The 2003 Arab Human Development Report: a critical approach.

• Author: Lavergne, Marc

IT IS AN EMBARRASSING TASK to comment upon such an impressive piece of work as the Arab Human Development Report 2003, which is the outcome of the collaboration of highly esteemed Arab thinkers of various countries and backgrounds. This comprehensive attempt to describe the Arab reality, within the framework of a selected theme, this year that of knowledge, has to be lauded for its honesty and courage to denounce, without complacency, the setbacks and loopholes of development in the Arab world. But it is a challenge to try to deliver relevant and useful comments on all statements and analysis given in this Report, precisely because of its wide range of approaches, and at the same time because of the number of concrete cases that could be cited to support, modify or deny the conclusions of the chosen global approach.

Thus, knowledge has been aptly selected as a key to development and as a pre-requisite for the access to individual freedom and dignity. In short, after lengthy developments of the factors contributing to a knowledge-based society, the Report concludes that there has been a large-scale failure of the Arab world in achieving this goal. In my view, it cannot be disputed that the status and role of knowledge face severe shortages, but I am of the opinion that the root causes of the problem are not always as accurately addressed as its manifestations. What is more, the remedies are, sometimes too easily or simply, sought after in a western mode of thinking and in western technological advances, which appear to carry as a side (and perhaps main) effect the reinforcement of western and more specifically U.S. influence on Arab societies. To start with, a simple question could highlight the contradiction contained in such an endeavor: to whom is this report addressed? The Arab public does not need such a report to discover what it knows all too well: the pitiful situation of knowledge in its society, and the reasons for this situation. That is, first of all, the refusal of the leaders to let culture and knowledge flow into their countries.

THE ARAB WORLD AS A FRAMEWORK FOR A DEVELOPMENTAL STUDY: IS IT RELEVANT?

An important preliminary question can be raised about the relevance of adopting the Arab world as the proper frame for this type of development study. This amounts to privileging a particular aspect of cultural unity over others, one that gives precedence to the elements of diversity of the same gathering of peoples (Markaz al-Wihda al-Arabiya, 1980, 1996). The idea of a so-called "Arab Development" assumes that there is an Arab identity that involves peculiar features, and that these may have an influence on development. This is, that an Arab cultural pattern, in its essence, can be accurately considered as providing the ground for economic and political developments (J-F. Bayart, 1996). This is a view widely shared in the Arab world itself, since the second half of the 20th century, which witnessed the growing influence of ideological views of movements claiming the unity of the "Arab nation" as a self-imposed goal which would heal the dividing wounds of colonialism, and bring about a solution to the problems of a newly independent Arab world.

This ideological premise, despite its failure in achieving political unity, gained new support based on quite questionable neo-conservative U.S.-sponsored Weltanschauung best summarized in a well publicized book (S. Huntington, 1996), which sees the world divided into several "great civilisations" that are definitely separated by strict boundaries, in the same way as the "Arab nation" as defined by the promoters of Arab unity, depicts the Arab culture as being composed of fixed, a-historical elements. This leads to considerations that Arab culture is based on so-called "traditional" values, inherited, for instance, from a mythical Bedu way of life, cradle of purity, as opposed to "modernity," which amounts to rejecting the imports of cultural mixture, viewed as a result of foreign domination. But Arab culture should not be seen in an anachronistic way, by vesting it with an a-historical essence and unity. Just as any other culture, it is the result of a mixture of foreign influences (A. Hourani, 1962). Therefore it is diverse and can express opposing views, which are not at the service of any cause, not even that of Arab nationalism or Arab Unity. This diversity is a valuable and useful tool for progress. Sadly however, this does not seem to be sufficiently admitted by the writers of the Report, who, for instance, use both the concepts of "tradition" and "modernity" without precise definition or proof.

The report-team avoids the debate about the content and meaning of the term "Arab" by referring only to the statistics and references produced within the spatial boundaries and the political frame of the Arab League. This leaves to the side qualitative interpretations, such as the definition of an Arab culture, if it is admitted that something close to that, from a scientific point of view, actually exists, in favor of quantitative data provided by official statistics. If language is selected as a major indicator of cultural belonging, it can be noted that these boundaries do not fit with those who practice Arabic as a mother tongue. They include a wide diversity of linguistic languages and dialects, Arabic being by no means the sole language spoken in most of these 22 countries. The reference to the search for Arab integration, based on an assumed common culture, religion and history is also worth questioning, with an objective look at the reality of inter-Arab relationships in all fields. Arab identity and self-consciousness has developed only since the end of the 19th century, in certain intellectual and then political circles. It has only gained a wide audience and a political expediency from the 1940's onward, following the model of European nationalism in the 19th century, and of the Turkish resurgence within the Ottoman Empire. If the 11th of September and the invasion of Iraq are to be viewed as the hallmark at the end of that period of time, it would be worth questioning the validity of the concept, in view of the threats of globalization on the one side, and of the strengthening of other identifications that defy the sole reference to the Arab State, as part of a wider Arab nation in the making, on the other.

In order to support their statements, the authors rely to a large extent on statistics produced by official bodies, that are aimed at presenting comparative data between Arab States. Exclusive reliance on indicators is indeed a warrant of neutrality and objectivity in the analysis of social and cultural trends in the Arab societies, but it may also indicate a lack of direct knowledge and understanding of the larger segments of the population by the intellectual western educated elite. One should also keep in mind the fact that figures are just an illusion of objectivity, since the choice to measure a factor or another is a political one, which tends to give a certain image of society. Figures are never, however, the exact reflection of reality and they can be biased either on purpose or by lack of means to ensure the reliability of the counting. To give an example, the absence of data on poverty in the Arab world, shows an absence of in-depth thinking on this important but complex question. What is more, the human and social significance of poverty could be more thoroughly explored within the Report.

The weaknesses and biases of the statistical apparatus constitute an important part of the problem that is central to the Report. While Arab countries have established a "Central Statistics Bureau," that employs large numbers of civil servants, the Censuses and reports that are issued by them are often defective, and do not serve the purpose of giving an adequate image of the society. Therefore they are not used as a tool for decision-making in the political or in the developmental field. This is not entirely the fault of the administration, but also of the decision-makers or investors, whose rationale is not of a technocratic nature, but is based on various personal or social considerations. Statistics are therefore considered as a concession to the western approach of planning. The case of Lebanon, which is admired in the Arab world for its intellectual and technical abilities, is often cited, because it has not held a population census since 1932, in order to hide the reality of the religious repartition and to keep a political system based on a decades-old illusion, instead of tackling in earnest the consequences of the demographic trends. By so doing, Lebanon is unable properly to solve the problems of unequal development, of population movements, etc. That is, in short, to settle the root-causes of the internecine fighting that ended in 1991. But nobody seems to bother about the negative effects of this piece of "Lebanese folklore," which does not hamper buoyant business and political life. It is therefore doubtful that either this data, or a quantitative approach are keys to a better understanding of Arab Human Development, the more so as knowledge is the central theme of 2003 Report.

The quite pessimistic general tone of the Report suggests implicitly that the Arab society might still be in the state of darkness, which evokes a--perhaps unconscious--religious reference to the pre-Islamic jahiliyya. The Islamist movement, based on the same analysis of the present situation, advocates that the only valid knowledge is the one that can be extracted...