Summaries of Published Opinions
| Publication year | 2022 |
| Pages | 78 |
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Summaries of Published Opinions
October 6, 2022
2022 COA 115. No. 19CA1007. People v. Dennel Jr. Children's Code—Juvenile Court—Juvenile Transfer Statute—Delinquency—Transfers to Criminal Court.
Dennel was charged in juvenile court with committing a delinquent act that if committed by an adult would constitute second degree murder, a class 2 felony. On the alleged offense date, Dennel was 15 years old and had no prior felony adjudications or convictions. The People moved to transfer Dennel's case to criminal court, and after a contested hearing, the juvenile court waived its jurisdiction and transferred the case to district court for adult criminal proceedings. Dennel then pleaded guilty to manslaughter, a class 4 felony, and was sentenced as an adult.
On appeal, Dennel argued that the juvenile court erred in transferring his case to the district court. Relying on People v. Nelson, 2015 COA 123, he contended that a child his age must have a prior felony adjudication for his case to be eligible for transfer under the juvenile transfer statute of the Children's Code. The Court of Appeals questioned the Nelson division's interpretation of the transfer statute. Turning to the plain meaning of the statute, the Court concluded that transfer eligibility for juveniles aged 14 and older is not conditioned on a previous delinquency adjudication. Transfer eligibility is met if the petition alleges that the juvenile committed a delinquent act that constitutes a felony. Because those conditions were met here, Dennel was eligible for transfer and the juvenile court did not err.
The judgment was affirmed.
2022 COA 116. No. 20CA1144. People v. Snelling. Second Degree Burglary—First Degree Criminal Trespass—Lesser Included Offenses— Supplemental Jury Instructions—Prosecutorial Misconduct—Admissibility of Evidence—Merger.
Snelling and several other individuals were drinking alcohol and/or consuming marijuana at his friend's apartment. Snelling began acting inappropriately toward two girls and was told to leave the apartment. Snelling left but shortly thereafter knocked on the door, saying that he had lost his keys and cell phone. Snelling's friend looked for the phone and keys and told Snelling he could not find them, and he refused to let Snelling into the apartment. Snelling yelled threats and tried to force himself into the apartment, and his friend called the police. While being transported to jail, Snelling spit on a window and on the partition between the officers and himself. The prosecution charged Snelling with second degree burglary and first degree criminal trespass for breaking into the apartment, harassment for striking one of the girls, and second degree criminal tampering for spitting in the patrol car. Snelling was convicted of second degree burglary, first degree criminal trespass, and second degree criminal tampering.
On appeal, Snelling argued that the trial court erred in not providing a supplemental jury instruction on the effects of voluntary intoxication as related to second degree burglary and second degree criminal tampering. The People conceded that the trial court erred but maintained the error was harmless. Here, the jury asked the trial court about the role of voluntary intoxication, demonstrating that the jurors had considered the relevant instruction but did not know if their concern was encompassed in that instruction. The trial court had an obligation to clarify the matter and committed prejudicial error by not answering the jury's question. This error was not harmless because a reasonable probability exists that the error contributed to Snelling's convictions.
Snelling also argued that the trial court erroneously allowed the jury to hear an inadmissible portion of a 911 call, which prejudiced his defense and requires reversal. Snelling asserted that the audio improperly referenced his alleged sexual behavior in violation of the court's earlier order and exploited racist tropes involving predatory sexual behavior between Black men and white women. However, the jury's split verdict indicates that the audio did not substantially influence the verdict or affect the trial's fairness, and Snelling's acquittal on the harassment charge indicates that the jury followed the court's instruction not to allow bias or prejudice to influence its decisions. Further, the record does not reveal the race of the girls, and without that information, Snelling's assertion that the jurors punished him for his sexual behavior toward white women is not supported by the record. Accordingly, there was no error.
Snelling further contended that the court erred by allowing the prosecutor to elicit irrelevant testimony that supported prejudicial racial stereotypes about sexual behavior between Black men and white women, and that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct for the same reasons. However, as stated above, the record does not reveal the race of the girls, so Snelling's assertion that jurors punished him because he was a Black man being sexually aggressive toward white women is unsupported. Further, the prosecution's language was not sexually charged, and none of Snelling's convictions revolved around sexual behavior. In addition, the prosecutor's statement that Snelling made the girls uncomfortable was relevant because it was a predicate to establishing why the burglary occurred and provided context to the jurors. Therefore, there was no evidentiary error.
Snelling also contended, and the People conceded, that his first degree trespassing and second degree burglary convictions should merge. Because first degree criminal trespass is a lesser included offense of second degree burglary, those convictions must merge.
The convictions for second degree burglary and criminal tampering were reversed and the case was remanded for a new trial. The trespassing conviction was affirmed subject to merger if defendant is again tried and convicted of second degree burglary.
2022 COA 117. No. 21CA0552. MLS Properties, Inc. v. Weld County Board of Equalization. Real Property Taxation—Valuation for Assessment—Level of Value—Unusual Conditions.
Plaintiffs are 55 Weld County commercial property owners and taxpayers. They requested revaluation of their 2020 property valuations under the unusual conditions statute based on the COVID-19 pandemic and resulting governmental orders. Plaintiffs exhausted their administrative remedies for protesting the valuations and filed this action in district court. The Weld County Board of Equalization and Weld County assessor (collectively, defendants) moved to dismiss, arguing that plaintiffs' amended complaint lacked specificity and was conclusory and that the claims failed as a matter of law because the pandemic and resulting governmental orders occurred after January 1, 2020 and thus could not be considered for the 2020 tax year, even if they were unusual conditions. The district court granted the motion on grounds that plaintiffs' claims were nonspecific and conclusory, and that, as a matter of law, the pandemic and resulting orders occurred too late to be considered for 2020 property valuations. It did not address whether the pandemic was an unusual condition.
On appeal, plaintiffs contended that the district court erred by ruling that the pandemic and orders occurred too late to be included in property assessments for that tax year. They maintained that the assessor may revalue their properties for the 2020 tax assessment based on unusual conditions that occurred after the conclusion of the base period—June 30, 2018—and at any point during the 2020 calendar year. By statute, real and personal property must be assessed and valued every two years. On January 1 of odd-numbered years, the assessor assigns the level of value for each property, which is the actual value of the property "for the one-and-one-half-year period immediately prior to July 1 immediately preceding the assessment date" CRS § 39-1-104(10.2)(d). Taxpayers pay taxes based on their properties' values at the end of the data-gathering period preceding the odd-numbered year in the reassessment cycle, not on the properties' current actual value. Generally, this level of value is carried over to the even-numbered year, but CRS § 39-1-104(11)(b)(I) makes exceptions for unusual conditions, which allow assessors to consider "in determining actual value for the years which intervene between changes in the level of value, any unusual conditions in or related to any real property which would result in an increase or decrease in actual value." The unusual conditions statute does not impose a cutoff date of January 1 of the even year or otherwise suggest that an "intervening year" does not span the entire calendar year; if an "unusual condition" exists, the assessor is required to revalue the property for the intervening tax year. Here, the phrase "years which intervene between changes in the level of value" means the time period between the dates when a new level of value for the biennial cycle was assessed for the plaintiffs' properties: from January 1, 2019, to January 1, 2021. Because this includes the entire even-numbered calendar year between reassessment cycles, plaintiffs were not precluded by law from invoking the unusual circumstances statute in their valuation protest based on events during spring 2020. Accordingly, the district court erred.
Plaintiffs also contended that the court erred by concluding they did not plead...
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