Statutes of Limitations and Repose in Construction Defect Cases-part Ii
Publication year | 2004 |
Pages | 67 |
Citation | Vol. 33 No. 6 Pg. 67 |
2004, June, Pg. 67. Statutes of Limitations and Repose in Construction Defect Cases-Part II
Vol. 33, No. 6, Pg. 67
The Colorado Lawyer
June 2004
Vol. 33, No. 6 [Page 67]
June 2004
Vol. 33, No. 6 [Page 67]
Specialty Law Columns
Construction Law Forum
Statutes of Limitations and Repose in Construction Defect Cases - Part II
by Ronald M. Sandgrund, Scott F. Sullan
Construction Law Forum
Statutes of Limitations and Repose in Construction Defect Cases - Part II
by Ronald M. Sandgrund, Scott F. Sullan
This column is sponsored by the CBA Construction Law Forum
Committee. The column addresses various construction-related
issues in both public and private areas. The column editor
and Committee encourage the submission of substantive law
articles addressing issues of interest to practitioners in
the field of construction law
Ronald M. Sangrund Scott F. Sullan
Column Editor
James W. Bain of Benjamin, Bain & Howard, L.L.C
Greenwood Village - (303) 290-6600,
jamesbain@bbhlegal.com
jamesbain@bbhlegal.com
About The Authors:
This month's article was written by Ronald M. Sandgrund
and Scott F. Sullan, Greenwood Village, principals with
Vanatta, Sullan, Sandgrund & Sullan, P.C. - (303)
779-0077. The firm often represents property owners in
construction, development, and building materials defect
litigation. The authors thank attorney Joseph F. Smith and
legal assistant Dinae Hoem for their help on this article,
and column editor Jim Bain for his expert editing.
This two-part article discusses Colorado's statutes of
limitations and repose in connection with construction and
materials defect litigation.
Part I of this article introduced CRS § 13-80-104,
Colorado's statutes of limitations and repose relating to
claims arising from the construction and sale of improvements
to real property.1 It also discussed the Construction Defect
Action Reform Acts of 2001 and 2003 ("CDARA I" and
"CDARA II," respectively). This second part of the
article discusses various circumstances that may serve to
"toll" (extend) the running of a particular statute
of limitations or repose. For example, such tolling may occur
if a construction professional promises to make repairs or
represents that repairs will be made.2
This Part II discusses the "repair doctrine" and
principles of waiver and equitable and promissory estoppel,
as well as potential constitutional challenges to certain
statutes of limitations and repose. Finally, this article
offers suggestions on how to craft jury instructions that
successfully integrate the affirmative defense of the statute
of limitations and various doctrines that may serve to toll
or estop a defendant from defeating a claim based on the
running of the limitations period before suit is filed.
Examples of such jury instructions appear in the Appendix.
Effect of Repairs on Statutes of Limitations And Repose
Damages arising from the negligent repair of a structure lead
to difficult questions about the application of statutes of
limitations and repose. In a 1999 case, Highline Village
Associates v. Hersh Cos., Inc. ("Highline Village
Assocs."),3 the Colorado Court of Appeals suggested that
negligent repairs might fall within the real property
improvement statute of limitations (CRS § 13-80-104).4
In Hersh Cos., Inc. v. Highline Village Associates
("Hersh Cos., Inc."),5 the Colorado Supreme Court
affirmed Highline Village Assocs. in part on other grounds,
and reversed in part, holding that a breach of warranty to
repair is subject to the limitations period provided by CRS §
13-80-101(1)(a), not by CRS § 13-80-104. To date, the
Colorado Supreme Court has not squarely determined whether
claims arising from negligent repair of a real property
improvement are subject to the: (1) real property improvement
statute of limitations (CRS § 13-80-104), which does not
mention "repair"; or (2) general negligence statute
of limitations (CRS § 13-80-102(1)(a)).6
In Highline Village Assocs., the Court of Appeals
acknowledged that it was not reaching the question whether
"routine repairs to real property, although resulting in
some physical alteration to that property, would . . .
