The Inevitable Discovery Exception to the Exclusionary Rule
Jurisdiction | United States,Federal,Colorado |
Citation | Vol. 28 No. 5 Pg. 61 |
Pages | 61 |
Publication year | 1999 |
1999, June, Pg. 61. The Inevitable Discovery Exception to the Exclusionary Rule
Vol. 28, No. 5, Pg. 61
The Colorado Lawyer
June 1999
Vol. 28, No. 6 [Page 61]
June 1999
Vol. 28, No. 6 [Page 61]
Specialty Law Columns
Criminal Law Newsletter
The Inevitable Discovery Exception to the Exclusionary Rule
by Matthew J. Karzen
Criminal Law Newsletter
The Inevitable Discovery Exception to the Exclusionary Rule
by Matthew J. Karzen
Because motions to suppress evidence based on alleged police
misconduct are so common, one of the most often considered
rules of law in criminal proceedings is the exclusionary
rule. The rule works, in short, to prohibit the
government's direct or derivative use of evidence
obtained as a result of police misconduct.1 The presence of
police misconduct, however, rarely ends the inquiry, for
there are a number of exceptions to the exclusionary rule
that may allow the government to use challenged evidence
notwithstanding the police misconduct. One of these
exceptions is the doctrine of inevitable discovery. To
resolve issues involving the exclusionary rule and its
inevitable discovery exception, practitioners must be
familiar with the contours and scope of both legal doctrines
The purpose of this article is to provide a practical
overview of the inevitable discovery doctrine as developed by
the U.S. Supreme Court and the Colorado appellate courts. The
article discusses the rationale behind the doctrine, how it
works in practice, and under what circumstances it does and
does not apply. The article addresses seminal U.S. Supreme
Court and Colorado cases involving the doctrine of inevitable
discovery, and points out apparent conflicts arising from
recent Colorado Supreme Court cases
The Exclusionary Rule
Understanding the Basics
To determine the applicability of the inevitable discovery
exception in a given case, practitioners must first
understand the reasons for the exclusionary rule, as well as
its limits. Without this understanding, application of the
inevitable discovery doctrine can develop into a careless
application of formalistic tests
Both the U.S. and Colorado Constitutions protect against
government violation of certain basic rights, including the
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.2 In
order that these rights may be given effect, the U.S. Supreme
Court, in Weeks v. U.S.,3 created a rule that prohibits the
government from using evidence obtained in violation of these
rights. Reversing a conviction achieved by the use of
evidence seized from the defendant's home without a
warrant, the Weeks Court recognized that the Fourth Amendment
of the U.S. Constitution places on the government active
"limitations and restraints."4 Reasoning that
convictions obtained by illegal government conduct should
find "no sanction in the judgments of the court,"
the Weeks Court held that courts are charged with the
"maintenance" of "fundamental rights."5
This maintenance currently takes the form of excluding
evidence tainted by the police misconduct.
Weeks, in its recognition that the police should not benefit
from their illegal action, seemingly assumes that before the
exclusionary rule is applicable, there must be a sufficient
nexus between the police misconduct and the use or discovery
of the challenged evidence. What was left unsaid in Weeks was
raised explicitly for the first time six years later in
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. U.S.,6 which involved the illegal
search and seizure of Silverthorne documents by federal
agents.
In an opinion foreshadowing the "fruit of the poisonous
tree" doctrine, the Court held that evidence illegally
obtained was not only excluded from use before the court in
trial, but that such evidence "shall not be used at
all."7 In articulating this derivative application of
the exclusionary rule, the Court recognized the limit of the
rule to those situations where the discovery or use of the
evidence involves some exploitation of the police misconduct:
Of course this does not mean that the facts obtained become
sacred and inaccessible. If knowledge of them is gained from
an independent source they may be proved like any others, but
the knowledge gained by the Government's own wrong cannot
be used by it in the way proposed.8
In 1939, in Nardone v. U.S.,9 the Court reaffirmed the
derivative use aspect of the exclusionary rule. The opinion
is significant not only because of its use of the now famous
"fruit of the poisonous tree" language, but also
because it contains important guidance as to the purpose and
limits of the exclusionary rule. It is particularly important
in analyzing any exception to the exclusionary rule because
it recognizes that the differing levels of nexus between the
police misconduct and the use of the challenged evidence are
critical. The Nardone opinion acknowledges the substantial
"handicap" that attaches to any plea for the
exclusion of relevant evidence, holding that any application
of such a rule "must be justified by an over-riding
public policy expressed in the Constitution or the law of the
land."10
In the context of police misconduct in criminal prosecutions,
that policy is the enforcement of basic constitutional
liberties, and it sits in the scale opposite the desirability
of presenting all relevant evidence to arrive at the truth.
To achieve the proper balance between the exclusion of
relevant evidence and enforcement of basic rights, Nardone
mandates that the accused demonstrate the government's
use of the challenged evidence is a "fruit" of the
police misconduct, and that the government receive an
opportunity to show it is attributable to some
"independent" or untainted event or source.11 As
the Court noted, well-crafted argument may establish some
factual connection between the misconduct and the use of the
evidence, but "good-sense" mandates further inquiry
to determine the practical impact of this connection.12
In the line of cases developing the contours of the
exclusionary rule, perhaps the most significant in the
context of an inevitable discovery analysis is Wong Sun v.
U.S.13 The Court in Wong Sun articulated the relevant inquiry
as not merely "was there police misconduct?" but
"is the use of the evidence dependent on exploitation of
the misconduct?" The Court rejected a test that would
exclude all evidence that did not come to light but for the
police misconduct and stated the inquiry as follows:
[T]he more apt question in such a case is whether, granting
establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to
which the instant objection is made has been come at by
exploitation of that illegality or instead by means
sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary
taint.14
This language would prove to be the linchpin of the seminal
U.S. Supreme Court case on the inevitable discovery doctrine.
What It Means
Several things are immediately clear from the cases defining
the purpose and scope of the exclusionary rule. First, the
exclusionary rule exists to deter illegal police misconduct
by denying the government the benefits of such misconduct
Second, the courts that created and defined the exclusionary
rule understood its substantial cost to the pursuit of truth.
The exclusion of relevant...
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