Admissibility of Fruits of a Miranda Violation in a Criminal Case

• Publication year: 2004
• Pages: 81
• Citation: Vol. 33 No. 9 Pg. 81

33 Colo.Law. 81 Colorado Lawyer 2004.

2004, September, Pg. 81. Admissibility of Fruits of a Miranda Violation in a Criminal Case

Vol. 33, No. 9, Pg. 81

The Colorado Lawyer
September 2004
Vol. 33, No. 9 [Page 81]

Specialty Law Columns
Evidence
Admissibility of "Fruits" of a Miranda Violation in a Criminal Case
by Elizabeth Harris

This month's article was written by Elizabeth Harris Denver, an attorney with Jacobs Chase Frick Kleinkopf &amp Kelley, LLC - (303) 685-4800, eharris@jcfkk.com

Those interested in submitting an article for publication in the Evidence column should contact the editor, Lawrence M. Zavadil, at (303) 389-4644 or lzavadil@jcfkk.com.

Q: May the "fruits" of a Miranda violation be admitted in a criminal case?

A: Yes, but a Miranda violation may render a subsequent confession inadmissible under the voluntariness test.

Assumed Facts

A Denver bank's surveillance tapes revealed that it had been robbed by convicted felon "Lightning" Steele. A police officer went to Steele's house. When Steele answered the door, the officer declared, "I'm here to arrest you. You're on camera holding up the bank. Want to explain that?"

Steele admitted he had robbed the bank and revealed the location of the money. The officer told Steele he wanted to take a more detailed statement. The officer then advised Steele for the first time of his Miranda rights.1 Steele signed a waiver form and reiterated his inculpatory statements.

At trial, the government conceded that Steele's pre-Mirandized statements were inadmissible, but contended that his subsequent confession, as well as the money, could be introduced. Steele urged the court to exclude his second confession and the money as fruits of the Miranda violation. Is the contested evidence admissible?

Discussion

Since 1914, direct evidence obtained by police in violation of a defendant's constitutional rights has been inadmissible at trial.2 The U.S. Supreme Court strengthened the rule in 1968, in Wong Sun v. U.S.,3 declaring that indirect and intangible evidence also is inadmissible as "fruit of the poisonous tree."4 Although developed in the context of the Fourth Amendment, this exclusionary rule also applies to violations of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.5

Less clear is whether the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine extends to Miranda violations. For some time, the answer appeared to be no. After issuing its watershed Miranda decision, the Supreme Court began to draw a distinction between statements that were made: (1) involuntarily, through coercion; and (2) voluntarily, but without benefit of Miranda warnings.

In Michigan v. Tucker,6 the Court concluded...