The State of the Intertwining Doctrine in Colorado
Publication year | 2007 |
Pages | 15 |
2007, January, Pg. 15. The State of the Intertwining Doctrine in Colorado
The Colorado Lawyer
January 2007
Vol. 36, No. 1 [Page 15]
January 2007
Vol. 36, No. 1 [Page 15]
Articles
Alternative Dispute Resolution
The State of the Intertwining Doctrine in Colorado
by Eric B. Liebman, Burkeley N. Riggs
Alternative Dispute Resolution
The State of the Intertwining Doctrine in Colorado
by Eric B. Liebman, Burkeley N. Riggs
ADR articles are sponsored by the CBA Alternative
Dispute Resolution Committee. The articles printed here
describe recent developments in the evolving field of ADR
with a particular focus on issues affecting Colorado
attorneys and ADR providers.
Article Editors:
Jonathan Boonin of Hutchinson, Black & Cook, LLP
Boulder - (303) 442-6514, boonin@hbcboulder.com; O. Russel
Murray of ADRcom.com, Denver - (303) 893-1667,
orm@adrcom.com
orm@adrcom.com
About the Authors:
Eric B. Liebman is a partner and Burkeley N. Riggs is an
associate at Moye White LLP, Denver - (303) 292-2900
eric.liebman@moyewhite.com and burke.riggs@moyewhite.com. The
authors gratefully acknowledge the valuable research
assistance of James F. Booth, an associate at the firm.
The Intertwining Doctrine states that when arbitrable
issues are factually and legally intertwined with
non-arbitrable claims in litigation, a court will not compel
arbitration of the matter. Although the U.S. Supreme Court
rejected this doctrine in 1985, its applicability in Colorado
appellate courts is uncertain.
Although the law pertaining to the Intertwining Doctrine has
been well-settled in federal jurisprudence for more than two
decades, it remains in a state of flux and uncertainty in
Colorado. It appeared that this uncertainty might be resolved
when the Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari
in the case of Eagle Ridge Condominium Ass'n v.
Metropolitan Builders, Inc. on October 18, 2004.(fn1)
However, on September 30, 2005, the Court dismissed its writ
of certiorari as improvidently granted, without
explanation.(fn2)
This article provides an overview and history of the
Intertwining Doctrine in federal and Colorado state courts.
It also summarizes current Colorado case law to provide
guidance to Colorado practitioners who regularly deal with
potentially arbitrable cases.
Overview and History of the Intertwining
Doctrine
The Intertwining Doctrine refers to the principle that a
court must, in deciding whether to compel arbitration in a
case in which both arbitrable and non-arbitrable claims are
present, determine whether the arbitrable issues are
factually and legally intertwined with non-arbitrable issues.
If they are, the court will not compel the case to
arbitration and all claims will be adjudicated in a court of
competent jurisdiction.(fn3) The Intertwining Doctrine was
applied by many federal and state courts beginning in the
1970s, with a federal circuit split developing in the early
1980s.(fn4)
To resolve this circuit split, the U.S. Supreme Court granted
certiorari in the case of Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc. v. Byrd.(fn5) In that 1985 decision, the Court
expressly considered and rejected the Intertwining Doctrine.
In doing so, the Court construed the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA).(fn6)
Since then, the Colorado appellate courts have continued to
uphold - in some cases - application of the Intertwining
Doctrine under the Colorado Uniform Arbitration Act (CUAA).
However, Colorado courts also have declined to apply the
Intertwining Doctrine in cases where it is determined that
the FAA is applicable.
Although the CUAA and FAA are similar statutes with the same
stated purpose of preferring arbitration over litigation
where the parties have chosen the former in a contract,
Colorado courts have upheld the Intertwining Doctrine under
the CUAA but rejected it under the FAA.(fn7) Also, the
Colorado appellate courts have frequently foregone the
analysis of whether the FAA applies and have directly
proceeded to the application of the Intertwining Doctrine. It
appears, in some cases, that these courts are not declining
to analyze the applicability of the FAA because the issue is
plainly irrelevant, but rather because the issue was not
recognized by the parties or raised sua sponte by
the courts.(fn8)
Wilko - A Seed is Planted
The seeds of the Intertwining Doctrine were planted by the
U.S. Supreme Court's 1989 decision in Wilko v. Swan.(fn9)
There, the Court addressed a perceived conflict between the
FAA and the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act).(fn10)
Specifically, the Court sought to balance the FAA's
policy emphasizing "the desirability of arbitration as
an alternative to the complications of litigation"(fn11)
with the 1933 Act's policy of protecting investors and
forbidding a waiver of those rights.(fn12) The Court resolved
the balance in favor of the 1933 Act, concluding that
"the intention of Congress concerning the sale of
securities is better carried out by holding invalid such an
agreement for arbitration of issues arising under the [1933]
Act."(fn13)
Wilko retained vitality for several decades before
being overruled by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1989.(fn14)
During this period, the Intertwining Doctrine emerged as a
reaction to the Wilko Doctrine. This is exemplified
by the numerous federal decisions interpreting Wilko
since 1953. For example, in Sibley v. Tandy
Corporation,(fn15) the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit was confronted with a plaintiff who brought a
federal securities claim, along with common law breach of
contract claims. The lower court had acknowledged that, under
the Wilko Doctrine, the federal securities claim was
not arbitrable but the common law contract claims were. The
defendants then requested that the court sever the claims,
submit the contract claims to arbitration, and stay the
federal securities claim pending the result of that
arbitration.
The Fifth Circuit first acknowledged the issue created by
Wilko, stating: "The present case squarely
raises the problem of what a court should do where arbitrable
claims are joined with claims that are not subject to
arbitration."(fn16) The court recognized the
applicability of the Intertwining Doctrine, holding:
However, the court went on to hold the Intertwining Doctrine inapplicable, due to a lack of the requisite intertwining of facts and law between the claims.We agree with the district judge that when it is impractical if not impossible to separate out non-arbitrable federal securities law claims from arbitrable contract claims, a court should deny arbitration in order to preserve its exclusive jurisdiction over the federal securities act claims.(fn17)
The Development of a Split Among
Circuits
Thereafter, the Intertwining Doctrine was applied frequently
but inconsistently by federal courts throughout the country.
This eventually developed into a circuit split, with courts
in the Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits approving the
Intertwining Doctrine (in decisions rendered in 1981, 1982,
and 1982, respectively),(fn18) and the Sixth, Seventh, and
Eighth Circuits rejecting the doctrine (in decisions rendered
in 1983, 1981, and 1984, respectively).(fn19)
The courts that approved the Intertwining Doctrine
acknowledged the strong federal policy in favor of enforcing
arbitration agreements, but offered two reasons district
courts should decline to compel arbitration in an
intertwining situation. First, such a result was necessary to
preserve what they considered the court's exclusive
jurisdiction over the federal securities claim; otherwise,
arbitration of an "intertwined" state claim might
precede the federal proceeding and the fact-finding done by
the arbitrator thereby might bind the federal court through
collateral estoppel. The second reason was efficiency. By
declining to compel arbitration, the court would avoid
bifurcated proceedings and efforts to litigate the same
factual questions twice.(fn20)
In contrast, the courts that rejected the Intertwining
Doctrine held that the FAA divested the district courts of
any discretion regarding arbitration in cases containing both
arbitrable and non-arbitrable claims and, instead, required
that the courts compel arbitration of arbitrable claims when
asked to do so.(fn21) These courts concluded that the...
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