The Imposition of Constructive Trusts and Other Concepts at Probate-part Ii
Jurisdiction | Colorado,United States |
Citation | Vol. 28 No. 1 Pg. 49 |
Pages | 49 |
Publication year | 1999 |
1999, January, Pg. 49. The Imposition of Constructive Trusts and Other Concepts at Probate-Part II
Vol. 28, No. 1, Pg. 49
The Colorado Lawyer
January 1999
Vol. 28, No. 1 [Page 49]
January 1999
Vol. 28, No. 1 [Page 49]
Specialty Law Columns
Estate and Trust Forum
The Imposition of Constructive Trusts and Other Concepts at Probate - Part II
by David W. Kirch
Estate and Trust Forum
The Imposition of Constructive Trusts and Other Concepts at Probate - Part II
by David W. Kirch
Editor's Note
This is the second part of a two-part article on recovery of
joint tenancy property and other lifetime transfers through
the imposition of constructive trusts and other tools. Part
I, which appeared in the December 1998 issue at page 41
analyzed generally how constructive trusts and other concepts
operate in the probate context. This Part II discusses the
outer limits of the concept, causes of action that support
it, and some tactical aspects of constructive trust
litigation
As noted in Part I of this article, availability of the
remedy of imposition of a constructive trust is not limited
to the transferor. A constructive trust may be imposed in
favor of an individual who would have been the donee or
devisee of the property against a person who obtains the
property by undue influence, thus preventing the gift to the
intended donee from being accomplished. A constructive trust
arises in favor of one who, but for the undue influence of
the transferee (the constructive trustee), would have
received the property.1 However, the courts may be more
willing to impose a constructive trust on grounds of unjust
enrichment (without findings of fraud, confidential
relationship, or duress) if it is the original owner of the
property who will recover, as opposed to third-party intended
beneficiaries.
Outer Limits of the Concept
The doctrine should be applicable to the wide variety of
nonprobate transfers taking effect at death or coming into
question after death, because of their impact on third
parties (for example, life insurance and pension benefits,
beneficiary designations, P.O.D. accounts, any assets held in
joint tenancy, transfers into inter vivos trusts, and
lifetime outright transfers). The doctrine can even be used
to attack a subsequent will.
As an example of the concept's potentially limitless
utility (in situations attorneys frequently view as otherwise
hopeless), a constructive trust has been imposed on life
insurance proceeds paid in violation of a separation
agreement, regardless of the fact that the designated
recipient was innocent and without notice.2 In certain
instances, this may certainly be a better remedy than a claim
against the probate estate (which may be insolvent).
The ability to impose a constructive trust on assets of a
decedent held by a party as a matter of convenience when the
transferee does not dispute the rights of other parties can
produce tax benefits. It should result in an increased tax
basis in the assets at death. Further, the transfer of assets
from the original transferee to the third parties should not
be a taxable gift, even if in excess of the $10,000 annual
exclusion.
There appears to be a general consensus supporting the view
that a constructive trust should be impressed, even though
the wrongful conduct by which the title was acquired was that
of a third party and not the donee (deemed trustor).3 In
Seidlitz v. Eames,4 the Colorado Court of Appeals awarded
life insurance proceeds to the children of the murderer
(mistress) of the insured, on the basis that they were the
successor-owners of the policies. As an alternative to the
argument made by the dissenting judge—that under
CRS § 15-11-803(3), the children should not receive the
proceeds because this was a "benefit" to the
insured's murderer—the question is whether the
decedent's estate or spouse could have asked for the
imposition of a constructive trust on the proceeds.
The devisees of an earlier will might seek to impress a
constructive trust on a decedent's estate even when the
assertion of traditional grounds for invalidation of the most
recent will and its revocation of the earlier will
(incapacity and undue influence) appear not to be appropriate
or likely to be successful.5 On the other hand, the courts
should consider the importance of protecting the recipient of
the property from potentially unfounded or tenuous claims. It
is certainly debatable that the courts should draw the line
in using the doctrine to grant relief in cases where the
intended beneficiary's rights were defeated because of
the "transferor's" own failure to get the job
done right by a completed gift or formal documentation. The
concept should not be used to remedy every injustice or
"botched" inter vivos gift or testamentary
disposition.6
Causes of Action Supporting The Doctrine
The imposition of a constructive trust is an equitable
remedy, not a separate cause of action itself, although the
court opinions applying the concept have lacked clarity and
precision in this regard. In cases involving the imposition
of a constructive trust, a number of different causes of
action can be (and have been) asserted. These include undue
influence, breach of fiduciary duty, failure to lodge a will,
fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation, tortious
interference with inheritance rights, abuse of process,
tortious misfeasance and nonfeasance, and conspiracy. Such
causes of action also will support a claim for punitive
damages.
It has...
To continue reading
Request your trial