From Our Readers

• Publication year: 1996
• Pages: 47
• Citation: Vol. 25 No. 11 Pg. 47

25 Colo.Law. 47 Colorado Lawyer 1996.

1996, November, Pg. 47. From Our Readers

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47

Vol. 25, No. 11, Pg. 47

From Our Readers

Dear Editor:

The title of the September employment and labor law column article is somewhat overstated [Pixler, "Nonexclusivity of Statutory Remedies for Employment Discrimination: Brooke v. Restaurant Services, Inc.," 25 The Colorado Lawyer 79 (Sept. 1996)]. While "Nonexclusivity of Statutory Remedies for Employment Discrimination" may apply to a claim under Colorado statutes, a different result may obtain under federal employment discrimination statutes.

In Price v. Public Service Company, 850 F.Supp. 934, 951 (D.Colo. 1994), a Title VII plaintiff asserted that the employer's discriminatory conduct also constituted a breach of her employment contract under state law. The federal court concluded that under the doctrine of preemption:

Where a plaintiff asserts a tort claim that rests on the same facts as a Title VII discrimination claim asserted in the action, the tort claim will not survive.... The court believes that this reasoning applies to [plaintiffs] ... breach of contract claim....

In Cook v. Rocky Mountain Bank Note Co., No. 91-F-1505, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20967 (D.Colo. 1991), the plaintiff presented claims under both Title VII and under the common law doctrine of outrageous conduct. In rejecting the state law claim, this Court held:

... we conclude that Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged outrageous conduct separate from age and sex discrimination in employment to avoid preemption by Title VII.... [She] asserts the same set of facts for both her [federal] discrimination claims and her [state] tort claim.... As Plaintiff alleges that her emotional injuries were the result of her employer's acts of discrimination, her claim for outrageous conduct must be dismissed.

The Cook decision referenced Stewart v. Thomas, 538 F.Supp. 891 (D.D.C. 1982). That case noted that Title VII preempted state law claims which arose out of the same set of operative facts as the Title VII claim. As stated in Stewart, "... to the extent that [plaintiffs] emotional injuries were the result of the stressful work situation created by defendant, her claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress is dismissed as subsumed within Title VII." 538 F.Supp. at 896 (emphasis added).

In Malone v. Signal Processing Technologies, Inc., 826 F.Supp. 370, 379 (D.Colo. 1993), Judge...