A call to police the margins: the Eighth Circuit's expansion of Miranda's public-safety exception.

• Author: Dixon, Bradley S.

United States v. Liddel (1)

1. INTRODUCTION

   The right of every citizen against compulsory self-incrimination is a principle firmly embedded in the American justice system. (2) The Supreme Court of the United States in Miranda v. Arizona, a decision that has established itself in the public consciousness, found the abuses of law enforcement so grave that the Court mandated certain prophylactic measures to protect Fifth Amendment rights. (3) In doing so, the Court recognized that it was balancing the interest of protecting individuals' Fifth Amendment rights against the potential detrimental costs to effective law enforcement. (4)

   In New York v. Quarles, the Supreme Court found a public policy exception to Miranda where there were exigent circumstances that constituted a sufficient risk to "public safety," which then justified disregarding Miranda's prophylactic measures in favor of effective law enforcement. (5) An immediate and serious danger to public safety could upset the balance of public interests protected by Miranda, and Quarles's new exception sought to regain that balance. In subsequent years, the public-safety exception has undergone an expansion beyond the exigency requirement originally articulated in Quarles.

   The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has disregarded immediacy as being absolutely necessary in finding the public-safety exception to Miranda. In United States v. Liddell, the Eighth Circuit held that the public-safety exception applies to circumstances in which there is potential harm to police officers if there is an objectively reasonable belief that they may mishandle or happen upon an inherently dangerous item. (6) In finding the public-safety exception applicable in these circumstances, the Eighth Circuit has upset the balance struck by the Supreme Court in Miranda and Quarles and ought to re-examine the exception to bring it back within its original conception--one rooted in exigency.

2. FACTS & HOLDING

   Antonio Ray Liddell was stopped in his car for a loud music violation by police officers in Iowa. (7) A subsequent check of his license revealed that Liddell was barred from driving in the state, and he was duly arrested. (8) A pat-down search of Liddell's person disclosed a bag of marijuana, $183 in cash, and two cell phones. (9) Liddell was then handcuffed and placed inside a patrol car. (10) While Liddell was secured in the patrol car, an officer conducted a search of his vehicle incident to his arrest and "discovered an unloaded .38 caliber revolver [placed] under the front seat." (11)

   Following the discovery of the revolver, police officers "removed Liddell from the patrol car and, ... referring to Liddell's" vehicle, officer Adney asked, "Is there anything else in there we need to know about?" (12) Officer Melvin interjected, "That's gonna hurt us," which prompted Officer Adney to repeat, "That's gonna hurt us? Since we found the pistol already." (13) Liddell responded by "laugh[ing] and said, 'I knew it was there but ... it's not mine,'" and also denied that there were other weapons in the car. (14) After this questioning, the officers completed their search of the vehicle and found rolling papers and .38 caliber ammunition. (15)

   Liddell was charged with unlawful possession of a firearm and unrelated drug offenses. (16) The District Court for the Southern District of Iowa denied Liddell's motion to suppress his statement that he knew the revolver was in the vehicle, even though the government conceded that Liddell was in custody and had not been read his Miranda (17) warnings before police questioning. (18) The district court relied on the public-safety exception (19) to Miranda to deny Liddell's motion to suppress and thereby justified admitting Liddell's statements prior to any Miranda warnings. (20)

   After the district court's refusal to suppress his highly incriminating statements regarding knowledge of the firearm, Liddell entered a conditional plea of guilty to the charge of being a felon in possession of a firearm. (21) Per his conditional plea, Liddell appealed to the Eighth Circuit the district court's denial of his motion to suppress his post-arrest and pre-Miranda statements regarding knowledge of the presence of the revolver in his vehicle. (22)

   on appeal, Liddell argued that the public-safety exception to Miranda was inapplicable to his case because there was no objectively reasonable need to protect the public from immediate danger. (23) The Eighth Circuit rejected Liddell's argument and adopted the reasoning of the government and district court, which applied the public-safety exception to Miranda to the facts of Liddell. (24) The court held that the risks inherent in "unknown firearms or drug paraphernalia provide[] a sufficient public safety basis" upon which to justify questions regarding whether there are weapons or other dangerous items located in or about a place that police are going to search. (25)

