Interlocking Directories and the Antitrust Laws
Publication year | 1997 |
Pages | 53 |
Citation | Vol. 26 No. 3 Pg. 53 |
1997, March, Pg. 53. Interlocking Directories and the Antitrust Laws
Vol. 26, No. 3, Pg. 53
The Colorado Lawyer
March 1997
Vol. 26, No. 3 [Page 53]
March 1997
Vol. 26, No. 3 [Page 53]
Specialty Law Columns
Business Law Newsletter
Interlocking Directories and the Antitrust Laws
by Gale T Miller
Business Law Newsletter
Interlocking Directories and the Antitrust Laws
by Gale T Miller
Column Ed.: David P. Steigerwald of Sparks Dix, P.C
Colorado Springs - (719) 475-0097
This newsletter is prepared by the Business Law Section of
the CBA to apprise members of the Bar of current information
concerning substantive law. This month's article was
written by Gale T. Miller, Denver, a partner of Davis, Graham
& Stubbs LLP, (303) 892-9400
Dr. K., a well-known physician, is a nominee for the boards
of two nonprofit hospitals in the Denver area. Professor
Zinc, a world-renowned Colorado School of Mines metallurgy
authority, serves on the boards of two gold-mining companies
one in Australia and the other with mines in Colorado and
Idaho. Although both individuals are well-meaning,
law-abiding pillars of their community, they are flirting
with potential antitrust violations by virtue of holding
"interlocking directorates." (More about Dr. K and
Prof. Zinc later.)
The frequency of these relationships is hardly surprising,
given the logic of choosing directors with knowledge and
experience in a corporation's business. The problem is
that when an individual simultaneously serves as an officer
or director of two competing companies, he or she stumbles
into a prime opportunity for collusion - for example,
coordination of pricing, marketing, or production plans of
the two companies. If such coordination occurs, both of the
competing corporations and the interlocking director (or
officer) could face serious criminal and treble-damage civil
liability for price fixing or similar offenses under § 1 of
the Sherman Antitrust Act.1
Even if there is no collusion or coordination, the
corporations and director may find that they have innocently
violated § 8 of the Clayton Antitrust Act.2 Fortunately, § 8
violations do not involve imprisonment, fines, or
(ordinarily) damages. On the other hand, who wants to invite
a federal antitrust investigation by the Federal Trade
Commission or Department of Justice, with the attendant
disruption, legal fees, and risks that something worse might
be uncovered in the process? Accordingly, corporate
counselors can make their clients' lives easier by
watching out for potential interlock problems.
Historical Background
Early in this century, Louis Brandeis wrote a series of
magazine articles exposing the rapid growth of interlocking
relationships among competing industrial companies and
financial institutions.3 President Wilson campaigned against
these "trusts" during the 1912 election and asked
Congress to ban interlocks.4 Congress responded by enacting §
8 of the Clayton Act in 1914. Since then, § 8 has been the
primary enforcement tool to prevent anticompetitive collusion
resulting from interlocking directorates. While largely
unchanged since 1914, the law was updated in 1990 to plug
some loopholes and create some safe harbors, discussed
below.5
Prima Facie § 8 Case
There are four basic elements to a § 8 violation, as set
forth in subsection (a)(1):
1. The same person must serve as either a director or officer
of two corporations (other than in certain regulated
industries, which, as discussed below, are covered by other
statutes) at the same time. Under § 8(a)(4), the only
"officers" covered are those elected by the board
of directors.
2. Both corporations must be engaged, in whole or in part, in
interstate commerce.
3. The two corporations must be competitors by virtue of the
nature of their business and the location of their
operations.
4. Each of the corporations concerned must have net worth
aggregating more than $13,813,000.6 In calculating the
aggregate net worth, only the corporate entities themselves
are considered; the net worth of parents, subsidiaries, and
other affiliates is not included.7
The most disputed element of § 8 is whether the two...
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