Family Limited Partnerships: Taxes, Courts, and an Uncertain Future-part Ii
Publication year | 2004 |
Pages | 91 |
Citation | Vol. 33 No. 9 Pg. 91 |
2004, September, Pg. 91. Family Limited Partnerships: Taxes, Courts, and an Uncertain Future-Part II
Vol. 33, No. 9, Pg. 91
The Colorado Lawyer
September 2004
Vol. 33, No. 9 [Page 91]
September 2004
Vol. 33, No. 9 [Page 91]
Specialty Law Columns
Estate and Trust Forum
Family Limited Partnerships: Taxes, Courts, and an Uncertain Future - Part II
by Carol Warnick
C 2004 Carol Warnick
Estate and Trust Forum
Family Limited Partnerships: Taxes, Courts, and an Uncertain Future - Part II
by Carol Warnick
C 2004 Carol Warnick
This column is sponsored by the CBA Trust and Estate Section
The column focuses on trusts and estate law topics, including
estate and trust planning and administration, elder law
probate litigation, guardianships and conservatorships, and
tax planning
Column Editor:
David W. Kirch, of David W. Kirch, P.C., Aurora - (303)
671-7726, dkirch@qwest.net
Carol Warnick
About The Author:
This month's article was written by Carol Warnick,
Denver,
Of Counsel with Holland & Hart LLP - (303) 295-8359,
cwarnick@hollandhart.com.
This two-part article discusses the Internal Revenue
Service's recent attacks on family limited partnerships
using the IRC § 2036 or "retained interest"
argument. Part I of the article reviewed case law and
analyzed the Service's position. Part II addresses the
Fifth Circuit Court's Kimbell decision and suggests how
to protect family limited partnerships during this period of
uncertainty.
This is the second of a two-part article that addresses the
use of family limited partnerships ("FLPs") in
estate planning. Part I, which was published in this column
in March 2004, discussed cases leading to the momentous Tax
Court decision in 2003 in Strangi II.1 As addressed in Part
I, Kimbell v. U.S.2 was one in a line of cases leading to the
Strangi II decision.3 The Fifth Circuit Court handed down the
second Kimbell decision on May 20, 2004. That decision proved
to be a tremendous victory for the taxpayer, with hints of a
bright future for FLPs in general.4
Part II of this article discusses the Kimbell case and
reviews the Fifth Circuit Court's analysis. The Kimbell
case is of particular interest because it provides guidance
for Colorado practitioners who are establishing FLPs or
family LLCs.
Discussion of Kimbell Case
The Kimbell decision was the first of the pre-Strangi cases
to focus its analysis on Internal Revenue Code
("Code") § 2036(a)(2).5 As discussed in detail in
Part I,6 the so-called "§ 2036 argument" concerns
transfers by a taxpayer that normally would place transferred
assets out of the taxpayer's estate.
This case involved a limited liability company
("LLC") formed by Ruth Kimbell, her son, and
daughter-in-law. Kimbell owned a 50 percent interest in the
LLC, and her son (who was the manager of the LLC) and
daughter-in-law each owned 25 percent interests.7 Kimbell and
the new LLC formed an FLP. The LLC contributed one percent of
the capital in the FLP and took back a one percent general
partnership interest; Kimbell contributed 99 percent of the
capital and took back a 99 percent limited partnership
interest.8 Two months after forming the FLP, Kimbell died at
the age of 96.
The estate valued Kimbell's limited partnership interest
at a discounted value of $1.257 million, but the Internal
Revenue Service ("Service") valued the same
interest at $2.463 million.9 The issue came before the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Texas on a motion
for summary judgment filed by the Service.10 The Service
argued that the property transferred by Kimbell should be
included in her estate under § 2036(a).11 The district court
agreed,12 holding that none of the exceptions to § 2036(a)
applied to keep the property from coming back into
Kimbell's estate.
The facts in Kimbell were not favorable to the taxpayer,
which makes the Fifth Circuit Court's decision even more
momentous. The appellate court analyzed the case in a very
different fashion from the district court. Thus, certain
specific facts that were instrumental to the district
court's decision were considered to be unimportant to the
Fifth Circuit Court.
The Fifth Circuit Court presented its holdings in the first
paragraph of the opinion in rather strong language.13 It
concluded that the lower court erred in finding as a matter
of law that: (1) family members cannot enter into a bona fide
transaction; and (2) a transfer of assets given in return for
a pro rata partnership interest does not constitute a
transfer for full and adequate consideration.14
The opinion also stated that the lower court erred by failing
to consider what the Fifth Circuit Court called
"uncontroverted record evidence" supporting the
taxpayer's position that the transfer to the partnership
constituted a bona fide sale.15 As noted, Kimbell was decided
originally on a motion for summary judgment. The Fifth
Circuit Court pointed out that factual evidence, submitted by
the taxpayer in the form of affidavits signed by the
decedent's son and business advisor, was uncontested and,
therefore, could not be ignored.16
The Fifth Circuit Court did not address the application of
the bona fide sale for full and adequate consideration to
transfers to the LLC that served as the general partner of
the FLP. Surprisingly, however, the court went out of its way
to note that even if the bona fide sale exception did not
apply to those transfers, Kimbell did not retain sufficient
control for her transfer to fall under the § 2036(a)
umbrella.17 She held only a 50 percent interest in the LLC,
and her son was designated manager of the LLC.18
The Fifth Circuit Court's reasoning provided a
significant contrast to the district court's analysis.
The partnership agreement provided that 70 percent of the
limited partners could remove the general partner, and
Kimbell retained a 99 percent limited partnership interest.
Thus, because Kimbell could remove and replace the general
partner, the district court had assumed that Kimbell retained
control sufficient to invoke § 2036(a).19
The Fifth Circuit Court's Kimbell opinion provides a
detailed explanation of § 2036(a). The court states that §
2036(a) prevents circumvention of the federal estate tax by
making lifetime transfers that do not really remove from the
transferor his or her lifetime enjoyment of the transferred
property.20
The court cites two exceptions that would allow a transfer to
escape the reach of § 2036(a). The first exception is a
transfer that is a bona fide sale for full and adequate
consideration.21 The second exception is where the transferor
does not retain: (1) the possession or enjoyment of the
transferred property; or (2) the right to designate who would
possess or enjoy the property.22 These exceptions are
addressed below as part of a detailed analysis of the Kimbell
case.
Exception: Bona Fide Sale for Full and Adequate
Consideration
Consideration
The first stated exception to § 2036(a) discusses the bona
fide sale for adequate and full consideration in money or
money's worth. The district court had determined that
Kimbell's transfer of assets for § 2036 purposes failed
for two reasons. First, in the district court's opinion,
it was a transfer among family members and, thus, could not
be arms-length and a bona fide sale. Second, the pro rata
interest Kimbell received in exchange for her contribution
did not reflect adequate consideration.23
The district court tried to distinguish a previous Fifth
Circuit Court case, Wheeler v. United States,24 and instead
relied on the Tax Court's opinion in Estate of Harper v.
Commissioner.25 However, the Fifth Circuit Court relied
heavily on Wheeler, which it analyzed in such a way as to
refute the district court's reasoning.
Full and Adequate
Consideration Analysis
Consideration Analysis
The Wheeler case involved an individual who sold a remainder
interest in a ranch to his sons for a price based on the
ranch's actuarial value obtained from tables created by
the Service. The Service tried to bring the value of the
ranch back into the decedent's estate, arguing that the
transfer was merely part of a...
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