Vawa: a Civil Rights Tool for Victims of Gender-motivated Violence
Publication year | 1999 |
Pages | 77 |
Citation | Vol. 28 No. 9 Pg. 77 |
1999, September, Pg. 77. VAWA: A Civil Rights Tool for Victims of Gender-Motivated Violence
Vol. 28, No. 9, Pg. 77
The Colorado Lawyer
September 1999
Vol. 28, No. 9 [Page 77]
September 1999
Vol. 28, No. 9 [Page 77]
Specialty Law Columns
The Civil Litigator
VAWA: A Civil Rights Tool for Victims of Gender-Motivated Violence
by Darold W. Killmer, Mari Newman
The Civil Litigator
VAWA: A Civil Rights Tool for Victims of Gender-Motivated Violence
by Darold W. Killmer, Mari Newman
On September 13, 1994, President Clinton signed into law a
major crime bill that, at the time, garnered significant
media attention due to the inclusion of such measures as a
ban on assault weapons. In the same legislation, however
Congress included the civil remedies provision of the
Violence Against Women Act ("VAWA") as a new
federal weapon to combat gender-based violence.1 This
important new civil rights remedy has been overlooked even by
most civil rights attorneys, however, in part because it was
overshadowed by the sexual-history protections of the amended
Federal Rule of Evidence 412, which was passed in the same
legislation
As VAWA has attracted the increasing attention of civil
rights attorneys, it has come under strenuous attack by the
defense bar. Despite a successful constitutional challenge to
VAWA in the Fourth Circuit, however, VAWA has held its ground
in nearly every other federal court that has considered its
validity. Ultimately, the rich and well-documented
legislative record supporting the enactment of the VAWA
should allow this important protection of civil rights for
women and protection against gender-motivated violence to
survive judicial scrutiny
Scope of Problem/Congressional Findings
Congressional enactment of VAWA was based on four years of
hearings regarding both the extent of violence faced by women
and the specific impacts of that violence on interstate
commerce. As quoted by the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York in Ericson v. Syracuse
University:
Gender-motivated violence against women is rampant throughout
the United States. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 103-138, at 38
(1993) ("Violence is the leading cause of injuries to
women ages 15 to 44, more common than automobile accidents,
muggings, and cancer deaths combined. As many as 4 million
women a year are the victims of domestic violence. Three out
of four women will be the victim of a violent crime sometime
during their life."); H.R. Rep. No. 103-395, at 26
(1993) ("Since 1988, the rate of incidence of rape has
risen four and a half times as fast as the total crime
rate.").
Such violence substantially impacts the ability of women to
function in interstate commercial activities. See, e.g., S.
Rep. No. 103-138 at 41 ("Gender-based violence bars its
most likely targets - women - from full [participation] in
the national economy. For example, studies report that almost
50 percent of rape victims lose their jobs or are forced to
quit in the aftermath of the crime."); id. at 54 n.70
("Women often refuse higher paying night jobs in
service/retail industries because of the fear of
attack.").2
Moreover, the reports on which Congress relied in enacting
VAWA revealed that "we spend $5 to $10 billion a year on
health care, criminal justice and other social costs of
domestic violence";3 "as many as 50 percent of
homeless women and children are fleeing domestic
violence";4 and the fear of gender-motivated violence
deters women from using public transportation and, thus,
"acts as a barrier to mobility, particularly for those
women who have no alternative to public transportation
because of economic constraints."5
Basic Cause of Action
In order to address this profound societal problem, VAWA
provides that a person (whether acting under color of law or
not) who commits a crime of violence motivated by gender,6
and thus deprives another of the right to be free from such
gender-motivated crime of violence, is liable to the party
injured in an action to recover compensatory and punitive
damages, injunctive and declaratory relief, and any other
relief the court deems appropriate.7
VAWA is specifically enumerated in Title 42, U.S.C. §
1988(b), as one of the civil rights statutes, making attorney
fees part of the costs of the action. Thus, a prevailing
plaintiff in a VAWA action is entitled to recover attorney
fees as well as the other remedies set out in the statute.
Elements of the Claim
The essential elements of a VAWA claim are: (1) the defendant
committed a "crime of violence"; (2) that crime of
violence was "motivated by gender"; and (3)
commission of the crime deprived the victim of the right to
be free from crimes of violence motivated by gender.8 An
offense is a "crime of violence" within the meaning
of the statute if it is (or would be, but for the
relationship between the defendant and the victim9):
either a felony against the person of the victim, or a felony
against property that presents a serious risk of physical
injury to another; and
comes within the meaning of state or federal offenses
described in 18 U.S.C. § 16, whether or not those acts have
actually resulted in criminal charges, prosecution, or
conviction.
The incorporation of the established section of the federal
criminal code within the definition of "crime of
violence" is beneficial to the plaintiff because of the
rather permissive and broadly interpreted case law under 18
U.S.C. § 16.10 In order to further federal uniformity, the
Tenth Circuit has determined whether a particular act is a
"crime of violence" within the meaning of § 16
through use of the "categorical" approach set out
by the U.S. Supreme Court in Taylor v. United States,11 in
which certain crimes are placed in the same category and are
so evaluated, regardless of the definitions adopted by the
state of origin.12
A growing body of case law establishes that certain offenses
- including many sex-related offenses - are per se violent,
even in the absence of physical force, because the risk of
physical force is inherent in the offense.13 Accordingly,
conduct that had previously been subject to redress but
subject to only limited remedies, such as sexual harassment
in the workplace, is now possibly actionable under VAWA.
The second element of a cause of action under VAWA, namely
that the defendant's offense be "motivated by
gender," is established under VAWA if the offense is
both:
committed "because of" or "on the basis
of" the victim's gender; and
due, at least in part, to an animus based on the victim's
gender.14
Courts will likely make reference to the established body of
civil rights case law in the area of employment
discrimination in determining what types of conduct are
"because of" or "on the basis of" the
victim's gender.15 Relying on the U.S. Supreme Court
decision in Oncale v. Sundownder Offshore Services, Inc.,16
the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado recently
held that "sexual harassment of any kind will meet the
statutory requirements."17
The third element of a cause of action under VAWA - that the
commission of the crime deprived the victim of the right to
be free from crimes of violence motivated by gender - might
initially appear tautologous: if an individual commits a
crime of violence (element one) that is motivated by gender
(element two), he or she has necessarily deprived another of
the right to be free from crimes of violence motivated by
gender (element three). As the district court in Doe v
Hartz18 found, however, it is precisely this third element
that makes clear that it is not an essential element of the
cause of action that the plaintiff suffer damage. Instead,
the statute provides that deprivation of the right is
sufficient injury to sustain...
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