The Volley of Canons

• Publication year: 1997
• Pages: 59
• Citation: Vol. 26 No. 9 Pg. 59

26 Colo.Law. 59 Colorado Lawyer 1997.

1997, September, Pg. 59. The Volley of Canons

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59

Vol. 26, No. 9, Pg. 59

The Colorado Lawyer
September 1997
Vol. 26, No. 9 [Page 59]

Departments
The Scrivener: Modern Legal Writing
The Volley of Canons
by K. K. DuVivier

Interpretation is the art of finding out . . .
what [the drafter] intended to convey.
Francis Lieber

I don't care what their intention was.
I only want to know what the words mean.
Oliver Wendell Holmes

The "canons of construction" are a set of formalized rules or maxims for interpreting words. These canons are especially relevant for two categories of legal writers. First, brief writers can use the canons to argue a particular interpretation of the words of a statute. The statute's words provide the best evidence of statutory intent, both under the "plain-meaning" rule and when legislative history is sparse. Second, attorneys who draft instruments should consider the impact of the canons when choosing specific language to insert in a contract,1 lease, or other instrument

An advantage of the canons of construction is that they provide some convenient and fairly uniform approaches for interpreting words. A disadvantage is that most canons are simply principles, not controlling rules. Furthermore different canons may lead to contrasting results,2 so the canons are applied inconsistently

Because of this inconsistency, it is best to cite some authority for any canon you urge a court to follow. For rules of grammar, you can turn to a standard grammar book: the Bluebook references the U.S. Government Printing Office Style Manual (1986) and the Chicago Manual of Style (14th rev. ed. 1993) for grammar rules.3 These sources do not, however, contain rules of construction.

A few of the many canons of construction have been codified as controlling law in Title 2, Article 4 of the Colorado Revised Statutes. Part 1 of Article 4 ("Construction of Words and Phrases") addresses discrete and basic issues, such as the computation of time.4 Part 2 ("Construction of Statutes") is more broad-brush. For example, CRS § 2-4-201 addresses the intent of a statute, but uses only general language such as the following:

In enacting a statute, it is presumed that . . . [a] just and reasonable result is intended; [a] result feasible of execution is intended. . . .5

Although CRS § 2-4-201 does not articulate...