2.2 Constitutional and Statutory Foundations

• Library: Federal Civil Practice in Virginia (Virginia CLE) (2018 Ed.)

2.2 CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY FOUNDATIONS

2.201 Grant of Jurisdiction Under Article III. The jurisdiction of federal courts is derived from article III of the United States Constitution. Section 1 of article III provides that "[t]he judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as

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the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." ³ Section 2 of article III provides a listing of "Cases" and "Controversies" over which "[t]he judicial power shall extend. . . ." ⁴

A. General Principle. Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, possessing only those powers conferred by the Constitution or by statute, and this power "is not to be expanded by judicial decree." ⁵

B. Obligation to Investigate Jurisdiction. Federal courts, therefore, have an "independent obligation" to investigate the limits of their subject matter jurisdiction, even when either or both parties have elected not to raise or press the issue. ⁶

C. "Arising Under." Within the jurisdiction granted to the federal courts by article III, section 2, are the "Cases" and "Controversies" that arise under the Constitution, laws of the United States, and federal treaties. ⁷

D. Justiciable "Cases" or "Controversies." "Article III of the Constitution limits federal court jurisdiction to 'Cases' and 'Controversies.' Those two words confine the business of federal courts to questions presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial process." ⁸ The term "justiciability" is integral to the concept of standing. It refers to those cases that are truly adversarial and capable of resolution through the judicial process without intruding upon functions that the Constitution has committed to other branches of government. ⁹

Where parties cannot show any injury, or imminent threat of injury, there is no actual dispute, and the suit "is not justiciable." ¹⁰

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2.202 Congressional Power over Creation and Jurisdiction of Courts. Congress was not required to create inferior article III courts to hear or decide cases; nor was it required to invest them with all of the jurisdiction that it was authorized to bestow under article III. ¹¹ Consequently, although the parameters of judicial power with which federal courts may be invested, and the exercise of that power, is limited by article III, the creation of district courts, including the very nature of their jurisdiction, is determined by Congress.

While Congress can preclude federal courts from hearing cases that they are authorized to hear, Congress cannot empower federal courts to hear cases that they are not authorized to hear under article III. ¹²

2.203 Judicial Power of Federal Courts. As stated above, federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. This means that, with certain limited exceptions, these courts can exercise only the judicial power that has been expressly conferred upon them by the Constitution or by acts of Congress. ¹³

A judge without jurisdiction is no more than a man in the street. What his views may be with respect to a given issue presented to him are but of passing moment. Jurisdiction either exists or it does not. This issue of jurisdiction can be raised at any time, even, as has been said, on a petition for a rehearing after a unanimous decision by the Supreme Court. ¹⁴

A. Judicial Interpretation. Federal courts have not only been entrusted with the responsibility to decide matters "arising under" the Constitution, but they are also the final arbiter of: (i) the constitutionality of acts of Congress; ¹⁵ (ii) the constitutionality of state laws; ¹⁶ and (iii) the constitutionality of state court decisions. ¹⁷

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B. Nonfederal Claims. When a federal court has subject matter jurisdiction over a federal claim, there are certain instances in which that court may also resolve related nonfederal claims. This is allowed primarily due to reasons of judicial economy and is discussed in this chapter in paragraph 2.8 below concerning supplemental jurisdiction.

2.204 Standing.

A. In General. Standing continues to be a regular subject of review in the United States Supreme Court. ¹⁸ Article III's "case-or-controversy requirement is satisfied only where a plaintiff has standing." ¹⁹

In its recent examinations of the "injury-in-fact" doctrine, the Supreme Court has emphasized that "[s]tanding to sue is a doctrine rooted in the traditional understanding of a case or controversy." ²⁰ The Court also noted that the law of article III standing "serves to prevent the judicial process from being used to usurp the powers of the political branches." ²¹ This doctrine also serves to confine the federal courts to their proper role in a democratic society. ²²

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"Standing is a threshold jurisdictional question which ensures that a suit is a case or controversy appropriate for the exercise of the court's judicial powers under the Constitution of the United States." ²³

