Formal Opinion 112: Surreptitious Recording of Conversations or Statements
Publication year | 2003 |
Pages | 55 |
2003, November, Pg. 55. Formal Opinion 112: Surreptitious Recording of Conversations or Statements
Vol. 32, No. 11, Pg. 55
The Colorado Lawyer
November 2003
Vol. 32, No. 11 [Page 55]
November 2003
Vol. 32, No. 11 [Page 55]
Departments
CBA Ethics Committee Formal Opinions
Formal Opinion 112: Surreptitious Recording of Conversations or Statements
CBA Ethics Committee Formal Opinions
Formal Opinion 112: Surreptitious Recording of Conversations or Statements
Formal Opinion 22: Recording Conversations
Effective July 19, 2003, the Colorado Bar Association Ethics
Committee has withdrawn Formal Opinion 22 (adopted January
26, 1962)
Formal Opinion 112: Surreptitious Recording of
Conversations or Statements
Conversations or Statements
Adopted July 19, 2003
SYLLABUS
Surreptitious recording of a conversation or statement occurs
where one party to the conversation (the recording party) has
consented to the recordation but at least one other party to
the conversation or statement is not aware of the recording
Because surreptitious recording of conversations or
statements by an attorney may involve an element of trickery
or deceit, it is generally improper for an attorney to engage
in surreptitious recording even if the recording is legal
under state law. For the same reason, a lawyer generally may
not direct or even authorize an agent to surreptitiously
record conversations, and may not use the "fruit"
of such improper recordings. However, where a client lawfully
and independently records conversations, the lawyer is not
required to advise the client to cease its recording, nor to
decline to use the lawfully- and independently-obtained
recording
The Committee believes that, assuming that relevant law does
not prohibit the recording,1 there are two categories of
circumstances in which attorneys generally should be
ethically permitted to engage in surreptitious recording or
to direct surreptitious recording by another: (a) in
connection with actual or potential criminal matters, for the
purpose of gathering admissible evidence; and (b) in matters
unrelated to a lawyer's representation of a client or the
practice of law, but instead related exclusively to the
lawyer's private life. The bases for the Committee's
recognition of a "criminal law exception" are the
widespread historical practice of surreptitious recording in
criminal matters, coupled with the Committee's belief
that attorney involvement in the process will best protect
the rights of criminal defendants. The Committee recognizes a
"private conduct exception" because persons dealing
with a lawyer
exclusively in his or her private capacity have diminished
expectations of privacy in connection with those
conversations; therefore, in the opinion of the Committee,
purely private surreptitious recording is not ordinarily
deceitful. However, the Colorado Supreme Court has not
recognized either of these exceptions to the general
prohibition against surreptitious recording by lawyers.
ISSUES
Under what circumstances, if any, may an attorney
surreptitiously record or direct another to surreptitiously
record an in-person or telephone conversation with another
person? Do the ethics rules recognize distinctions between
surreptitious recording by attorneys in civil and criminal
matters? Do the rules recognize distinctions between
attorneys who surreptitiously record conversations in the
course of representing clients or otherwise acting in a
professional capacity, versus attorneys acting in a purely
private capacity?
This opinion does not address non-consensual recording, i.e.,
wiretapping, in which a non-party to the conversation engages
in surreptitious recording. It also does not address the
circumstances, if any, in which lawyers may use false
pretenses to gather evidence, for example in investigating
claims of housing discrimination and trademark infringement.
EXISTING LEGAL AUTHORITY
The Committee does not write on a clean slate. In its Formal
Opinion 22 ("CBA 22"), originally issued on January
26, 1962, the Committee considered the broad question of
whether "[a] lawyer, by means of a mechanical or
electronic device, [may] record conversations with and
statements by other persons." The Committee resolved the
issue under the then-applicable Colorado Canons of
Professional Ethics (the predecessor to the Colorado Code of
Professional Responsibility ("Colorado Code") that,
in turn, preceded the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct
("Colorado Rules")). The Committee concluded:
One of the principal purposes of the Canons of Ethics is to
increase public confidence in the legal profession. This end
can be achieved only if individual members of the Bar earn a
reputation as men of honor, integrity and fair dealing.
Conversely, every deceptive practice and resort to artifice
by an attorney must necessarily demean the Bar as a whole in
addition to the particular attorney involved.
. . .
[W]e believe that the large majority of persons would not
suspect that a conversation with an attorney was being
surreptitiously recorded. Moreover, one reason for an
attorney intentionally not disclosing that a particular
conversation or statement is being recorded may be a belief
that the person whose conversation is being recorded would
choose his words more carefully, or speak less freely, or not
at all, if such knowledge were imparted to him.
[T]here is inherent in the undisclosed use of a recording
device under these circumstances an element of deception,
artifice or trickery which falls below the standard of candor
and fairness which all attorneys are bound to uphold.
In 1974, the American Bar Association ("ABA")
reached a similar result in its Formal Opinion 337 ("ABA
337"), concluding that under the ABA Model Code of
Professional Responsibility, with a possible exception for
conduct by law enforcement officials, a lawyer may not engage
in undisclosed recording of any conversation.
The Colorado Supreme Court relied on CBA 22 and ABA 337 in
People v. Selby, 198 Colo. 386, 606 P.2d 45 (1979), an
attorney disciplinary case, as support for the following
broad statements: "A lawyer may not secretly record any
conversation he has with another lawyer or person. Candor is
required between attorneys and judges. Surreptitious
recording suggests trickery and deceit." 606 P.2d at 47
Selby involved a criminal defense attorney who
surreptitiously recorded an in-chambers conference with the
trial...
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