Summaries of Published Opinions
| Publication year | 2023 |
| Pages | 76 |
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Summaries of Published Opinions
December 15, 2022
2022 COA 142. No. 21CA0883. People v. Martinez. Probation—Restitution—Payment Schedule—Good Cause for Probation Extension.
Martinez pleaded guilty to vehicular assault, and she was sentenced to four years of supervised probation and ordered to pay $150,553.07 in restitution. Martinez couldn't pay the full restitution amount, so a collections investigator assessed her ability to pay and established a payment schedule under CRS § 16-18.5-104(4) (a)(I). The payment schedule initially required Martinez to pay $50 per month, which was later increased to $100 per month. Martinez made all required payments, but when her probationary period ended, her restitution balance had increased because her payments had not offset the accrued interest of 8% per year. Martinez's probation officer filed a complaint to revoke her probation on the sole basis that she hadn't yet paid the full restitution amount. The trial court extended Martinez's probation for five years, unsupervised, conditioned solely on continued payment of restitution.
On appeal, Martinez argued that the trial court lacked authority to extend her probation under CRS § 16-18.5-105(3)(d)(III) because she made all payments under her payment schedule and the statutory procedures weren't followed. When a defendant fails to make payments under a restitution payment schedule, CRS § 16-18.5-105(3)(d)(III) allows the court to extend the probation period upon a finding that the defendant failed to pay. However, this statute does not authorize a probation extension solely because restitution wasn't fully paid when a defendant has made all required payments under a payment schedule established under CRS § 16-18.5-104(4)(a)(I). CRS § 16-18.5-105(3) also outlines the procedures for a collections investigator to follow when a defendant fails to make a scheduled payment within seven days of the due date. Here, Martinez hadn't failed to make a scheduled payment at the time her probation period was extended, and there is no evidence that a collections investigator ever requested the court to issue a notice to show cause for any alleged failure to make a restitution payment within seven days of the due date. Therefore, CRS § 16-18.5-105(3)(d)(III) is inapplicable, and the trial court erroneously relied on that section to extend Martinez's probation.
Martinez also argued that the trial court erred in extending her probation because good cause for the extension does not exist as required by CRS § 18-1.3-204(4)(a). Section 18-1.3-204(4) (a) allows a court to increase a probation term where, among other things, there is "good cause" to extend the term. Here, it is unrealistic to expect that Martinez would ever be able to pay off her entire restitution obligation under her current circumstances. Further, the statutory scheme allows for continued payments of restitution to victims after a defendant's sentence is complete. Accordingly, Martinez's case circumstances do not provide good cause to extend her probation, and the trial court erred.
The order extending Martinez's probation was reversed and the case was remanded with directions to terminate Martinez's probation.
2022 COA 143. No. 22CA0204. Roane v. Archuleta. Colorado Open Records Act—Public Records Request—Allowance or Denial of Inspection—Disclosure and Discovery.
Roane filed a declaratory judgment action against the Archuleta County Board of County Commissioners (Board) for its alleged violation of Colorado's open meetings statute. The declaratory judgment case was subject to CRCP 16.1, which requires parties to make specified disclosures and allows limited discovery. The parties neither exchanged disclosures nor propounded discovery requests but filed cross-motions for summary judgment. While the motions were pending, Roane submitted a Colorado Open Records Act (CORA) records request to Archuleta in her capacity as the Board's records custodian seeking, as relevant here, a recording of a public Board meeting (the recording). Archuleta denied Roane's request, asserting that the recording was not open to inspection. Roane then filed a separate action against Archuleta under CORA to obtain an order requiring her to make the recording available for his inspection. The court ordered Archuleta to make the recording available to Roane.
