22.43 - E. General Sentencing Principles

• Jurisdiction: New York

E. General Sentencing Principles

After verdict or plea, absent a waiver thereof, an unreasonable delay in sentencing deprives a court of jurisdiction over sentencing. A defendant’s waiver may be implied by his or her conduct such as absconding or hiding under a false identity. ³¹⁹⁸ The U.S. Supreme Court regarding sentence is quoted here:

Traditionally, “[s]entencing courts have not only taken into consideration a defendant’s prior convictions, but have also considered a defendant’s past criminal behavior, even if no conviction resulted from that behavior.” . . . We [have] explained . . . that “both before and since the American colonies became a nation, courts in this country and in England practiced a policy under which a sentencing judge could exercise a wide discretion in the sources and types of evidence used to assist him in determining the kind and extent of punishment to be imposed within limits fixed by law.” That history, combined with a recognition of the need for individualized sentencing, led us to conclude that the Due Process Clause did not require “that courts throughout the Nation abandon their age-old practice of seeking information from out-of-court sources to guide their judgment toward a more enlightened and just sentence.” ³¹⁹⁹

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Notes:

^[3198] . People v. Drake, 61 N.Y.2d 359, 474 N.Y.S.2d 276 (1984); People v. Saunders, 93 A.D.3d 487, 940 N.Y.S.2d 61 (1st Dep’t 2012).

^[3199] . Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389 (1995); Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008):

It is instructive . . . that in the last quarter century federal sentencing rejected an “indeterminate” system, with relatively unguided discretion to sentence within a wide range...