2.2 Constitutional and Statutory Foundations

• Library: Federal Civil Practice in Virginia (Virginia CLE) (2023 Ed.)

2.2 CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY FOUNDATIONS

2.201 Grant of Jurisdiction Under Article III.

The jurisdiction of federal courts is derived from article III of the United States Constitution. Section 1 of article III provides that "[t]he judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." ²⁰ Section 2 of article III provides a listing of "Cases" and "Controversies" over which "[t]he judicial power shall extend. . . ." ²¹

A. General Principle.

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, possessing only those powers conferred by the Constitution or by statute, and this power "is not to be expanded by judicial decree." ²²

B. Obligation to Investigate Jurisdiction.

Federal courts, therefore, have an "independent obligation" to investigate the limits of their subject matter jurisdiction, even when either or both parties have elected not to raise or press the issue. ²³

C. "Arising Under."

Within the jurisdiction granted to the federal courts by article III, section 2, are the "Cases" and "Controversies" that arise under the Constitution, laws of the United States, and federal treaties. ²⁴

D. Justiciable "Cases" or "Controversies."

"Article III of the Constitution limits federal court jurisdiction to "Cases" and "Controversies." Those two words confine the business of federal courts to questions presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial process." ²⁵ The term "justiciability" refers to those cases that are truly adversarial and capable of resolution through the judicial process without intruding upon functions that the Constitution has committed to other branches of government. ²⁶ The doctrines of standing, mootness, ripeness, and political question "all originate in Article III's 'case' or 'controversy' language . . . ." ²⁷

2.202 Congressional Power over Creation and Jurisdiction of Courts.

Congress was not required to create inferior article III courts to hear or decide cases; nor was it required to invest them with all of the jurisdiction that it was authorized to bestow under article III. ²⁸ Consequently, although the parameters of judicial power with which federal courts may be invested, and the exercise of that power, is limited by article III, the creation of district courts, including the very nature of their jurisdiction, is determined by Congress.

While Congress can preclude federal courts from hearing cases that they are authorized to hear, Congress cannot empower federal courts to hear cases that they are not authorized to hear under article III. ²⁹

2.203 Judicial Power of Federal Courts.

As stated above, federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. This means that, with certain limited exceptions, these courts can exercise only the judicial power that has been expressly conferred upon them by the Constitution or by acts of Congress. ³⁰

A judge without jurisdiction is no more than a man in the street. What his views may be with respect to a given issue presented to him are but of passing moment. Jurisdiction either exists or it does not. This issue of jurisdiction can be raised at any time, even, as has been said, on a petition for a rehearing after a unanimous decision by the Supreme Court. ³¹

A. Judicial Interpretation.

Federal courts have not only been entrusted with the responsibility to decide matters "arising under" the Constitution, but they are also the final arbiter of: (i) the constitutionality of acts of Congress; ³² (ii) the constitutionality of state laws; ³³ and (iii) the constitutionality of state court decisions. ³⁴

B. Nonfederal Claims.

When a federal court has subject matter jurisdiction over a federal claim, there are certain instances in which that court may also resolve related nonfederal claims. This is allowed primarily due to reasons of judicial economy and is discussed in this chapter in paragraph 2.8 below concerning supplemental jurisdiction.

2.204 Standing.

A. In General.

"Standing is a threshold jurisdictional question which ensures that a suit is a case or controversy appropriate for the exercise of the courts' judicial powers under the Constitution of the United States." ³⁵

Standing continues to be a regular subject of review in the United States Supreme Court. ³⁶ The Court has emphasized that "[s]tanding to sue is a doctrine rooted in the traditional understanding of a case or controversy." ³⁷ The Court also noted that the law of article III standing "serves to prevent the judicial process from being used to usurp the powers of the political branches." ³⁸ This doctrine also serves to confine the federal courts to their proper role in a democratic society. ³⁹

B. Establishing Standing.

To have article III standing, a plaintiff must adequately establish:

