Counselor, stop everything! Missouri's venue statutes receive an expansive interpretation.

• Author: Shreves, Darin P.
• Position: NOTE

State ex rel. Kansas City Southern Railway Co. v. Nixon, 282 S.W.3d 363 (Mo. 2009en banc).

1. INTRODUCTION

   In 2005, the Missouri plaintiffs' bar inadvertently revealed just how much it benefitted from the state's pre-reform venue statute. (1) During that year, the Missouri General Assembly enacted House Bill 393, commonly referred to as the Tort Reform Act (Act). (2) This Act was to become effective in late August 2005, and it threatened plaintiffs' attorneys by instituting rigid venue provisions that restricted their ability to steer suits into favorable venues. (3) Seeking to avoid the new Act's restrictions, these attorneys responded by filing 602 tort lawsuits in St. Louis City (4) in May 2005; in contrast, they filed only 255 tort lawsuits in that venue in May 2006, nine months after the Tort Reform Act became effective. (5)

   As illustrated above, Missouri's pre-reform venue law held substantial advantages for plaintiffs' attorneys. These attorneys regularly used creative statutory readings and questionable procedural techniques to exploit the state's venue statute and maneuver their lawsuits into favorable forums. (6) Just as frequently, defense attorneys challenged these practices in the state's appellate courts. (7) In the resulting decisions, Missouri courts developed an elaborate venue doctrine that consistently limited the ability of litigants to circumvent the state's venue laws by curtailing common forum shopping strategies. (8)

   The Missouri General Assembly responded to the state's venue difficulties by enacting the Tort Reform Act in 2005. This Act dramatically revised the state's venue statute, section 508.010, to impose rigid limitations on where a suit could be filed. (9) The Act also included a new statute, section 508.012, that substantially codified the venue doctrine created by the state's courts. (10) In State ex rel. Kansas City Southern Railway Co. v. Nixon, the Supreme Court of Missouri interpreted this new statute as a matter of first impression. (11) In doing so, however, the court diverged significantly from the Tort Reform Act's statutory language and legislative goals. (12) As a result, Nixon has potentially dramatic consequences for all litigation filed in Missouri.

   This Note seeks to place Nixon in the context of Missouri law in order to analyze the court's holding and its attendant consequences. First, this Note will review Missouri's venue law leading up to Nixon. (13) Next, this Note will examine the court's reasoning, consider its interpretation of the newly-enacted venue provision of section 508.012, and explore the issues and implications arising from the decision. (14) Finally, this Note will conclude that in order to mitigate Nixon's departure from the legislative goals of the Tort Reform Act, future courts will limit the decision's reach by failing to apply its reasoning beyond the narrow procedural issue presented in Nixon. (15)

2. FACTS AND HOLDING

   On June 25, 2007, a Kansas City Southern Railway Company (the Railway) train collided with a car at a railroad crossing in Ruston, Louisiana. (16) At the time of the collision, Louisiana residents Lauren Cockerell, Clifford and Kimberly McFarland, and the McFarlands' daughter, Hannah, were in the car. (17) The collision killed Hannah. (18)

   The McFarlands sued the Railway for wrongful death in the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri; in the same suit, Lauren sued the Railway for her own personal injuries. (19) The Railway's principal place of business was situated in Jackson County, but its registered agent was located across the state in St. Louis County. (20) After the plaintiffs filed and served the petition, (21) the Railway moved to transfer the venue of the lawsuit based on Missouri Supreme Court Rule 51.045. (22) In its motion, the Railway argued that, under section 508.010.5 of the Act, (23) the only proper venue for the lawsuit was in St. Louis County because the plaintiffs alleged a tort but did not reside or suffer injury in Missouri and the Railway was a corporation with its registered agent in St. Louis County. (24) Rather than dispute the Railway's argument, the plaintiffs attempted to cure the defect in venue by seeking leave to add Kevin McIntosh as an additional defendant in the suit. (25) McIntosh was a Railway employee, but, more importantly, he was a Jackson County resident. (26) Because adding McIntosh as a defendant would have rendered venue proper in Jackson County under section 508.010.5,27 the trial court granted the plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend. (28) On the same day, the trial court also denied the Railway's motion to transfer venue. (29)

