Disciplinary Opinion
| Publication year | 2008 |
| Pages | 151 |
| Citation | Vol. 37 No. 11 Pg. 151 |
2008, November, Pg. 151. Disciplinary Opinion
November 2008
Vol. 37, No. 11 [Page 151]
Colorado Disciplinary Cases
The Colorado Supreme Court adopted a series of changes to the attorney regulation system, including the establishment of the Office of the Presiding Disciplinary Judge (PDJ), pursuant to C.R.C.P. 251.16. The Court also made extensive revisions to the rules governing the disciplinary process, repealing C.R.C.P. 241 et seq., and replacing those rules with C.R.C.P. 251 et seq. The PDJ presides over attorney regulation proceedings and, together with a two-member Hearing Board, issues orders at trials and hearings. The Rules of Civil Procedure and the Rules of Evidence apply to all attorney regulation proceedings before the PDJ. See C.R.C.P. 251.18(d). Disciplinary Opinions may be appealed in accordance with C.R.C.P. 251.27.
The Colorado Lawyer publishes the summaries and full-text Opinions of PDJ William R. Lucero and the Hearing Board, whose members are drawn from a pool appointed by the Supreme Court. For space purposes, exhibits, complaints, and amended complaints may not be printed. Disciplinary Opinions are printed as submitted by the Office of the PDJ and are not edited by the staff of The Colorado Lawyer.
Case No. 07PDJ064
Complainant:
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF COLORADO,
Respondent:
RAYMOND ANSON GRAHAM.
July 31, 2008
On April 30, 2008, a Hearing Board composed of William J. Martinez and Andrew A. Saliman, both members of the Bar, and William R. Lucero, the Presiding Disciplinary Judge ("PDJ"), held a Sanctions Hearing pursuant to C.R.C.P. 251.18. April M. Seekamp appeared on behalf of the Office of Attorney Regulation Counsel ("the People") and Michael H. Berger appeared on behalf of Raymond Anson Graham ("Respondent"). The Hearing Board now issues the following Opinion and Order Imposing Sanctions pursuant to C.R.C.P. 251.19.
Suspension is appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in criminal conduct not enumerated in ABA Standard 5.11 that seriously adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law. Public censure is appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in any other conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law. Respondent entered pleas to two misdemeanors and then failed to report either of them to the People. What is the appropriate sanction?
The Hearing Board finds that Respondent's DWAI conviction and subsequent knowing failure to report it to the People adversely reflects upon his fitness to practice law. Likewise, Respondent's failure to register as a sex offender and failure to report that conviction to the People adversely reflects upon his fitness to practice law. An isolated incident might warrant a public censure under ABA Standard 5.13. However, in this case, Respondent was convicted of two separate misdemeanors and knowingly avoided reporting his DWAI conviction to the People when he knew that he had a duty to do so. We find these circumstances warrant more than a public censure, because they show a knowing disregard of his duties as a lawyer to follow disciplinary rules promulgated by the Colorado Supreme Court.
On September 26, 2007, the People filed a complaint that charged Respondent with four separate claims arising from two separate misdemeanor convictions and his failure to report them to the People. Respondent filed his answer on October 24, 2007, and his amended answer on November 19, 2007.
On April 7, 2008, the PDJ granted in part and denied in part a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by the People and also denied Respondent's motion to dismiss claims arising out of his failure to report his DWAI conviction based on the applicable statute of limitations. The PDJ entered judgment as a matter of law as to Claim I (Colo. RPC 8.4(b) and C.R.C.P. 251.5(b)), Claim II (C.R.C.P. 251.20), Claim III (Colo. RPC 8.4(b)), and Claim IV (C.R.C.P. 241.16) and dismissed Claim III (C.R.C.P. 251.5(b)) and Claim IV (C.R.C.P. 251.20(b)). Therefore, the sole issue for the Hearing Board's determination is the appropriate sanction for violation of these rules.
The following facts and rule violations have been established by clear and convincing evidence.(fn1) Respondent took and subscribed the Oath of Admission and gained admission to the Bar on October 30, 1984. He is registered upon the official records, Attorney Registration No. 14106, and is therefore subject to the jurisdiction of the Hearing Board.
In February 1998, Respondent was arrested and charged with driving while ability impaired (DWAI) in Pitkin County. In April 1998, Respondent pled guilty to DWAI, C.R.S. §42-4-1301(1)(b), in People v. Raymond Anson Graham, case no. 98T0112. Respondent failed to report this DWAI conviction to the People as required by C.R.C.P. 241.16(b), the former rule requiring a lawyer to report a conviction of a driving offense involving the use of alcohol.
Respondent engaged in criminal conduct by driving while his ability was impaired. This conduct violated Colo. RPC 8.4(b). Respondent was required to notify the People of the criminal conviction in 98T0112 within ten days of the conviction but failed to do so. By such conduct, Respondent violated C.R.C.P. 241.16(b). This conduct occurred approximately eighteen months after Respondent entered into a conditional admission of misconduct in People v. Graham, 933 P.2d 1321 (Colo. 1997), in which he verified that he was familiar with the rules of the Colorado Supreme Court regarding the procedure for discipline of attorneys.
In 1995, Respondent pled guilty to third degree sexual assault, C.R.S. §18-3-404(1)(2) (a class 1 misdemeanor) in People v. Raymond Anson Graham, 94CR1084 (Jefferson County).(fn2) Respondent was sentenced to a four-year period of probation as a result of his guilty plea. Following this conviction, Respondent registered as a sex offender in Denver County where he resided at the time.(fn3) He then registered in Elbert County after moving there sometime in 1997. Respondent resided in Elbert County with his parents at their ranch in Elizabeth where he maintained an office and practiced law.
In 1998, Respondent purchased a condominium in Aspen (Pitkin County), which he owned until 2006. Respondent renovated the Aspen condominium from 1998 through approximately 2001. Respondent, along with approximately twelve other individuals who owned property in the building, were members of the homeowner's association for the building. During the renovation...
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