Colorado Automobile Searches After Arizona v. Gant

Publication year2010
Pages25
39 Colo.Law. 25
Colorado Bar Journal
2010.

2010, January, Pg. 25. Colorado Automobile Searches After Arizona v. Gant

The Colorado Lawyer
January 2010
Vol. 39, No. 1 [Page 25]

Articles Criminal Law

Colorado Automobile Searches After Arizona v. Gant

by Joanne Eldridge

Criminal Law articles are sponsored by the CBA Criminal Law Section and generally are written by prosecutors, defense lawyers, and judges to provide information about case law; legislation; and advocacy affecting the prosecution, defense, and administration of criminal cases in Colorado state and federal courts.

Coordinating Editor

Morris Hoffman, judge for the Second Judicial District Court, Denver

About the Author

Joanne Eldridge serves as Assistant Routt County Attorney in Steamboat Springs. Prior to her current position, she practiced primarily in the area of criminal law-jeldridge@co.routt.co.us.

In April 2009, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed Fourth Amendment vehicle searches incident to arrest in a divided opinion in Arizona v. Gant.This article explores the effects of the new standard on Colorado law.

On April 21, 2009, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Arizona v. Gant,(fn1) a Fourth Amendment automobile search and seizure case. Police arrested Gant for driving with a suspended license and found cocaine when they searched his car incident to the arrest. During the search, Gant was handcuffed and secured in a police vehicle. Gant was convicted of cocaine possession.

The Supreme Court reversed Gant's conviction, overruling the twenty-eight-year-old precedent of Belton v. New York,(fn2) and articulated a new two-part test for vehicle searches. As a result of the Court's ruling, police may now search a vehicle incident to the arrest of a recent occupant only if (1) the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search, or (2) police have reason to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the crime of arrest.(fn3) Since 1981, when Belton was decided, the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement has gradually expanded, and courts have upheld warrantless searches conducted by police even when the arrested suspects were handcuffed and secured in police vehicles.(fn4) The Colorado Supreme Court has followed Belton and other cases that have expanded the exception.(fn5)

This article reviews Gant and the opinions that preceded it, as well as Colorado case law in this area. The article addresses the following:

* how Colorado courts will apply Gant to vehicle searches incident to arrest

* whether the two-part standard articulated by the Supreme Court will be workable for law enforcement officers

* what guidance the Colorado Supreme Court will provide in People v. Pineda.(fn6)

Supreme Court Precedent Used in Gant

Numerous opinions of the Supreme Court address the search incident to arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. Of those, the cases that follow set the stage for the Court's opinion in Gant.

The Preston Decision

In Preston v. United States,(fn7) cited by the Gant majority, the Supreme Court reviewed the warrantless search of a car and analyzed the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement. Police arrested Preston and two other men on vagrancy charges after finding them sitting in a parked car at 3:00 a.m. without adequate explanation. After arrest, the men were searched and their car was towed by the police, who later searched it without a warrant and discovered loaded guns and evidence linking the men to an armed bank robbery. At trial, the men were charged with conspiracy to rob a bank and raised Fourth Amendment objections to the evidence.(fn8) They were found guilty and their convictions were upheld by the Sixth Circuit.

The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reviewed the search incident to arrest exception. Traditionally, on a lawful arrest, police may conduct a contemporaneous warrantless search of the arrestee for weapons or implements of the crime.(fn9) This search may include items under the arrestee's immediate control and, to some degree, the place where the arrest takes place.(fn10) Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Black noted that when a search occurs remote in time or place from an arrest, such justifications are not present.(fn11) Therefore, the search in Preston was not incidental to the arrest, and the warrantless search of the car violated the Fourth Amendment.(fn12)

The Chimel Decision

In Chimel v. California,(fn13) police officers with an arrest warrant for Chimel entered his house with his wife's permission and arrested Chimel when he arrived home. Without a search warrant, and over Chimel's objection, the police searched the house as a search incident to the arrest. Chimel was convicted of burglary based on evidence seized from his home. He challenged the search as unconstitutional. Addressing the permissible scope of a search incident to a lawful arrest, the Court concluded that an arresting officer may search an arrestee's person to seize weapons and prevent destruction of evidence, as well as the area under his immediate control.(fn14)

The Chimel Court cited Preston, stating that the Fourth Amendment requires "adherence to judicial processes,"and reaffirmed the principle that Fourth Amendment considerations remain the focus of the analysis, not whether certain types of police conduct are acceptable.(fn15) The warrantless search of the house was not a valid search incident to arrest because it extended beyond Chimel's person and areas where he might reach for a weapon or evidence.(fn16)

The Belton Decision

At the heart of the debate in Gant was the interpretation of Belton. Justice Stewart, also the author of the Chimel decision, wrote the Belton opinion for a divided Court. The issue was whether, in the case of a vehicle occupant subjected to a lawful custodial arrest, police could conduct a warrantless search of the passenger compartment of the car consistent with the search incident to arrest exception.(fn17)

A state trooper stopped a speeding vehicle in which Belton was a passenger. After smelling burnt marijuana and seeing an envelope labeled with the name of a type of marijuana, the trooper had the driver and the three passengers get out of the car. The trooper separated the passengers and patted them down before searching the envelope marked "Supergold."(fn18) The trooper placed the four men under arrest after finding marijuana in the envelope. Because he was alone, the trooper was unable to handcuff and secure the men prior to conducting a thorough search of the car. Consequently, the four men were standing by the car during the search. The trooper found cocaine in the pocket of Belton's jacket on the car's back seat.(fn19)

The trial court denied Belton's challenge to the seizure of the cocaine, and the decision was upheld by the appellate division of the New York Supreme Court.(fn20) The New York Court of Appeals reversed, reasoning that a search of a zippered pocket of an inaccessible jacket could not be upheld as a valid search incident to arrest.(fn21) The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine the constitutionally permissible scope of the search of a vehicle's interior incident to a lawful arrest of one of its occupants.(fn22)

Reviewing the standard articulated in Chimel twelve years earlier, the Court noted that although the test could be stated simply enough-that is, the permissible scope of a search incident to arrest was the area where an arrestee might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence-courts had difficulty applying the principle to specific cases. The Court believed that a straightforward rule was needed that could guide police officers in the field, to permit them to make constitutionally correct law enforcement decisions. The "area within the immediate control of the arrestee"was not a clear rule. The Court noted its concern regarding the effect of conflicting legal decisions on the issue:

When a person cannot know how a court will apply a settled principle to a recurring factual situation, that person cannot know the scope of his constitutional protection, nor can a policeman know the scope of his authority.(fn23)

The Belton Court concluded that the passenger compartment of an automobile was an area where an arrestee might reach and that it was appropriate to read the test of Chimel to establish a workable rule. The Court held that a police officer who had made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant...

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