Opinions
| Publication year | 2000 |
| Pages | 121 |
| Citation | Vol. 29 No. 6 Pg. 121 |
2000, June, Pg. 121. Opinions
Vol. 29, No. 6, Pg. 121
The Colorado Lawyer
June 2000
Vol. 29, No. 6 [Page 121]
June 2000
Vol. 29, No. 6 [Page 121]
From the Courts
Colorado Disciplinary Cases
Opinions
Colorado Disciplinary Cases
Opinions
Presiding Disciplinary Judge
Appellate Discipline Commission
Appellate Discipline Commission
Disciplinary Opinions
The Colorado Supreme Court has adopted a series of changes to
the attorney regulation system, including the establishment
of the Office of the Presiding Disciplinary Judge, pursuant
to C.R.C.P. 251.16, and a new intermediate appellate entity
known as the Appellate Discipline Commission, pursuant to
C.R.C.P. 251.24. The Court also made extensive revisions to
the rules governing the disciplinary process, repealing
C.R.C.P. 241 et seq., and replacing those rules with C.R.C.P
251 et seq. The Presiding Disciplinary Judge presides over
attorney regulation proceedings and issues orders together
with a two-member hearing board at trials and hearings. The
Rules of Civil Procedure and the Rules of Evidence apply to
all attorney regulation proceedings before the Presiding
Disciplinary Judge. See C.R.C.P. 251.18(d)
Beginning with the September 1999 issue, The Colorado Lawyer
will publish the summaries and full-text opinions of the
Presiding Disciplinary Judge, Roger L. Keithley, and a
two-member hearing board, whose members are drawn from a pool
appointed by the Supreme Court, and the opinions of the
Appellate Discipline Commission
These Opinions may be appealed in accordance with C.R.C.P.
251.26 and C.R.C.P. 251.27.
The full-text opinions, along with their summaries, are
available on the CBA homepage at
http://www.cobar.org/tcl/index.htm. See page 119 for details.
Case No. 99AD005
In the Matter of Mary Jody Sheffer,
Attorney-Respondent.
April 6, 2000
Proceeding in Discipline
EN BANC
Reversed and Remanded
John S. Gleason, Attorney Regulation Counsel, James S.
Sudler, Assistant Regulation Counsel, Denver, Colorado,
Attorneys for Complainant
George S. Meyer, Denver, Colorado, Attorney for
Attorney-Respondent
BY THE COMMISSION
Commissioners Jeffrey A. Chase and Denise S. Maes did not
participate.
In this attorney regulation case, a Hearing Board
("Board") suspended the respondent, Mary Jody
Sheffer, from the practice of law for two years. The Board
also ordered Sheffer to take and satisfactorily complete the
Multistate Professional Responsibil ity Examination prior to
reinstatement, and it ordered her to pay the costs of the
proceeding below. Subsequently, the Presiding Disciplinary
Judge granted Sheffer's motion to stay the Board's
order pending her appeal.
Sheffer contends in her appeal that the Board erred in
concluding that she violated two criminal statutes; that the
Board's sanction bears no relation to the conduct, is
manifestly excessive, or is otherwise unreasonable; and, that
the sanction should be reduced to a public censure.
For the reasons expressed herein, we reverse the decision of
the Board and remand this case to the Board solely for the
purpose of determining the appropriate sanction.
I.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the Board made factual
findings by clear and convincing evidence and drew legal
conclusions in two matters identified respectively as the
Vialpando Dissolution and the Notary Matter.1 This appeal
arises solely, however, from the findings and conclusions
pertaining to the events identified as the Notary Matter.2
A.
Mary Jody Sheffer is licensed to practice law in the state of
Colorado and has practiced as a solo practitioner for more
than ten years.3 She has devoted her legal career to
representing clients who have difficulty affording legal
services and has focused a substantial portion of her
practice on issues relating to battered women.
B.
While representing her son in early 1997 in his dissolution
of marriage action, Sheffer notarized his answers to
interrogatories, his financial affidavit, a deed of trust he
had issued on his marital home, and a request for release of
deed of trust and release. The deed of trust was recorded in
Arapahoe County.
