Hezbollah: analysis of violence.

• Author: Cohler, Sarah
• Position: Report

Hezbollah (1) is the voice of the Shi'ites. For a Lebanese group that is the least educated, the poorest, the most excluded and oppressed on a long-term basis, to see a leadership emerging that comes not from old Shi'ite elite families but rather from the mosques, from more populist level, to see that leadership acting by and large with prudence while still proving itself effective--it's really quite an impressive movement. -Professor Richard Bulliet (2)

Significance of Hezbollah

Hezbollah is best described as a sub-state actor fighting a more powerful state adversary, and studying the variation in this group's violence illuminates not only case-specific causes of violence but also adds to the scholarship on the causes of guerrilla violence. Furthermore, identifying the source of asymmetric violence is the first step towards its eradication. Asymmetric violence or guerrilla warfare is the structural inverse of conventional warfare, which is acted out between large, organized, military forces in open battle on a linear front. Both World Wars and the Persian Gulf War of 1991 fall under the conventional warfare category.

Distinct from conventional warfare, other types of prolonged military campaigns are unconventional, including sub-conventional and supra-conventional (nuclear) warfare. As a sub-state actor, Hezbollah commits acts of violence under the rubric of sub-conventional warfare.

Even those uninterested in this particular group will find an analysis of Hezbollah's violence a useful guide for understanding and predicting the actions of comparable guerrilla groups because the nature of guerrilla warfare demands that the militarily weaker, sub-state actor, whether located in Lebanon or Vietnam, use secrecy, attrition strategies, and the high cost of counter-insurgency to their advantage. Underlying similarities in the structure and function of these groups makes the study of any one an inherently useful rubric to study any other. At a time when the United States and its allies are currently embroiled in campaigns opposing unconventional actors, investigating the causes of asymmetric violence would benefit any political scientist or policy maker interested in state security.

Background

An analysis of Hezbollah's violence is best understood in its geopolitical and historical context. Therefore, I highlight Hezbollah's goals and organizational structure, the structure of the Lebanese government, the Iranian institutions responsible for setting foreign policy and therefore the state's relationship to Hezbollah, and the history of Syria's influence.

Hezbollah (in Arabic, the "Party of God" (3)) was born out of the 1980s Lebanese Civil War, fighting other Lebanese militias and the Israeli invasion and subsequent occupation. (4) Shi'ite Muslims, Hezbollah's largest support base, account for 40% of Lebanon's total population, many of whom feel under-represented in the Lebanese political and economic system. (5) Headquartered in Beirut, Hezbollah controls Southern Lebanon, which represents about 10% of all Lebanese territory, where most Shi'a are concentrated. (6)

History Professor Rashid Khalidi adds that there was no Hezbollah before the Israeli occupation. Hezbollah portrays itself as a resistance and social movement that speaks for the disenfranchised of Lebanon. (7)

The group has maintained a military commitment to the expulsion of Israel from Lebanese territory, attracting "wide if non-unanimous support" in Lebanon. (8) Hezbollah first entered the Lebanese government as a political party in 1992 and in 1996 outlined its political manifesto, declaring its ambitions to include: the resisting of Israeli ocupation on contested Lebanese land, reforming public education, safeguarding public freedoms, and instating a wide range of social and economic measures. (9) Social services that Hezbollah offers include "hospitals, medical centers, schools, orphanages, and rehabilitation centers for the handicapped." (10) These welfare programs, while they assist the Shi'ite public, also benefit the resistance movement by lending it public support.