constitute an improvement to that property within the meaning
of the contractors' statute."7 Nonetheless, the
court held that
the activity engaged in by defendant here consisted of more
than routine repair [because the] defendant was required to
prepare the surface to receive the new paint by removing the
old paint and by sanding and caulking that surface; it then
repainted the entire exterior of two large apartment
complexes. . . . If, then, we are to focus upon
defendant's activities, we must conclude that the nature
of its activities here did not differ substantially from the
services it would have performed had the two complexes been
newly constructed.8
On appeal, in explaining why claims for breach of a warranty
of repair did not fall within the real property improvement
statute of limitations, the Supreme Court stated:
While the breach of contract claims allege a deficiency in
the original workmanship, the warranty claims seek relief for
the defendant's failure to provide its
"repair-or-replace" remedy for defects appearing
during the term of the guarantee. Because the latter claims
seek recovery for the breach of a subsequent contractual duty
to repair or replace rather than recovery for a deficiency in
the original work, they do not fall within the class of
actions governed by section 13-80-104.9 (Emphasis added.)
Thus, property owner counsel may reasonably argue that some
claims arising from negligent repair similarly "seek
recovery for the breach of a subsequent [tort] duty to repair
or replace rather than recovery for a deficiency in the
original work." In such a case, the owner would not be
subject to the limitations period set forth in CRS §
13-80-104.
A few courts have analyzed this issue from the standpoint
that a statute of limitations that applies to making
"improvements" to real property does not include
within its scope work performed to effect repairs.10 Colorado
has adopted the "continuing negligence" doctrine in
the context of medical malpractice claims. However, Colorado
courts have not addressed whether: (1) the doctrine of
continuing negligence has any application to a related series
of construction errors (such as a combination of original
construction and later repair errors); and (2) the policies
supporting adoption of this doctrine render the doctrine
amenable to negligent repair claims in the proper case.11
Colorado recognizes a warranty of "future
performance" under its commercial code.12 The existence
and effect of such a warranty in the context of construction
defect disputes has not been fully explored by the courts.
Adoption of such an implied warranty in light of CDARA
II's statutory "notice of claim and right to offer
repair" process awaits case law development.13
In Hersh Cos., Inc.,14 the Colorado Supreme Court held that
the real property improvement statute of limitations does not
apply to a breach of express warranty claim to repair or
replace defective work. Instead, CRS § 13-80-101, the statute
of limitations for contract actions, applies.
The Court found that analogous repair warranty cases under
the Uniform Commercial Code hold that a cause of action does
not accrue until the "plaintiff discovers or should have
discovered the defendant's refusal or inability to
comply" with the warranty. Thus, there was no reason to
define the breach of warranties to repair or replace
differently for the sale of goods than for the performance of
services.15 The Court concluded:
[W]hen a contract contains both an express warranty as to
future performance, like the five-year warranty against
defect contained in Hersh's contracts, and a
repair-or-replace warranty fixing the remedy in the event of
a defect, a claim for breach of warranty does not accrue
until the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the
defendant's refusal or inability to comply with the
warranties made.16
In an important 2003 Court of Appeals case, Stiff v. BilDen
Homes, Inc.,17 the plaintiff claimed that, in contrast to a
structural flooring system,18 a slab-on-grade flooring system
was improperly used. The plaintiff in BilDen Homes, Inc. knew
that the soils report cautioned that "alternative
specifications" for a slab-on-grade floor "will not
prevent movement, but would reduce damage if movement
occurred," and that if a structural floor was not used,
the owner must be "willing to accept the risk of slab
movement."19 The court concluded:
Here, the builder installed slab-on-grade flooring and took
action to accommodate a certain amount of movement. As a
result, a certain amount of movement of the slab-on-grade
floor was to be expected. It was not until the movement
became greater than expected that any damage that was caused
by the allegedly negligent act would permit plaintiff to
maintain a cause of action. Accordingly, under the facts
here, damage would arise to permit a successful cause of
action only when the movement of the slab-on-grade flooring
became excessive and the accommodations were no longer
sufficient to control the damage.20
As to the breach of contract and warranty claims, the BilDen
Homes, Inc. court held that a cause of action accrues under
the real property improvement statute of limitations on the
builder's failure to remedy the defect pursuant to the
contract or warranty, not when the discovery of the defect
occurs.21
Tolling, Estoppel, and
Repair Doctrines
Repair Doctrines
Courts may ameliorate harsh results dictated by statutes of
limitations by tolling the limitation period when warranted
by the facts and where the legislative purpose of the statute
will not be undermined.22 Tolling principles have been
adopted by statute as well.23 In general, courts resort to
two...
To continue reading
Request your trial