Public Employee Expression Law Under the Colorado and Federal Constitutions
Publication year | 2005 |
Pages | 77 |
2005, April, Pg. 77. Public Employee Expression Law Under the Colorado and Federal Constitutions
Vol. 34, No. 4, Pg. 77
The Colorado Lawyer
April 2005
Vol. 34, No. 4 [Page 77]
April 2005
Vol. 34, No. 4 [Page 77]
Specialty Law Columns
Labor and Employment Review
Public Employee Expression Law Under the Colorado and Federal Constitutions
by J. Michael McGuinness
Labor and Employment Review
Public Employee Expression Law Under the Colorado and Federal Constitutions
by J. Michael McGuinness
This column is sponsored by the CBA Labor Law Forum Committee
to present current issues and topics of interest to
attorneys, judges, and legal and judicial administrators on
all aspects of labor and employment law in Colorado
Column Editor
John M. Husband of Holland & Hart LLP in Denver - (303)
295-8228,
jhusband@hollandhart.com
jhusband@hollandhart.com
About The Author
This month's article was written by J. Michael
McGuinness, an attorney licensed in North Carolina,
Massachusetts, and the District of Columbia. McGuinness
practices and teaches constitutional, civil rights, and
employment law. He maintains a satellite office in Denver for
consulting purposes - (303) 296-3292,
jmichael@mcguinnesslaw.com,
http://www.mcguinnesslaw.com.
http://www.mcguinnesslaw.com.
Public sector workplaces in Colorado and throughout the
United States employ public servants who frequently engage in
expression both on and off duty, which may stir management to
respond with discipline. Employee expression can present a
variety of perplexing public employment liability issues
under the First Amendment and under Article II, § 10 of the
Colorado Constitution. One such issue involves determining
when employee expression is protected and when it may
constitute grounds for discipline. Public employment
litigation involving First Amendment retaliation claims are
among the most frequently litigated civil rights cases.1
The constitutional rights of public employees and the
obligations of public employers in Colorado are ill-defined
in the area of employee expression because of the
case-by-case application of several methodological tests. The
public concern, interest balancing, and causation tests
determine whether speaking public employees are protected or
subject to discipline. Recent cases demonstrate uncertainty
over the extent that public employees are able to criticize
their employers and speak out on a range of issues. However,
several leading authorities, including Colorado appellate
courts and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit,
frame the parameters of permissible public employee
expression.
Currently, the First Amendment rights of public employees are
being widely debated in Colorado and throughout the United
States in a dispute involving University of Colorado
("CU") Professor Ward Churchill.2 In an essay
regarding the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, Churchill
made denigrating statements regarding the victims.3
Churchill's remarks set off a national firestorm.4 The
Colorado General Assembly passed a resolution denouncing
him.5 Governor Bill Owens weighed in and called for
Churchill's termination of employment.6 CU's Interim
Chancellor ordered a review of Churchill's writings and
speeches. These governmental actions raise serious
implications about Churchill's constitutional rights to
off-duty expression.
This article explores issues that are at the heart of the
Churchill debate. It discusses the basic principles of
constitutional employee expression cases and reviews
important cases in the area. Such cases have been decided by
the U.S. Supreme Court, Colorado appellate courts, and Tenth
Circuit.
Public Employee
Rights of Expression
Rights of Expression
In general, a public employee may not be adversely treated
because of his or her expression on any matter of public
concern, unless the public employer's interest in the
efficient fulfillment of its responsibilities outweighs the
employee's interest in free expression.7 Colorado and the
Tenth Circuit generally are in accord with traditional public
expression principles.8
A public employee may be able to recover for retaliation
following his or her exercise of the right to expression. In
such instances, the employee must establish that: (1) the
expression qualified as protected speech or activity; and (2)
such protected speech or activity was a substantial or
motivating cause of the adverse action or had a chilling
effect on employee expression.
In Fikes v. City of Daphne,9 the Eleventh Circuit recognized
a free speech claim whereby the employee reported misconduct
to law enforcement authorities. The four-part test announced
in Fikes has been used in Colorado as well.10 (See
accompanying box, "Four-Part Fikes Test.")
Four-Part Fikes Test
In Fikes v. City of Daphne, 79 F.3d 1079 (11th Cir. 1996),
the Eleventh Circuit enumerated a four-part test to evaluate
a public employee's free speech claim.
1. Matter of Public Concern: Was the expression a matter of
public concern?
2. Constitutional Interest Balancing Test: If the speech was not a matter of public concern, do the governmental employer's interests outweigh the employee's interests? In this test, the employee and employer interests are analyzed and balanced by the court as a matter of law. The court will consider: (a) whether the expression impeded the employer's ability to perform its duties; (b) the time, place, and manner of the speech; and (c) the context of the speech.
3. Causation: Was the speech a "substantial or motivating factor" in the adverse action or did it have a chilling affect against the employee?
4. "Anyway" Defense: Would the governmental employer have reached the same decision in the absence of the employee's speech or protected conduct?
2. Constitutional Interest Balancing Test: If the speech was not a matter of public concern, do the governmental employer's interests outweigh the employee's interests? In this test, the employee and employer interests are analyzed and balanced by the court as a matter of law. The court will consider: (a) whether the expression impeded the employer's ability to perform its duties; (b) the time, place, and manner of the speech; and (c) the context of the speech.
3. Causation: Was the speech a "substantial or motivating factor" in the adverse action or did it have a chilling affect against the employee?
4. "Anyway" Defense: Would the governmental employer have reached the same decision in the absence of the employee's speech or protected conduct?
Speech as Substantial or
Motivating Factor
Motivating Factor
After an employee's speech (or activity) is deemed
protected, he or she also must establish that the protected
speech (or activity) was a substantial or motivating factor
in the adverse employment action.11 Unlike the public concern
question, the substantial or motivating factor issue is a
question of causation to be decided by the jury.12
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to establish proof of
motivation and causation.13
Proof that "exercise of protected expression was a
substantial and motivating factor can be shown by close
proximity in time between the exercised First Amendment
rights and retaliatory action."14 This general rule is
supported by scores of cases.15
In Ware v. Unified School District,16 the Tenth Circuit
reversed the district court's decision, setting aside an
employee's verdict after being discharged for speaking
out on a school bond issue. The court rejected the district
court's conclusion that the employee's evidence was
insufficient as a matter of law because it was subjective.17
Circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences necessarily
involve subjective elements. (See "Circumstantial
Evidence Showing Proof of Motivation and Causation" in
the accompanying box.) Only rarely can direct evidence of
improper motive be captured. Most civil rights claims are
ultimately premised on indirect or circumstantial evidence.18
Invidious discriminatory or improper intent "may often
be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts."19
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff need not
submit "direct evidence of discriminatory
intent."20
Moreover, it is not necessary to prove that the challenged
decision rested solely on an improper or discriminatory
purpose.21 It must be established that an improper or
discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor involved,
although it need not be the dominant or primary purpose.22
The doctrine of inferred intent is the primary means by which
employees typically survive summary judgment.23 A 1995 Fifth
Circuit case demonstrates the essence of the causation
principle:
[D]irect evidence in proving illegitimate intent is not
required to avoid summary judgment in unconstitutional
retaliation claims; circumstantial evidence will suffice
. We recognize that direct...
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