When she notarized the various documents, Sheffer used the
notary seal of a former employee and signed the
employee's name to the jurat. Opposing counsel learned of
Sheffer's conduct. One result, among others, was that the
completion of the sale of her son's marital residence was
delayed for two days until a properly notarized request for
release of deed of trust and release could be obtained.
Sheffer wrote to opposing counsel the day after the closing
was to have been completed, admitting that she had used her
former employee's notary seal, etc. She also wrote to the
Office of Disciplinary Counsel (now Regulation Counsel),
admitting that she had used the notary seal, etc., on a few
occasions during the last two years. She apologized,
expressed remorse, and attributed her conduct to laziness.
Sheffer was charged in the Eighteenth Judicial District with
forgery, §18-5-102(1)(c), 6 C.R.S. (1998), a class 5 felony;
criminal impersonation, §18-5-113(1)(d), 6 C.R.S. (1998), a
class 6 felony; and wrongful possession of a journal or seal,
§12-55-118, 6 C.R.S. (1998), a class 3 misdemeanor. She
entered into a plea agreement and pleaded guilty to a fourth
charge of abuse of public records, §18-8-114(1)(c), 66 C.R.S.
(1998), a class 1 misdemeanor. She was sentenced to eighteen
months probation, fined $500, assessed costs and fees of
$285, and ordered to undergo a mental health evaluation and
treatment. The three original charges were dismissed.
II.
Sheffer admitted and the Board concluded that she violated
Colo. RPC 8.4(b) (committed a criminal act that reflects
adversely on her honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a
lawyer); Colo. RPC 8.4(d)(engaged in conduct prejudicial to
the administration of justice); and Colo. RPC 8.4(a)(violated
a rule of professional conduct).
Sheffer also admitted that she violated Colo. RPC
8.4(h)(engaged in other conduct that reflects adversely on
her fitness to practice law). The Board observed, however,
that it found no evidence of other conduct adversely
reflecting on her fitness to practice despite her admission
or lack of objection to the alleged violation. It then noted
that her admission of having violated Colo. RPC 8.4(h) played
no part in the Board's formulation of its sanction.
In addition, the Board found that Sheffer violated Colo. RPC
8.4(c)(engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit, or misrepresentation), and it concluded that her
commission of a crime constituted grounds for discipline
under C.R.C.P. 241.6(5). The Board observed that:
Sheffer's falsification of … [her former
employee's] signature, and her improper use of the notary
seal on the Deed of Trust and the Request for Release of Deed
of Trust and Release is (sic) of particular significance
because these actions call into question the very foundation
of trust and authenticity which the legal system invests in
any document affecting the ownership and chain of title of
real property. Such documents, once signed, notarized and
filed in the public records, carry with them an inherent
reliability not accorded to normal documentation. Indeed, in
light of the high level of reliability accorded them under
law, such documents are both self-authenticating and excluded
from the hearsay rule. On their face, they establish what
they purport to be.
People v. Sheffer, No. GC98A112 (consolidated with
GC98A113)(Colo. P.D.J. June 10, 1999), slip op. at 10
(citation omitted). The Board further indicated that it
viewed the documents notarized by Sheffer as false:
The Deed of Trust falsely notarized by Sheffer was
subsequently recorded with the Clerk and Recorder of Arapahoe
County and infected the integrity of the chain of title to
the subject property. The Request for Release of Deed of
Trust and Release prepared and submitted by Sheffer to
effectuate a closing on the subject property was intended by
Sheffer to mislead the closing's participants into
believing the document was genuine.
Id. (emphasis added). As it continued its analysis of
Sheffer's behavior, the Board observed that:
Sheffer's conduct would have succeeded in its intended
deceit absent the astute intervention of opposing counsel.
Opposing counsel's intervention prevented further
personal harm to the closing's participants as well as
future owners of the property.4 The prevention of greater
harm to the closing's participants by opposing counsel
does not lessen the severity of Sheffer's misconduct.
Id. (emphasis added). The Board, speaking again of false...
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