Disciplinary Opinions
Publication year | 2004 |
Pages | 117 |
2004, March, Pg. 117. Disciplinary Opinions
Vol. 33, No. 3, Pg. 117
The Colorado Lawyer
March 2004
Vol. 33, No. 3 [Page 117]
March 2004
Vol. 33, No. 3 [Page 117]
From the Courts
Colorado Disciplinary Cases
Disciplinary Opinions
Colorado Disciplinary Cases
Disciplinary Opinions
The Colorado Supreme Court has adopted a series of changes to
the attorney regulation system, including the establishment
of the Office of the Presiding Disciplinary Judge, pursuant
to C.R.C.P. 251.16. The Court also made extensive revisions
to the rules governing the disciplinary process, repealing
C.R.C.P. 241 et seq., and replacing those rules with C.R.C.P
251 et seq. The Presiding Disciplinary Judge presides over
attorney regulation proceedings and issues orders together
with a two-member hearing board at trials and hearings. The
Rules of Civil Procedure and the Rules of Evidence apply to
all attorney regulation proceedings before the Presiding
Disciplinary Judge. See C.R.C.P. 251.18(d).
The Colorado Lawyer publishes the summaries and full-text Opinions of the Presiding Disciplinary Judge, Roger L Keithley, and a two-member hearing board, whose members are drawn from a pool appointed by the Supreme Court. For space purposes, accompanying Exhibits may not be printed.
These Opinions may be appealed in accordance with C.R.C.P 251.27.
The full-text Opinions, along with their summaries, are available on the CBA home page at http://www.cobar.org/tcl/index.htm. See page 140 for details.Opinions, including Exhibits, and summaries are also available on LexisNexisTM at http://www.lexis.com/research by clicking on States LegalU.S./Colorado/Cases and Court Rules/By Court/Colorado Supreme Court Disciplinary Opinions.
The Colorado Lawyer publishes the summaries and full-text Opinions of the Presiding Disciplinary Judge, Roger L Keithley, and a two-member hearing board, whose members are drawn from a pool appointed by the Supreme Court. For space purposes, accompanying Exhibits may not be printed.
These Opinions may be appealed in accordance with C.R.C.P 251.27.
The full-text Opinions, along with their summaries, are available on the CBA home page at http://www.cobar.org/tcl/index.htm. See page 140 for details.Opinions, including Exhibits, and summaries are also available on LexisNexisTM at http://www.lexis.com/research by clicking on States LegalU.S./Colorado/Cases and Court Rules/By Court/Colorado Supreme Court Disciplinary Opinions.
Case Number: 02PDJ039
Complainant:
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF COLORADO
Respondent:
CHARLES C. CORBIN
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN DISCIPLINE
BEFORE THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDING
DISCIPLINARY JUDGE
November 20, 2003
REPORT, DECISION AND IMPOSITION OF SANCTION
Opinion by Presiding Disciplinary Judge Roger L. Keithley and
Hearing Board Members Helen R. Stone and Paul Willumstad,
both members of the bar.
SANCTION IMPOSED: ATTORNEY DISBARRED
I. BACKGROUND
The People filed a Complaint in this matter on May 17, 2002.
The Citation and Complaint were sent via regular and
certified mail to the respondent on the same date. The People
filed a Proof of Service of Citation and Complaint on June 6,
2002. The Proof of Service showed that the Office of Attorney
Regulation Counsel sent Respondent Charles C. Corbin
("Corbin") a certified mailing of the Citation and
the Complaint at his registered address in Denver, Colorado.
Respondent failed to file an Answer or otherwise respond to
the Complaint.
On July 10, 2002, upon the People's motion, the PDJ
entered default as to the facts set forth in the Complaint,
which were deemed admitted, and as to the claims set forth in
the Complaint, which were deemed established. On October 22,
2002, the PDJ vacated the entry of default and the hearing,
based on a question of law which remained unresolved by the
Complaint: whether an attorney could continue to practice
before the United States Patent and Trademark Office although
suspended from the practice of law in Colorado.
The People filed an Amended Complaint on January 13, 2003.
The Amended Complaint was sent via regular mail to Corbin on
the same date. Corbin failed to file an Answer or otherwise
respond to the Amended Complaint. On March 5, 2003, upon the
People's Motion, the PDJ entered default as to the facts
set forth in the Complaint, which were deemed admitted, and
as to three claims set forth in the Amended Complaint - Colo.
RPC 5.5(a) in Claim I; Colo. RPC 8.4(c) in Claim II; Colo.
RPC 3.4(c) in Claim III, which were deemed established.
Corbin had adequate notice of the hearing and did not appear
in person or through counsel.
