Update on Colorado Appellate Decisions in Workers' Compensation Cases
| Publication year | 1996 |
| Pages | 67 |
1996, July, Pg. 67. Update on Colorado Appellate Decisions in Workers' Compensation Cases
This article discusses recent Colorado appellate court decisions regarding workers' compensation matters. Other recent updates appeared in the October 1995 issue at page 2375, the January 1996 issue at page 71 and the April 1996 issue at page 57.
In Industrial Claim Appeals Office v. Jennie Romero,(fn1) the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the Colorado Court of Appeals(fn2) and held that CRS § 8-42-111(5), which terminated permanent total disability benefits when the claimant reached age sixty-five, violated her rights under the Equal Protection Clause. Because the statute was repealed in 1994, it affected only those claimants who were injured between July 1, 1991, and July 1, 1994.
The unanimous opinion held that if the avoidance of duplicate benefits was the purpose behind the classification, the statute was not rationally related to that purpose
because social security retirement benefits do not serve the same purpose as workers' compensation benefits. Social security retirement benefits are provided to persons over age sixty-five regardless of injury. . . . These benefits are not disability benefits, but are old age entitlements serving the same function as pension benefits. In contrast, workers' compensation benefits . . . compensate employees who suffer work-related injuries for loss of income resulting from such injuries. . . . Thus, withholding workers' compensation benefits for persons age sixty-five and older because they presumably receive retirement benefits is not rationally related to the goal of preventing duplicate benefits because workers' compensation benefits do not serve the same purpose as retirement benefits.(fn3)
The court also held that even if it were rational to assume that persons over the age of sixty-five would have retired even if they had not been injured,
it is then irrational to allow persons age sixty-five and older who are temporarily or [permanently] partially disabled to collect workers' compensation because such persons are no less likely to retire at age sixty-five than those who are permanently and totally disabled. The irrationality of this classification is further buttressed by the fact that partially disabled persons can recover workers' compensation benefits even if they voluntarily retire after being injured.(fn4)
The second asserted legislative purpose behind the age cap was that the cap was a "trade-off" for a 2 percent annual cost of living increase for other workers' compensation recipients who were permanently and totally disabled but younger than sixty-five years old. The court rejected this argument, noting that
the legislature is prohibited from passing legislation which excludes an otherwise eligible class of persons from permanent disability benefits for job-related injuries when similarly situated persons do not receive similar treatment. . . . Moreover, funding overall cost-of-living increases for other workers' compensation recipients by eliminating benefits for permanently and totally disabled persons age sixty-five and older is arbitrary, unfair and irrational.(fn5)
In note 9 to the opinion, the court noted that CRS § 8-41-102 abolished the common law right to bring a tort action against employers, while CRS § 8-42-111(5) eliminated compensation for workers who were injured and became permanently and totally disabled over the age of sixty-five. The court held that § 8-42-111(5)
This is the first case in which the court has held that any provision of the Workers' Compensation Act was unconstitutional on the ground that it deprived workers of an adequate remedy for injuries sustained on the job, and thus denied them the quid pro quo of the Workers' Compensation Act.(fn7)is unconstitutional because it deprives claimants age sixty-five and older with permanent and total disabilities of an adequate statutory remedy to replace the common law rights that were abolished by the Workers' Compensation Act.(fn6)
In Montezuma Well Services, Inc. v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office,(fn8) the Court of Appeals again dealt with the termination of permanent total disability benefits when the claimant reached age sixty-five. Here, the employer claimed that since the age cap provision in CRS § 8-42-111(5) was unconstitutional, subsection 8-42-111(4) was void ab initio because it was not severable from the age cap provision. Subsection (4) provided a cost-of-living adjustment for permanent total disability benefits paid to those who were under age sixty-five
The Court of Appeals disagreed. It first noted that although it was unnecessary to raise constitutional issues at the administrative level, the better practice was to do so. It then held that:
The severability clause creates a presumption that the General Assembly would have been satisfied with the portions of the statute that remain after the offending provisions are stricken as unconstitutional. . . . [T]his presumption is dispelled if what remains is so incomplete or riddled with omissions that it cannot be salvaged as a meaningful legislative enactment.
Whether unconstitutional provisions are existed from an otherwise sound law depends on two factors: (1) the autonomy of the portions remaining after the defective provisions have been deleted and (2) the intent of the enacting legislative body. . . .(fn9)
The Montezuma court noted that the conference committee that dealt with § 8-42-111 considered the age cap as a means to "derive some additional saving" for the cost increase that would result from the cost-of-living increase. The court held that this discussion was insufficient to overcome the presumption of the specific severability clause in the 1991 enactment. This clause stated that:
The court also noted that although the 1994 General Assembly declared that the age cap and the cost-of-living adjustment were interrelated, it was not bound by the 1994 legislature's pronouncement of the intent of the 1991 legislatureIf any provision of this act or the application thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid, such invalidity shall not effect other provisions or application of the act which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this act are declared to be severable.(fn10)
Finally, the court held that the employer had not shown that in the absence of the age cap provision, the remainder of § 8-42-111 "could not function as a meaningful legislative enactment." It concluded that, "Because the remaining provision governing PTD benefits would allow a claimant to receive benefits until death, that provision could operate as a unified statute without the age cap. . . . [T]he mere fact that the age cap may have been a political or economic trade-off for the COLA affects neither the operation nor the meaning of the COLA."(fn11)
Oberle v. The Industrial Claim Appeals Office(fn12) deals with the mental impairment statute, CRS § 8-41-301(2). Subsection (2) (a)...
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