   Following the trial court's ruling, the Railway sought a writ of prohibition (30) that would bar "the trial court from enforcing its order granting plaintiffs' motion to add McIntosh as a defendant." (31) The Railway maintained its position that St. Louis County was the proper venue for suit and that "the trial court, therefore, exceeded its 'jurisdiction'" in denying the Railway's transfer motion. (32) After the Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District denied the Railway's request, (33) the Railway appealed again. (34) The Supreme Court of Missouri held that the "trial court did not exceed its jurisdiction or its authority by allowing plaintiffs to cure the defect in venue by adding McIntosh as a defendant." (35)

3. LEGAL BACKGROUND

   This Note argues that in Nixon, the Supreme Court of Missouri expanded venue within the state by interpreting section 508.012, the statute addressing the transfer of a case based on the addition of a party, in a way that is inconsistent with the legislative goals of the Tort Reform Act. In order to understand and analyze the significance of Nixon, it is first necessary to briefly survey Missouri's pre-reform venue statutes and rules. Next, important decisions interpreting those rules and statutes must be reviewed in order to understand the evolution of the court's venue doctrine prior to reform. Finally, this Note examines the venue statutes enacted in the Tort Reform Act that led the court to its ruling in Nixon.

   1. Venue Prior to the Tort Reform Act and Related Missouri Law

      Consistent with current law, venue in Missouri was governed by statute prior to the Tort Reform Act, (36) and the general venue statute of section 508.010 determined where suits were to be "brought." (37) Prior to its amendment, section 508.010 determined venue primarily based on the residence of the defendant, and attorneys could circumvent the statute's provisions by joining parties pretensively or at strategic times. (38) Such procedural maneuvering is commonly known as "forum shopping," (39) and under Missouri's pre-reform venue statute plaintiffs effectively used the technique to navigate lawsuits into favorable venues. (40)

      While section 508.010 established venue, other laws and procedural rules governed transferring venue. Missouri Supreme Court Rule 51.045 instructed that if a suit was filed in an improper venue, then, upon a timely motion to transfer, the suit "shall be transferred to a court where venue is proper." (41) Similarly, section 476.410 required that if a suit was filed in an improper venue, then the trial court "shall transfer the case" to any venue where the suit "could have been brought." (42)

      Other laws affected venue in more subtle ways. Rule 55.33 allowed a party to amend and to supplement the pleadings, (43) and Rule 67.02 permitted the voluntary dismissal of a suit. (44) Both of these rules could affect venue by altering the pleadings before the court. Finally, article v, section 4 of the Missouri Constitution provided the Supreme Court of Missouri with "general superintending control over all courts" in the state, as well as the authority to "issue and determine original remedial writs." (45) Missouri law recognizes the writs of mandamus and prohibition, (46) and litigants may protest a trial court's venue ruling by petitioning for either. (47)

      While the Tort Reform Act dramatically revised the general venue statute of section 508.010, the other statutes, rules, and constitutional provisions mentioned above were not altered by that Act. As a result, that body of law remains crucial to understanding venue in Missouri.

   2. Interpreting the Rules of Venue: Mummert, Linthicum, and Ohmer

      The Supreme Court of Missouri examined the interaction of these venue laws in the case of State ex rel. DePaul Health Center v. Mummert. (48) In Mummert, the plaintiffs filed a medical malpractice suit for injuries occurring in St. Louis County against a doctor and two medical businesses, both located in St. Louis County for venue purposes. (49) Because the plaintiffs filed suit in St. Louis City, (50) the defendants argued that venue was improper and, thus, the circuit court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendants.51 Thereafter, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the defendant doctor in an attempt to cure the defect in venue. (52) Accordingly, the trial court denied the defendants' motion to transfer. (53)

      In reaching its ruling, the Supreme Court of Missouri first noted the Missouri General Assembly's recent amendment of the statute governing the commencement of suits and service of process, (54) as well as the distinct purposes served by personal jurisdiction and venue. (55) As a result, the court concluded that the legislature "severed" the concepts through the statute's amendment and held that "proper venue was no longer a prerequisite to personal jurisdiction," thereby permitting trial courts to continue to hear suits over which they lacked proper venue. (56)

      The court next addressed the defendants' transfer motion and concluded that section 508.010 required venue to be "determined as the case stands when brought, not when a motion challenging venue is decided." (57) Because the presence of the defendant doctor in the suit rendered venue improper at the time the suit was brought, his subsequent dismissal from...