3. Legal Background

   1. The Fifth Amendment and Miranda

      The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, inter alia, that "no person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." (26) So important was this principle to the Framers of the Constitution that they took from England what had formerly been a "mere rule of evidence" (27) and "clothed [it] in this country with the impregnability of a constitutional enactment." (28) Finding that the rights embodied in the Fifth Amendment and incorporated to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment were not properly safeguarded by law enforcement, the Supreme Court took preventative action.

      The Supreme Court, in Miranda v. Arizona, addressed what it found to be the destruction of human dignity attendant to encroachments on liberty when suspects were forced to speak under compulsion while in state custody. (29) Miranda was a consolidation of four cases in which law enforcement officials took suspects into custody and interrogated them without advising them of their rights to remain silent and to consult with an attorney. (30) The Court evaluated common interrogation procedures of the time, which included intimidation, isolation of suspects, and mental abuse, such that the Court opined that any confession obtained under these procedures, and other like procedures, could not be the product of the suspect's free will. (31) The Court held that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination extends to any situation in which a person's "freedom of action is curtailed" by law enforcement "in any significant way." (32) Further, the Court held that a person cannot be given a genuine opportunity to exercise his privilege against self-incrimination unless he is first effectively notified of his rights. (33) Without these prior warnings, statements received through pre-Miranda questioning would have been presumptively obtained through compulsion and, therefore, obtained in a constitutionally deficient manner. (34)

      Miranda's guarantee that law enforcement must inform a suspect of his Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination entered into the public consciousness, and the term "Miranda rights" entered into the public lexicon. (35) However, the Supreme Court later found unwavering adherence to this new procedure to be untenable. Pragmatism demanded a scheme that was more pliable since, after all, the Miranda warnings are not rights in and of themselves but rather prophylactic measures guaranteeing rights based in the Fifth Amendment. (36)

   2. Quarles and The Public-Safety Exception

      In New York v. Quarles, the Supreme Court considered whether there should be a public-safety exception to the Miranda warnings. (37) In Quarles, a young woman approached police officers in their car, stated that she had just been raped, provided a detailed description of the alleged perpetrator, told the officers that the suspect had just entered a supermarket located nearby, and said that the man was carrying a gun. (38) one of the officers radioed for help while the other entered the supermarket and found the alleged perpetrator, Quarles, who then proceeded to run. (39) Having momentarily lost sight of the suspect, the officer pursued him with his gun drawn, caught up with the suspect, and ordered him to stop. (40) The police officer then frisked the suspect and discovered an empty shoulder holster. (41) After handcuffing the suspect and before informing him of his Miranda rights, the officer asked him where the gun was located. (42) The suspect responded, "[T]he gun is over there," and nodded toward some empty cartons, where the officer then found the gun. (43)

      At Quarles's subsequent prosecution for criminal possession of a weapon, the trial judge excluded the statements concerning the gun obtained both prior to and after his Miranda warnings because the evidence surrounding the gun was impermissibly tainted by the statements given prior to Quarles receiving Miranda warnings. (44) The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York affirmed the judgment without opinion, and the New York Court of Appeals affirmed by a four to three vote. (45) The court of appeals refused to recognize an exigency exception to the strictures of Miranda because there was no evidence in the record of the police officer's subjective belief that the situation was one in which concerns of public safety required derogation from Miranda. (46)

      The Supreme Court of the United States agreed to consider the case to determine whether this was an instance where concern for public safety justified an exception to the protections enunciated by Miranda. (47) The Court began by noting that it had recognized exigent-circumstance exceptions that negate normal protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures. (48) The Court then analyzed the policies behind the Miranda warnings. It reasoned that the Miranda warnings are...