Sentencing Dilemmas
Publication year | 2000 |
Pages | 67 |
Citation | Vol. 29 No. 10 Pg. 67 |
2000, October, Pg. 67. Sentencing Dilemmas
Vol. 29, No. 10, Pg. 67
The Colorado Lawyer
October 2000
Vol. 29, No. 10 [Page 67]
October 2000
Vol. 29, No. 10 [Page 67]
Specialty Law Columns
Criminal Law Newsletter
Sentencing Dilemmas
by Phil Cherner
Criminal Law Newsletter
Sentencing Dilemmas
by Phil Cherner
Colorado?s sentencing scheme has evolved from the simplicity
of when it was enacted in 1979 to a bewildering complexity of
statutes and court decisions. The danger of misunderstanding
the sentence range individuals face can create serious
problems in plea negotiation and trial strategy for both the
prosecution and defense, as well as for counsel and the court
at sentencing hearings
This article provides background information on Colorado?s
felony sentencing scheme and describes how it works
currently. The article also discusses sentencing for sex
offenders and Colorado?s parole/community corrections
conundrum
Historical Background
Prior to 1979, the Colorado felony sentencing scheme was
based on indeterminate sentencing. The judge would impose a
sentence of incarceration by specifying a minimum and maximum
number of years. The discretion of the Parole Board to allow
parole was governed by these two numbers; the Board could
release an inmate no sooner than a percentage of the minimum
number of years and hold the inmate for no longer than the
maximum number of years, less certain earned time and good
time discounts. For example, the permissible range of
incarceration for the class 3 felony of aggravated robbery
was from 5 to 40 years. Therefore, any sentence of at least 5
years and no more than 40 years was valid. The higher the
lower number was, the longer it was before the Board could
release the inmate on parole
In 1979, the Gorsuch Bill1 established a determinate
sentencing system. In an effort to make sentences more
uniform statewide, the range of sentences available to the
judge was narrowed, and indeterminate sentences were replaced
by sentences to a specific term. The Parole Board?s
discretion in setting the release date was abolished. Release
was automatic after service of the sentence, less accumulated
earned time and good time credits (which, as a practical
matter, meant after service of 50 percent of the sentence,
less earned time). A judge could impose a sentence outside
the presumptive range only if "extraordinary mitigating
or aggravating circumstances" existed.2 Therefore, for
an aggravated-robbery defendant, the law now provided a
presumptive sentencing range of from 4 to 8 years, and an
extraordinary range of no less than half the minimum (or 2
years) and no more than double the maximum (or 16 years). The
sentence had to be a fixed number (for example, 5 years)
within that range. Release on parole was automatic after
service of half the sentence (2½ years), less a few
weeks earned time.
Two major changes occurred to the Gorsuch scheme in 1985. The
General Assembly doubled the top of the presumptive
sentencing ranges for most felonies3 and returned discretion
to the Parole Board to release, or refuse to release, an
inmate at any time after service of the sentence, less earned
time and good time.4 For example, the sentencing range for an
aggravated-robbery defendant became from 4 to 16 years in the
presumptive range and from 2 to 32 years in the extraordinary
aggravated or mitigated range.
Assuming the defendant received a 5-year sentence, the Board
could place the defendant on parole supervision after he or
she served 2½ years, less earned time. However, the
Board also could refuse to release the defendant up until the
inmate had served the full 5-year sentence, less earned time.
In the latter case, the inmate would be discharged from the
sentence without serving parole because he or she was not
released early. The renewed Parole Board discretion turned
what had been a determinate number under the original 1979
Gorsuch enactment into a sentence that now looked quite a bit
like the old indeterminate sentence.
Another major change occurred in 1993 when the General
Assembly mandated that any period of parole be in addition
to, and not part of, the term of years the sentencing court
imposed. Thus, regardless of whether the hypothetical
defendant served 5 years or 10 years, he or she would still
have to serve a period of time on parole supervision (which
is 5 years for a class 3 felony). This latest scheme has
taken on the name "mandatory parole," a phrase that
has led to confusion because it is the same label used to
refer to the "automatic-release" scheme embodied in
the original Gorsuch legislation.
The 1993 amendments also included a reduction in the
sentencing range for most offenses.5 Offenses for which the
penalty ranges were not reduced became "extraordinary
risk" crimes.6 Because aggravated robbery is an
extraordinary risk offense7 the authorized presumptive
sentence remained a single number between 4 and 16 years,
plus an additional 5 years of parole.
In addition to "extraordinary mitigation and
aggravation" and "extraordinary risk" crimes,
a third category of crimes underwent change. For years prior
to Gorsuch, Colorado had a statute mandating a sentence to
prison for commission of a "crime of violence." CRS
§ 16-11-309 contained a detailed definition of "crime of
violence." The term generally included certain offenses,
such as aggravated robbery, during which a deadly weapon is
used. Under Gorsuch, this statute originally required
imposition of at least the minimum sentence to prison (that
is, it denied probation). For example, the minimum sentence
for aggravated robbery was 4 years. The statute was amended
to require imposition of at least the minimum sentence in the
extraordinary aggravated range, which is one day more than
the maximum sentence in the presumptive (or ordinary) range,
to a maximum of twice the top of the presumptive range.
Thus, for aggravated robbery, the minimum sentence would be
from 16 years and a day to 32 years. Later amendments reduced
the minimum sentence for a person convicted of a "crime
of violence" to the midpoint of the presumptive range
(or an authorized sentence of between 10 and 32 years for
aggravated robbery). Over the years, amendments to CRS §
16-11-309 have broadened the definition of "crime of
violence;" therefore, the date of an offense is critical
in determining the applicability of the statute.
When a Mandatory Sentence is Mandatory
CRS § 16-11-309(4) provides that "in any case in which
the accused is charged with a crime of violence, . . . the
indictment or information shall so allege in a separate...
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