1. an injury in fact (namely, an invasion of a "legally protected interest" that is "concrete," "particularized" to the plaintiff, and "actual or imminent"). ⁴⁰ Concreteness and particularization are two "distinct requirements" that are "quite different" from one another. ⁴¹ An injury is particularized if it affects the plaintiff "in a personal and individual way"; an injury is concrete if it is "de facto," i.e. , it actually exists. ⁴² While it must actually exist to be concrete, the injury may nevertheless be intangible. ⁴³

2. causation (namely, a "fairly traceable" connection between the alleged injury in fact and the alleged conduct of the defendant); ⁴⁴ and

3. redressability (namely, it is "likely" and not "merely speculative" ⁴⁵ that the plaintiff's injury will be remedied by the relief that the plaintiff seeks in bringing suit). ⁴⁶

A bare procedural violation of a statute is insufficient to demonstrate an injury in fact. ⁴⁷ "[W]hen a plaintiff sues to vindicate a statutory right, she still must establish that she suffered a concrete injury from the violation of that right." ⁴⁸ Moreover, the harm suffered by the plaintiff must be "the type of harm Congress sought to prevent when it enacted the statute." ⁴⁹

In some cases, "the injury required for standing need not be actualized. A party facing prospective injury has standing to sue where the threatened injury is real, immediate, and direct." ⁵⁰ However, as the Supreme Court recently clarified, a risk of harm qualifies as a concrete injury only for claims for "forward-looking, injunctive relief to prevent the harm from occurring." ⁵¹ "An injury sufficient to meet the causation and redressability elements of the standing inquiry must result from the actions of the respondent, not from the actions of a third party beyond the court's control." ⁵² In Davis v. Federal Election Commission, ⁵³ the Supreme Court observed that it is not enough that a party has the requisite interest in a case to establish standing at its outset, but an actual controversy must continue to exist "at all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed." ⁵⁴

Importantly, the burdens for establishing standing at the motion-to-dismiss and summary-judgment stages are "distinct" and "what may perhaps be speculative at summary judgment can be plausible on a motion to dismiss." ⁵⁵

Each plaintiff must establish standing for each claim that it seeks to press and for each form of relief that it asserts. ⁵⁶ While a claim is justiciable if even only one plaintiff has standing to raise it, ⁵⁷ plaintiffs who seek relief that is individualized and not identical must each allege an individualized injury in fact. ⁵⁸

C. Standing of Organizational Plaintiffs.

An organizational plaintiff can demonstrate standing under either of "two distinct theories." ⁵⁹ First, the association "may have standing in its own right" based on injuries to its own rights. ⁶⁰ Second, the association may have "representational" or "associational" standing as the representative of its members who have been injured. ⁶¹

To demonstrate direct standing under the first theory, an organizational plaintiff must be able to demonstrate "personal harm both traceable to the challenged provisions and redressable by a federal court." ⁶² Injury to an organizational purpose, without more, does not provide a basis for standing. ⁶³

To plead representational standing under the second theory, an organization must allege that "(1) its own members would have standing to sue on their own right; (2) the interests the organization seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (3) neither the claim nor the relief sought requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit." ⁶⁴

In Summers v. Earth Island Institute, ⁶⁵ the Supreme Court clarified that, to show that its members would have standing, an organization must "make specific allegations establishing that at least one identified member had suffered or would suffer harm." The Fourth Circuit enforced this limitation in Southern Walk at Broadlands Homeowner's Ass'n v. OpenBand at Broadlands, LLC, ⁶⁶ finding that a homeowners association had failed to allege standing under either the direct or representational standing theories. The bare allegation that the association "is being harmed" by agreements granting the defendant exclusive rights to provide telecommunications services to member owners did "not equate to an allegation that each or all of" the organization's members are being harmed. ⁶⁷

The Fourth Circuit, in Maryland Shall Issue, Inc. v. Hogan, ⁶⁸ recently held that an organization challenging the constitutionality of a statute banning "rapid fire trigger activators" had failed to allege an injury in fact. The organization alleged that the statute "undermined" and "acted as an obstacle to its purpose and message." ⁶⁹ The court pointed out that the organization "did not allege that it had expended resources as a result of [the legislation], nor did it explain a way in which [the legislation] 'perceptibly impaired' its activities," but rather only...