Seminole Tribe's Impact on Environmental Suits Against States in Federal Court
Jurisdiction | United States,Federal |
Citation | Vol. 26 No. 9 Pg. 105 |
Pages | 105 |
Publication year | 1997 |
1997, September, Pg. 105. Seminole Tribe's Impact on Environmental Suits Against States in Federal Court
Vol. 26, No. 9, Pg. 105
The Colorado Lawyer
September 1997
Vol. 26, No. 9 [Page 105]
September 1997
Vol. 26, No. 9 [Page 105]
Specialty Law Columns
Natural Resource and Environmental Notes
Seminole Tribe's Impact on Environmental Suits Against States in Federal Court
by F. J. "Rick" Dindinger
Natural Resource and Environmental Notes
Seminole Tribe's Impact on Environmental Suits Against States in Federal Court
by F. J. "Rick" Dindinger
On March 27, 1996, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Seminole
Tribe v. Florida1 that the Eleventh Amendment bars suits in
federal courts by Indian tribes seeking to enforce the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act against states. The ramifications of
this holding extend beyond the Seminole Tribe facts. Indeed
the Court's decision potentially extends to all federal
statutes enacted pursuant to Commerce Clause power that
purport to create federal court jurisdiction over states
among them the many environmental statutes governing mining
oil and gas, and other resource development.
The Eleventh Amendment
The Eleventh Amendment provides: "The Judicial Power of
the United States shall not be construed to extend to any
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of
the United States by Citizens of another State, or by
Citizens or subjects of any Foreign State."2 While the
amendment's language speaks only of suits by citizens
from other states, the Supreme Court has consistently
interpreted it to preclude all suits against a state in
federal court.3
The Eleventh Amendment's jurisdictional bar is not
absolute. A state may waive its immunity and consent to suit
in federal court.4 In addition, the Ex Parte Young5 doctrine
allows plaintiffs to sue individual state officials in
federal court for declaratory and injunctive relief to stop
continuing violations of federal law.6 Finally, under some
circumstances Congress may abrogate a state's Eleventh
Amendment immunity.7
The Eleventh Amendment potentially applies to all actions
brought against states under environmental laws. On its face
and as consistently interpreted, the amendment serves to
prevent any such suit brought in federal court by
environmentally concerned citizens and environmental
organizations. Nevertheless, if one of the exceptions to
Eleventh Amendment immunity applies, states may still be
subject to these private environmental suits.
The Seminole Tribe Decision
Prior to Seminole Tribe, the Supreme Court permitted
congressional abrogation of a state's Eleventh Amendment
immunity in two instances. In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,8 the
Court authorized abrogation whenever Congress legislates
pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, since the
enforcement provisions of § 5 "necessarily limited"
antecedent Constitutional provisions.9 In Pennsylvania v.
Union Gas Co.,10 the Supreme Court recognized congressional
power to abrogate immunity pursuant to the Interstate
Commerce Clause11 on the theory that the clause granted
Congress similar power as § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.12
Seminole Tribe addressed these two instances and held that
Union Gas improperly extended Fitzpatrick in permitting
abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity under the Commerce
Clause. The Fitzpatrick decision relied on the rationale that
the Fourteenth Amendment limited state authority possessed
under preceding Constitutional provisions and thereby altered
the existing balance between state and federal power,13 but,
according to Seminole Tribe, this rationale cannot serve to
abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity under the Commerce
Clause, since the amendment came after the clause in time and
therefore worked to expand state authority at the expense of
power previously conferred on Congress by the Commerce
Cause.14
In addition to this "last-in-time-controls"
rationale, the Court rejected Fitzpatrick's application
because the Fourteenth Amendment contained express terms
directed at the states that were intended to limit a
state's power, while the Commerce Clause contained no
such language.15 Consequently, the Seminole Tribe decision
expressly overruled Union Gas and restored Eleventh Amendment
immunity to statutory schemes created by Congress pursuant to
the Commerce Clause.16
The Union Gas Decision
Union Gas, in a plurality decision, found congressional
authority to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity under
Commerce Clause legislation, specifically the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1990 ("CERCLA").17 Under CERCLA, the U.S.