Although the group remains tight-lipped about its organizational structure, researchers have discovered that it is structured as a hierarchical pyramid, headed by the decision-making Advisory Council (Majlis Shura al-Qarar), (12) over which Sheikh Hassan Sayyid Nasrallah has presided as the Secretary General since 1992. (13) The Advisory Council is comprised of nine members, including two Iranian representatives, whose presence implies not that the Iranian government leads the Council but that it is certainly influential. As is evident in Figure 1, underneath the Advisory Council are several subordinate councils known as functional councils: the Executive Council, the Judicial Council, the Political Council, the Political Advisor, and the Jihad/Military Council. Each functional council is in charge of several operational "desks" each responsible for specific topics. (14) Nasrallah confirms that Hezbollah has four organizational levels, the top levels being more visible to the public, and the last level represented by the mujahidin, or guerrilla fighters. (15)

The Lebanese Government

Lebanon has a weak central government, which is rare in the Middle East. Every four years, Lebanese vote on members of parliament. (16) Since the Taef Agreement in 1989, which marked the end of the Lebanese Civil War, parliamentary seats must be divided equally between Christians and Muslims. The seats are further subdivided along sectarian lines, and voters cast their ballots for every available seat, regardless of sect. Therefore, candidates must appeal to constituents across sectarian lines. (17)

There are two main political coalitions in Lebanon: the first is a coalition of mainly Sunnis, Druze, and Christians that formed after 2005 called the March 14 Group, named in honor of the protest on March 14th, 2005 when one million demonstrators called for an investigation into the assassination of Prime Minister Hariri - suspected at the time of having been ordered by the Syrian government. (18)

The second coalition is known as the March 8 group in commemoration of the large demonstration organized by Hezbollah and Amal to thank Syria for its role in maintaining peace in the country. In the 1980s and early 1990s, Amal competed with Hezbollah for Southern Lebanese support for guerrilla campaigns; however, Amal disarmed in 1992 and is now Hezbollah's political ally in the government. The March 8 group is comprised predominantly of the southern Lebanese Shi'a represented by Hezbollah and Amal as well as "large elements" of the Christian community. (19)

Before the 1992 elections when Hezbollah established itself as a political party, Hezbollah's leadership made strategic decisions to run as a coalition alongside Sunnis and Christians in some Lebanese districts to allow for political maneuvering and compromises with all factions that live in the region. (20) For example, in Hezbollah's first election, the group captured eight seats in addition to two seats won by loyal Sunni representatives and two seats won by Christian representatives with whom Hezbollah had bargained. (21) Khalidi notes that the groups coalesced as the result of coalition politics, but the marriage of convenience has remained solid and stable. (22)

An Iranian Profile

After the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, there emerged two dominant political factions: the reformists, who promote rapprochement with the United States and suspended uranium enrichment, and the "hardliners" or conservatives, who advocate the exportation of Islamic revolutions and increased conflict with the United States and Israel. Both camps are antagonistic towards the American and Israeli military but take different approaches to counter that potential threat. (23)

Iran, despite the US media's current obsession with its President, is not a one-man dictatorship. In fact, Iran is better described as an "oligarchy of Shi'ite fundamentalist clerics and laypersons who operate within a complex system." (25) No one person controls it. Instead, Iran is governed by a system of clerics and non-religious elites. As outlined in Figure 2, the Iranian Constitution gave executive, legislative, and judicial powers to the highest ranking Shiite cleric known as the Ayatollah but did not bestow unchecked power on him either, since the Constitution also created an elected president, an elected parliament known as the Majlis, and an elected Assembly of Experts. Although Supreme Leader Khamenei is the most powerful official, he could be overruled if the majority of the oligarchs wished. (26) This government is really a regime, an entire system of elites. A change in any one of these structures - that is if a shift occurred in any of these governing bodies from one political faction to the other - might lead to a change in the articulation of Iranian foreign policy.

For example, the reformist school of thought dominated Iranian local councils in 1999, became a majority in the Majlis in 2000, and re-elected reformist President Khatami in 2001. The conservatives, however, maintained control over the non-elected offices during this time; these institutions include the Council of Guardians, the Council of Experts, and the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, who succeeded Ayatollah Khomeini, installed after the Islamic Revolution. (27) Khatami's policy of seeking dialogue and improved ties with the West gave way to increased tension with neighbors and the international community due to growing conservative power.(31)

Professor Eva P. Rakel reiterates that "Iranian foreign policy is linked to the policy preferences of the Iranian ruling political elite," (28) so it is imperative to investigate the interests--sometimes dueling interests--of the different factions of the Iranian government. This is especially important for foreign policy since the reformists and conservatives have...