Us Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
| Publication year | 2023 |
| Pages | 77 |
Summaries of Selected Opinions
No. 23-9900. United States v. Doe. 1/20/2023. D.Okla. Judge Tymkovich. Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act-First Degree Murder-Transfer to Adult Court-Transfer Factors-Punishment.
Doe initiated the murder of her parents by her boyfriend and another friend when she was 17 years old. She was charged with two counts of murder under § 1111 of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (the Act). The government filed a motion to transfer proceedings from juvenile court to adult court. The magistrate judge considered the motion and recommended that the case be transferred to adult court. The district court judge reviewed the case de novo, adopted the recommendation, and granted the government's motion to transfer Doe's case.
Doe appealed the transfer order. As an initial matter, the Tenth Circuit determined that criminal jurisdiction is appropriate in federal court because Doe is an enrolled member of the Choctaw Nation and the offenses occurred on the Choctaw Nation reservation. On the merits, Doe argued that it is unconstitutional to charge her with first-degree murder as an adult because the punishments for first-degree murder under § 1111 of the Act violate the Eighth Amendment when applied to a juvenile, so no constitutional punishments are available if she is convicted. Under the Act, juveniles may be prosecuted as adults if they are at least 15% years old, they allegedly committed a felony crime of violence, and the court determines adult prosecution would be "in the interest of justice." The penalties for first-degree murder- death or life imprisonment without parole-are unconstitutional when applied to juveniles. However, the constitutionality issue is not ripe because the Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment applies only after there has been a guilt determination or a plea, which has not yet occurred in this case. The need to impose an unconstitutional sentence may not arise if, for example, Doe is acquitted, is convicted of a lesser crime, pleads to a lesser-included offense, or is convicted of first-degree murder but receives a lower sentence. And Doe may effectively raise her argument again later in the proceedings.
Doe also argued that the district court (1) applied the incorrect test for transferring a juvenile to adult court, because it used an inapplicable balancing test when considering transfer and thus reversibly erred; and (2) abused its discretion by finding the transfer factors weighed in favor of prosecuting her as an adult. Juvenile adjudication is presumed appropriate unless the government establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that a transfer to adult status is warranted in the interests of justice. The Act provides six statutory factors for determining whether transfer to adult status is in the interest of justice. A district court balances the factors as it deems appropriate and must consider and make findings with respect to each factor. Here, the district court correctly framed the legal test for transferring a juvenile to adult court. Second, the district court independently addressed each of the six transfer factors and adopted the magistrate judge's extensive findings regarding those factors to ultimately conclude that Doe's risk to society outweighed the potential benefits of a juvenile adjudication. Given that Doe was almost 18 years old at the time of the alleged offense, the heinousness of the crime, the callousness of her participation, and her leadership role, the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the government's motion to transfer.
The order was affirmed.
No. 19-8054. United States v. Kahn. 2/3/2023. D.Wyo. Judge Briscoe. Controlled Substances Act-"Knowingly or Intentionally" Mens Rea Requirement-Burden of Proof-Harmless Error.
Kahn was convicted of violating the Controlled Substances Act, 21 USC § 841(a), for dispensing controlled substances not "as authorized." He appealed to the Tenth Circuit, contending, as relevant here, that the district court's jury instructions improperly advised the jury regarding § 841(a)'s mens rea requirement. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the convictions, relying on prior precedent. Kahn appealed to the US Supreme Court, which held that § 841(a)'s "knowingly or intentionally" mens rea requirement applies to the "except as authorized" clause of the statute. Ruan v. United States, 142 S.Ct. 2370 (2022). The Court vacated the Tenth Circuit's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the Tenth Circuit to address whether the jury instructions complied with Ruan's mens rea standard and whether any instructional error was harmless.
On remand, the Tenth Circuit first determined that Ruan expressly disallows convictions under § 841(a)(1) for behavior that is only objectively unauthorized; the government always has the burden of proving that a defendant "knowingly or intentionally acted in an unauthorized manner." Here, the jury was repeatedly instructed that it could convict Kahn if it concluded that he acted outside the usual course of professional medical practice or without a legitimate medical purpose, so the instructions effectively lowered the government's burden to showing only that Kahn's behavior was objectively unauthorized. Therefore, the jury instructions did not require the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Kahn knowingly or intentionally acted in an unauthorized manner, and they were inconsistent with Ruan's...
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