government sued Union Gas Co. for cleanup costs at a
dismantled coal gasification plant.18 Union Gas filed a
third-party complaint against Pennsylvania on grounds that
the Commonwealth was an "owner or operator" of the
plant, and Pennsylvania sought dismissal of that complaint on
grounds that Eleventh Amendment immunity barred the suit.19
The Union Gas plurality first evaluated whether CERCLA
clearly expresses an intent to hold states liable, and
concluded that Congress intended that states be liable along
with everyone else for cleanup costs recoverable under
CERCLA. After concluding that CERCLA permits suits against
states in federal court, Union Gas analyzed whether the
Commerce Clause granted Congress the power to enact such a
statute. By analogy to Fitzpatrick's abrogation of
Eleventh Amendment immunity under the Fourteenth Amendment,
the plurality ruled that the clause expands federal power
while contracting state power. Finally, the plurality noted
the need for congressional solutions to environmental
problems.20 Based on these factors, the Union Gas plurality
held that Congress possesses authority pursuant to the
Commerce Clause to render states liable.21
Four justices dissented,22 acknowledging that Congress
intended for CERCLA to render states "liable for money
damages in private suits."23 However, they declared this
intent, even with CERCLA's textual imposition of
liability upon states, insufficient to abrogate Eleventh
Amendment immunity. The dissenter's position stemmed,
fundamentally, from the rationale that "state immunity
from suit in federal courts is a structural component of
federalism, and not merely a default disposition that can be
altered by actions of Congress pursuant to its Article I
powers."24
The Seminole Tribe Decision
The case involved the Seminole Tribe's suit against
Florida for its failure to negotiate with the Tribe as
required under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
("IGRA").25 Congress passed the IGRA pursuant to
the Commerce Clause provision vesting plenary authority in
Congress over Indian commerce and Indian tribes.26 The IGRA
requires tribes to obtain a state's cooperation prior to
operating casino-style gaming27 and requires states to
negotiate "with the Indian tribe in good faith to enter
such a compact."28 Finally, it expressly authorizes
tribes to sue states in federal courts if a state fails to
conduct such negotiations in good faith.29
"If one of the exceptions to Eleventh Amendment immunity
applies, states may still be subject to private environmental
suits."
Florida moved to dismiss on grounds that the case violated
the state's sovereign immunity from suit in federal
court.30 After the district court denied Florida's
motion,31 the Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that the
Eleventh Amendment barred the suit.32 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari33 and affirmed the Eleventh Circuit by
holding that none of the powers conferred by Article I of the
Constitution authorize Congress to abrogate Eleventh
Amendment immunity.
The Supreme Court reached its decision by applying a
two-pronged conjunctive test. Under the first branch of the
test, the Court determined that Congress unequivocally
expressed an intent to abrogate states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity.34 The Court reached this conclusion
without requiring a specific statutory reference to the
Eleventh Amendment, which signifies that Congress need not
refer explicitly to the amendment in a statute in order for
that statute to enjoy the requisite intent to abrogate a
state's immunity.
Once the Court made a positive determination under the
test's first prong, it then addressed whether Congress
acted "pursuant to a valid exercise of power"35 and
evaluated whether the Commerce Clause empowered Congress to
abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity. The Supreme Court
stated that Union Gas stands as the only case recognizing
such power and concluded that no "principled
distinction" exists between the Indian Commerce Clause
and the Interstate Commerce Clause.36 This conclusion
resulted in Seminole Tribe's complete review of the Union
Gas decision.
The consequence of the Court's review led it to
explicitly overrule Union Gas. The Court reached its decision
by relying on the position that the Eleventh Amendment
limited federal courts' Article III jurisdiction by
barring all suits by any citizens against any state. Although
the amendment's text speaks only of suits against a state
by citizens from other states, the Seminole Tribe majority
relied on stare decisis from Hans v. Louisiana for the...
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