"An injury sufficient to meet the causation and redressability elements of the standing inquiry must result from the actions of the respondent, not from the actions of a third party beyond the court's control." ²⁴

In Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, ²⁵ the Fourth Circuit noted that the standing requirement "prevents federal courts from transgressing [their] constitutional limit," and emphasized the plaintiff's burden of showing: (i) "injury in fact;" (ii) a causal connection between the injury and the defendant's conduct; and (iii) that a favorable judicial ruling will "likely" redress the injury. ²⁶

B. Establishing Standing. In order to have article III standing, a plaintiff must adequately establish: (i) an injury in fact (namely, an invasion of a "legally protected interest" that is "concrete," "particularized" to the plaintiff, and "actual or imminent"); ²⁷ (ii) causation (namely, a "fairly traceable" connection between the alleged injury in fact and the alleged conduct of the defendant); ²⁸ and (iii) redressability (namely, it is "likely" and not "merely speculative" ²⁹ that the plaintiff's injury will be remedied by the relief that the plaintiff seeks in bringing suit). ³⁰ A bare procedural violation

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of a statute is insufficient to demonstrate an injury-in-fact. ³¹ Furthermore, "the injury required for standing need not be actualized. A party facing prospective injury has standing to sue whether threatened injury is real, immediate, and direct." ³² While it must actually exist to be concrete, the injury may nevertheless be intangible. ³³

In Davis v. FEC, ³⁴ the Supreme Court observed that it is not enough that a party has the requisite interest in a case to establish standing at its outset, but an actual controversy must continue to exist "at all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed." ³⁵ As the Fourth Circuit has pointed out, however, the burdens for establishing standing at the motion-to-dismiss and summary-judgment stages are "distinct" and "what may perhaps be speculative at summary judgment can be plausible on a motion to dismiss." ³⁶

Each plaintiff must establish standing for each claim that it seeks to press and for each form of relief that it asserts. ³⁷ While a claim is justiciable if even only one plaintiff has standing to raise it, ³⁸ plaintiffs who seek relief that is individualized and not identical must each allege an individualized injury in fact. ³⁹

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C. Standing of Organizational Plaintiffs. An organizational plaintiff must be able to demonstrate "personal harm both traceable to the challenged provisions and redressable by a federal court." ⁴⁰ Injury to an organizational purpose, without more, does not provide a basis for standing. ⁴¹

To plead representational standing, an organization must allege that "(1) its own members would have standing to sue on their own right; (2) the interests the organization seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (3) neither the claim nor the relief sought requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit." ⁴²

D. "Prudential" Standing. The Fourth Circuit has examined the concept of "prudential" standing, noting that "Federal courts . . . face judicially imposed prudential limits on their jurisdiction 'founded in concern about the proper—and properly limited—role of the courts in a democratic society.'" ⁴³ Prudential standing encompasses three notions: "the general prohibition on a litigant's raising another person's legal rights, the rule barring adjudication of generalized grievances more appropriately addressed in the representative branches, and the requirement that a plaintiff's complaint fall within the zone of interests protected by the law and invoked." ⁴⁴ In Lexmark International v. Static Control Components, Inc., however, the Supreme Court clarified that the zone-of-interests test is properly viewed as one of statutory interpretation, ⁴⁵ and deemed the "prudential standing" label a misnomer for that inquiry. ⁴⁶ The Court also noted a "tension" between the prudential standing doctrine and the federal courts' "virtually unflagging" obligation to hear and decide cases within their jurisdiction. ⁴⁷

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E. Virtual Representation. The United States Supreme Court has, in a case of first impression, disapproved the doctrine of "virtual representation." ⁴⁸ Several circuit courts of appeals had held that nonparties could be bound by a judgment if those parties had been "virtually represented" by a party to the case in which the judgment was rendered. On due process grounds, the Supreme held that a person who is not a party to a suit generally has no full or fair opportunity to litigate its claims, and the doctrine of "virtual representation" runs afoul of the "deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should have his own day in court." ⁴⁹ Noting that the preclusive effect of a federal court judgment is determined by federal...