an interview, Mark Davidson, a senior foreign service public diplomacy officer who has been intimately involved in State-DOD discussions over the proper relationship between civilian-led PD and military information operations, questioned whether it was in the best interest of the U.S. that the military should engage with civilians in countries outside of combat areas around the world, stating: "I think that no one questions the validity of the DOD going into war zones and interacting in ways that are necessary to winning wars. In places that people aren't shooting at us, the DOD probably has very little business going ..." (Mark Davidson 2010). From a military standpoint, Col. Stephen Perkins argues that military outreach to foreign audiences could serve as a "non-kinetic force multiplier" that could help mitigate or even resolve emerging challenges (Col. Stephen P. Perkins 2006, 5).

Information Operations

Information Operations serves as an umbrella for several military capabilities, including electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, operations security and military deception. IO is a coordinating concept, not a capability (JP 3-13 2006, I-1). Successful IO coordinates and de-conflicts different capabilities in order to support a military mission (Col. Carl Ayers, Ret. 2010). IO activities are meant to affect decisions and the decision-making process through use of influence, disruption, corruption or usurpation (JP 3-13 2006, I-6).

Central to both IO and public diplomacy efforts is the goal of identifying cultural and political factors that can influence public opinion. A fundamental difference between the two disciplines is the military's focus on achieving 'mission success.' In contrast to the goal-driven nature of military IO, public diplomacy can often involve cultural and education activities aimed at improving long-term relations in less tangible ways, such as to promoting understanding of American values that could help with foreign relations during a future crisis. The tendency for IO to be viewed as a one-way blast of information can limit opportunities for important dialogue and discourse with local populations, which is an integral part of public diplomacy.

In the past ten years, IO has grown as an area of interest. A 2006 revision of IO doctrine aimed to add defense support to public diplomacy and clarify the role of civil military operations in this arena (JP 3-13 2006). While there are still no flag officer positions stemming from IO, rear Admiral Gregory Smith, a U.S. Navy Public Affairs Officer, was recently promoted and given a second star to serve as deputy to General Petraeus. As part of his duties, he handles IO in Afghanistan (Brian E. Carlson 2010).

Psychological Operations (Military Information Support Operations)

PSYOP is the element of IO that is most closely related to public diplomacy, although the two differ in important respects. According to JP3-13 Psychological Operations are defined as:

"Planned operations to convey selected truthful information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately, the behavior of their governments, organizations, groups, and individuals ..." (JP 3-13 2006, II-1)

Broadly speaking, the goal of PSYOP either to: (1) deliver information to key leadership in order to deter behavior that violates U.S. national interest, or (2) to target a specific foreign population in order to create separation from the adversary state leadership and build internal pressure (Col. Blane R. Clark 2010). At first glance, PD and PSYOP can be seen as largely overlapping activities. Both seek to use media, print and other media to reach a foreign target audience (TA). In practice, the two diverge on certain key points:

1. PSYOP seeks to influence public opinion in a specific direction that advances U.S. interests. Public diplomacy, in contrast, tends to focus on broader goals, such as dialogue, cultural exchange, and correction of misunderstandings. It seeks to educate and inform rather than influence opinion in a specific direction.

2. PSYOP is directed at a target region or audience that is critical to mission success, whereas PD is generally meant to address an entire country or region.

3. PSYOP deals with dissemination of information on specific issues that influence mission success. PD broaches a wide range of issues that pertain to US policy, such as trade policies, public health, foreign relations and education.

4. The potential for classification or secrecy in PSYOP is not consistent with the open and public conduct of public diplomacy.

   In 2010, the name 'PSYOP' officially changed to Military Information Support Operations (MISO). The decision was based on the potential negative connotations to the term 'psychological operations,' in addition to a feeling that the term was inadequate to encompass all PSYOP activities. For example, military broadcasts in post-earthquake Haiti telling people where they could get food were technically PSYOP (Marc Ambinder 2010). Colonel Ayers noted that the name change had no effect on the substantive activities towards foreign...