On appeal, Archuleta argued that the court's inspection order is contrary to law because an individual litigating against a public entity is barred from using CORA to obtain relevant documents from that entity. However, CORA does not expressly bar individuals from obtaining public records from entities against which they are litigating, and it does not prevent litigants from using CORA to obtain public records for use in a pending suit against the producing entity; rather, CORA only prevents the requesting party from recovering attorney fees and costs if that party could also have obtained the subject documents through discovery. In addition, CORA is consistent with other states' interpretations of their open records laws in cases with facts similar to those presented here. Further, Archuleta's argument is unsupported by (1) relevant Colorado case law; (2) Colo. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 01-1 (July 5, 2001), which supports the determination that CORA generally allows civil litigants to access public records from a public entity that is an adverse party; and (3) US Supreme Court decisions, which do not prohibit using an open records act request to obtain documents from a public entity against which the party is litigating. Further, the inspection order is not inconsistent with public policy and does not violate the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure applicable to document requests. Accordingly, the district court correctly ordered Archuleta to provide the recording to Roane.
The inspection order was affirmed.
December 22, 2022
2022 COA 144. No. 20CA1697. People v. Garcia. Due Process—Right to an Impartial Jury—Voir Dire—Confrontation Clause—Public Policy Considerations—Trial Proceedings—COVID-19— Face Masks.
Garcia was charged with one count of theft from an at-risk person—$500 or more; one count of theft—$20,000-$100,000; and two counts of violating the pawnbroker act. His jury trial was held in July 2020 and was the first in-person trial in Denver after the COVID-19 pandemic began. The trial court consulted with health officials to create a safety plan that required everyone in the courtroom to wear face masks during the trial. The plan followed the governor's statewide mask mandate and was approved by the chief justice. The impaneled jury was seated throughout the courtroom gallery to ensure social distancing, with some jurors sitting in line with or slightly behind Garcia, and the parties were seated at tables perpendicular to the judge on either side of the courtroom. Garcia filed a written objection to holding the jury trial in the early months of the pandemic, raising multiple concerns with the court's COVID-19 safety protocols, and he moved for a mistrial during the hearing on his written objections. The court denied the motion and the objections, but after further consideration, the court permitted trial witnesses to use face shields instead of masks while testifying. Garcia was convicted as charged.
On appeal, Garcia argued the court violated his constitutional rights by (1) requiring prospective jurors to wear face masks during voir dire, which undermined the parties' and the court's ability to observe each juror's demeanor and prevented defense counsel from effectively exercising challenges, and (2) requiring impaneled jurors to wear masks during the rest of the trial, which prevented defense counsel from assessing the jurors' reactions and making effective strategic decisions. Whether requiring or permitting jurors to wear masks during trial violates a defendant's constitutional rights appears to be a matter of first impression in Colorado. Here, the mask requirement reflected the court's careful consideration of governing safety and health measures, and it was a reasonable exercise of the court's discretion to manage voir dire in the face of the pandemic. Further, the relevant case law does not give constitutional significance to the ability to view a potential juror's entire face; counsel and the court can still observe the jurors' body language, tone of voice, eye contact, and other elements of their demeanor. And even if the prospective jurors' masks made assessing their demeanor slightly more difficult, the defense and the prosecution were equally burdened by this challenge. Garcia's claim that requiring the impaneled jury to wear masks violated his constitutional rights fails for similar reasons. Therefore, the court's mask requirements did not violate Garcia's constitutional rights.
Garcia also argued that seating the impaneled jurors in the gallery during trial violated his constitutional rights because some jurors could not see his face during the entire trial and some jurors were seated farther away from the witness stand than in a typical trial, reducing their ability to evaluate the witnesses' demeanor. Assuming without deciding that a defendant's confrontation right includes the right to have the jury observe the defendant's demeanor, such a right is subject to exceptions in certain circumstances. Here, similar to the mask requirement, the court's positioning of the jurors in the gallery furthered the important public policy of ensuring everyone's safety in the courtroom. Further, this social distancing policy did not deprive Garcia of meaningful cross-examination because (1) the witnesses were not masked during their testimony, and Garcia did not allege that they could not hear the witnesses; and (2) the record shows that the trial court repeatedly asked jurors if...
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