Good Faith and Fair Dealing Developments-part I
Publication year | 1998 |
Pages | 115 |
1998, June, Pg. 115. Good Faith and Fair Dealing Developments-Part I
Vol. 27, No. 6, Pg. 115
The Colorado Lawyer
June 1998
Vol. 27, No. 6 [Page 115]
June 1998
Vol. 27, No. 6 [Page 115]
Specialty Law Columns
Business Law Newsletter
Good Faith and Fair Dealing Developments-Part I
by E. Lee Reichert
Business Law Newsletter
Good Faith and Fair Dealing Developments-Part I
by E. Lee Reichert
Over the past two years, the Colorado Supreme Court has shown
a marked interest in addressing "good faith and fair
dealing" issues. Beginning with its 1996 decision in
Amoco Oil Company v. Ervin,1 the Supreme Court has devoted
substantial attention to such issues in nine opinions, a
sizable percentage of its commercial litigation cases. This
recent attention has not been limited to the Supreme Court
In adopting the Colorado Uniform Partnership Act
("CUPA") in its 1997 session, the Colorado
legislature statutorily codified an obligation of good faith
and fair dealing
This two-part article addresses the recent Colorado
developments in good faith and fair dealing. This Part I
discusses the cases decided by the Supreme Court since 1996
and the implications for business attorneys. Part II of this
article, which will be published in the July issue, focuses
on the obligation of good faith and fair dealing in CUPA and
highlights the drafting issues Colorado attorneys now face
To appreciate good faith and fair dealing issues fully, it is
necessary to understand the recent development of the
doctrine in both tort and contract cases. While the Supreme
Court has provided rough contours to the doctrine, this
article points out a number of issues that remain unanswered,
particularly in the contractual area. The resulting
uncertainties create constraints that later may be placed on
performance under agreements. Hence, transactional attorneys
need to be familiar with these issues in negotiating and
drafting contracts, and in advising their clients.
Overlap of Tort and Contract Theories
The law governing good faith and fair dealing has long been
confusing in many jurisdictions, and the precise treatment of
good faith and fair dealing issues varies significantly from
state to state. The confusion has arisen in large part from
the blurring of the distinctions between tort and contract
theories. Of course, the determination of whether a tort or
contract action is involved is critical because it affects
the measure and availability of certain damages (for example,
punitive damages), statutes of limitations, and other
procedural requirements. While Colorado courts have attempted
to differentiate between tort and contract theories in a
number of cases, their varying degree of success has led to
requests for judicial clarification of the overlapping
theories.2
Language in the opinions compounds the problem, particularly
the constant interchanging of the terms "covenant"
and "duty." To add further confusion, § 7-64-404(3)
of CUPA uses the term "obligation of good faith and fair
dealing," while § 4-1-203 of Colorado's Uniform
Commercial Code ("UCC") simply uses the phrase
"obligation of good faith."3 [Emphasis added.]
In an attempt to create some level of consistency, this
article uses the term "duty of good faith and fair
dealing" when dealing with tort issues. As discussed
below, in certain circumstances, Colorado law imposes a legal
duty on a party, which, if breached, leads to tort liability.
On the other hand, this article uses the term "covenant
of good faith and fair dealing" when dealing with
contract issues. The law implies a mutual covenant of good
faith and fair dealing with respect to certain obligations in
certain contracts. The implied covenant does not create an
independent cause of action for breach of contract, but is a
principle of contract interpretation that is applied by
courts to an express contract term as a gap-filling device.
In addition, as discussed below, parties may agree to an
express covenant of good faith or fair dealing which, if
breached, will result in an ordinary breach of contract
action. While the distinction between "duties" and
"covenants" may appear overly simplistic,
consistent use of such terminology could alleviate some of
the confusing overlap in judicial opinions between contract
and tort theories.
Recognition of Tort Duty
The overlap of tort and contract theories is particularly
noticeable in the insurance context. In large part, the
overlap exists because the contractual relationship creates
the insurers' tort duty recognized in Colorado (and in
the majority of other jurisdictions). As a result, the
Supreme Court occasionally discusses the contours of an
insurer's tort duty by reference to the underlying
insurance contract.
In Farmers Group, Inc. v. Trimble,4 the Supreme Court first
addressed the distinction between contractual and tort
theories of good faith and fair dealing in the insurance
coverage context. In imposing a good faith legal duty on an
insurer, the Trimble court focused on the different nature of
contract and tort remedies and the "special nature of
the insurance contract and the relationship that exists
between the insurer and insured." As a result of the
"quasi-fiduciary" relationship that arose from the
underlying insurance contract, the Supreme Court concluded
that an insured could assert a separate and additional tort
cause of action apart from a contract action.
In Traveler's Insurance Company v. Savio,5 the Supreme
Court extended Trimble's basic rationale to permit tort
actions where an insurer allegedly handled a workers'
compensation claim in bad faith. The Savio court noted that
the duty of good faith and fair dealing "permeates all
of the dealings between the insurer and the insured."
Following these two decisions, the Colorado legislature has
recognized the duty of good faith and fair dealing for
insurers.6
Recent Tort Decisions
Following the Trimble/Savio insurance cases, Colorado
litigants have attempted to extend the doctrine by
analogizing different relationships to the insurance context.
Previously, the Colorado Court of Appeals has shown a strong
predisposition to reject such efforts, refusing on a number
of occasions to recognize or create new tort causes of
action.7 In the past year, the Supreme Court has addressed
both the continuing viability of the Trimble/Savio doctrine,
and its extension to other areas.
Continuing Viability of a Common Law Tort Action
Last fall, in Vaughn v. McMinn,8 the Supreme Court concluded
that its Savio decision had not been abrogated by subsequent
legislative changes to Colorado's workers'
compensation statutes. In doing so, the Supreme Court
stressed that the legislative changes following Savio did not
explicitly bar the common law tort action for breach of an
insurer's duty of good faith and fair dealing.
Expansion of Common Law Tort Action
On two separate and recent occasions, the Supreme Court also
addressed whether the Trimble/Savio doctrine should be
extended or expanded. As discussed below, the majority and
dissenting opinions in these cases suggest factors that
Colorado appellate courts likely will apply to determine
whether a tort duty of good faith and fair dealing applies to
other relationships.
In Transamerica Premier Insurance Company v. Brighton School
District 27J,9 the Supreme Court considered whether the
Trimble/Savio doctrine should be extended to commercial
sureties. The Supreme Court concluded (over a vigorous
dissent) that it was proper to impose a legal duty of good
faith and fair dealing on a commercial surety, thereby
allowing a tort action to proceed.
In finding a special relationship sufficient to support the
legal duty, the majority opinion considered: (1) the purposes
of commercial sureties and insurers; (2) the legislative
statutes governing commercial sureties; (3) the nature of the
relationship between commercial sureties and obligors; (4)
case law from other jurisdictions; and (5) the sufficiency of
contract damages. In contrast, the dissenting opinion found
essential differences between the surety/obligee relationship
and the insured/insurer relationship. The dissent did not
find a tort duty because none of the considerations
underlying the special relationship in the insured/insurer
context (such as quasi-fiduciary obligations, protection
against unforeseeable loss, and unequal bargaining power)
existed in the suretyship context.
"While the Supreme Court
has provided rough contours
to the doctrine, a number
of issues remain
unanswered, particularly in
the contractual area."
has provided rough contours
to the doctrine, a number
of issues remain
unanswered, particularly in
the contractual area."
Conversely, in Decker v. Browning-Ferris Industries (Thomas
Decker),10 the Supreme Court refused to extend the
Trimble/Savio doctrine to the...
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