A Sanctions Hearing pursuant to C.R.C.P. 251.15(b) was held
on October 22, 2002, before the Hearing Board consisting of
the Presiding Disciplinary Judge ("PDJ") and two
Hearing Board Members, Helen R. Stone and Paul Willumstad,
both members of the bar. A continued hearing was held on June
16, 2003. Debora D. Jones, Assistant Regulation Counsel,
represented the People of the State of Colorado at both
hearings. Corbin did not appear either in person or by
counsel at the hearing. At the Sanctions Hearing on October
22, 2002, the People's exhibits 1 through 9 were admitted
into evidence. Subsequently, on June 16, 2003, the
People's exhibits 10 and 12 were admitted into evidence.
The Hearing Board considered the People's argument, the
facts established by the entry of default, and the exhibits,
and made the following findings of fact, which were
established by clear and convincing evidence.
II. FINDINGS OF FACT
Corbin has taken and subscribed the oath of admission, was
admitted to the bar of the Colorado Supreme Court on January
14, 1987, and is registered upon the official records of the
Colorado Supreme Court, registration number 16382. Corbin is
subject to the jurisdiction of this Court pursuant to
C.R.C.P. 251.1(b).
All factual allegations set forth in the Amended Complaint
were deemed admitted by the entry of default, and are
therefore established by clear and convincing evidence. See
the Amended Complaint attached hereto as exhibit 1. The entry
of default as to violations of Colo. RPC 5.5(a), 3.4(c) and
8.4(c) determined that the alleged violations of the Rules of
Professional Conduct set forth in the order were established.
III. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Corbin was immediately suspended from the practice of law in
Colorado on September 18, 1997, and has not applied for
reinstatement. Corbin's practice included appearances in
twelve trademark matters before the United States Patent and
Trademark Office ("Office") despite his suspension
in Colorado. Under the relevant federal regulations, and the
case law interpreting them, such practice was in violation of
the rules governing the practice of law. The relevant federal
regulations provide that a trademark owner1 may only be
represented by an attorney or other individual authorized to
practice in trademark cases; the provision does not include
agents (non-lawyers).
37 C.F.R. § 2.11 (2003). Definitions pertaining to practice
before the Office specify what is meant by the term
"attorney" or "lawyer":
Attorney or lawyer means an individual who is a member in
good standing of the bar of any United States court or the
highest court of any State. A "non-lawyer" is a
person who is not an attorney or lawyer.
37 C.F.R. § 10.1(c). There is no category of non-lawyer
agents in trademark matters.
Practitioners before the Office include (1) an attorney or
agent in patent cases or (2) an individual authorized under 5
U.S.C. § 500(b)2 or otherwise3 to practice before the Office
in trademark or other non-patent cases. 37 C.F.R. §
10.1(r).(emphasis supplied). Thus, attorneys in good standing
in a state or other court may represent others before the
Office in trademark cases, while non-lawyers (with an
exception inapplicable here) may not.4 Id. § 10.14(b).
The framework for practice before the Office in patent cases
is differentiated from that in trademark cases. Non-lawyers
are specifically permitted to practice in patent cases, but
are not permitted to practice in trademark cases. Failure to
specifically include non-attorneys in trademark matters while
including them in the patent area supports the conclusion
that the omission was intentional. Beeghly v. Mack, 220 P.3d
610, 613 (Colo. 2001) (under rule of interpretation expressio
unius exclusio alterius, the inclusion of certain items
implies the exclusion of others).
According to these regulatory provisions, the respondent
could only practice before the Office in trademark cases if
he was in good standing of the bar of any United States court
or the highest court of any state. Evidence was presented
that showed the respondent was not in good standing in any
court at the time of the incidents in question.5 Having been
suspended by the Colorado Supreme Court, the respondent's
continued practice in trademark cases constituted the
unauthorized practice of law.
In Marinangeli v. Lehman, 32 F. Supp.2d 1 (D.D.C. 1998), the
subject attorney had been suspended in New York and New
Jersey for disciplinary reasons related to felony theft. When
an investigator for the Office received this information, the
investigator informed Marinangeli that he could no longer
practice before the Office in trademark cases because of his
suspension in New York and New Jersey. Marinangeli was,
however, able to continue practicing before the Office as a
patent agent, because he did not need bar membership to do
so. The Office filed a disciplinary complaint against
Marinangeli in 1995 in relation to the felony theft
conviction. Thereafter, Marinangeli was suspended for two
years for practicing before the Office in patent and
trademark cases, even though he had been reinstated from his
suspensions in New York and New Jersey. The District Court
determined that the subsequent suspension was appropriate.
The court noted that it was undisputed that Marinangeli
continued to practice trademark law despite being suspended
from the New York and New Jersey bars. The court pointed out
that attorneys are expected to know and abide by the
disciplinary rules, which Marinangeli had not done.
The respondent initiated at least 12 separate applications
for trademarks on behalf of others after February 10, 1998
the date of his suspension in Ohio. Each of the 12 trademark
applications lists Charles C. Corbin as the attorney of
record and lists the respondent's address as 1306 South
Parker Road, #375,...
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