Attorney Fee Awards: Assessing the Reasonableness of the Number of Hours Claimed
Publication year | 2001 |
Pages | 79 |
Citation | Vol. 30 No. 6 Pg. 79 |
2001, June, Pg. 79. Attorney Fee Awards: Assessing The Reasonableness of the Number of Hours Claimed
Vol. 30, No. 6, Pg. 79
The Colorado Lawyer
June 2001
Vol. 30, No. 6 [Page 79]
June 2001
Vol. 30, No. 6 [Page 79]
Specialty Law Columns
Labor and Employment Review
Attorney Fee Awards: Assessing The Reasonableness of the Number of Hours Claimed
by Jessica Lee
Labor and Employment Review
Attorney Fee Awards: Assessing The Reasonableness of the Number of Hours Claimed
by Jessica Lee
It is the general rule in this country that litigants must
pay their own attorney fees.1 However, a widespread exception
to this general rule has grown as more statutes authorize
payment of attorney fees by one party to the prevailing
party.2 The Americans with Disabilities Act
("ADA"), Title VII, and § 1988 each grant
prevailing parties a reasonable fee.3 The Age Discrimination
in Employment Act ("ADEA") and Fair Labor Standards
Act ("FLSA") require courts to award fees to
prevailing plaintiffs.4 Once a party has established its
entitlement to fees, the court must decide on a reasonable
fee
The starting point for determining a reasonable fee is the
"lodestar"—the number of hours reasonably
expended multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.5 One key
issue with respect to this method of calculating fees is
whether the prevailing party has exercised appropriate
"billing judgment" concerning the number of hours
claimed. This article discusses the factors courts consider
when assessing the billing judgment of the parties and
suggests specific challenges that can be made to attorney fee
applications
Determination of
Reasonable Fee
Reasonable Fee
There is a strong presumption that the lodestar represents a
reasonable fee.6 However, to enable the court to calculate
the lodestar, the fee movant must demonstrate not only that
the claimed hours were actually expended, but also that they
were "reasonably" expended.7 Specifically, the fee
applicant must exercise billing judgment by excluding
unreasonable hours from the initial fee calculation.8
"Billing judgment consists of winnowing the hours
actually expended down to the hours reasonably
expended."9 According to the U.S. Supreme Court
"Hours that are not properly billed to one's client
also are not properly billed to one's adversary pursuant
to statutory authority."10 (Emphasis in original.)
If fee applicants do not exercise billing judgment, courts
are obligated to do it for them.11 In considering whether
counsel's hours were appropriately expended, courts seek
to ascertain what a fee-paying client reasonably would expect
to pay.12 Courts also examine a number of different factors
to determine reasonableness, including whether (1) the tasks
were clerical in nature or could have been performed by more
junior lawyers or paralegals; (2) the work could have been
performed more efficiently; (3) the case was overstaffed, the
hours logged were duplicative, or the tasks performed were
redundant; and (4)Êcertain time was not reasonably
expended on the litigation or certain tasks simply should not
have been performed. Each of these factors is discussed
below.
Clerical Matters and Tasks
Time billed for clerical matters is routinely challenged and
disallowed. "[P]urely clerical or secretarial tasks
should not be billed at a paralegal [or lawyer's] rate,
regardless of who performs them."13 The dollar value of
such non-legal work is not increased because it is performed
by a lawyer.14 Thus, it is unreasonable for lawyers to bill
for tasks that non-attorneys could perform at a significantly
lower cost to the client.15
In Davis v. City and County of San Francisco, the city and a
class of female and minority plaintiffs settled class
employment discrimination claims filed under Title VII, and
the plaintiffs were awarded attorney fees.16 The city
appealed the district court's fee award, arguing, among
other things, that time billed for clerical matters was a
clear example of billing abuse.17 The district court noted
that plaintiffs' counsel had billed eighty-three hours
for copying, filing, and serving papers.18 However, the
plaintiffs later reduced the total number of hours claimed by
5 percent, which they claimed rendered a further reduction in
the lodestar amount unnecessary.19 The court of appeals
agreed. Significantly, the 5 percent reduction amounted to
approximately 450 hours.20
In Spegon v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, the plaintiff
appealed a fee award under the FLSA.21 The district court had
disallowed all of the associate attorney's hours. The
appeals court...
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