Public Employee Strikes in Colorado: the Supreme Court Adopts a New Rule
| Jurisdiction | Colorado,United States |
| Citation | Vol. 22 No. 1 Pg. 1 |
| Pages | 1 |
| Publication year | 1993 |
1993, January, Pg. 1. Public Employee Strikes in Colorado: The Supreme Court Adopts a New Rule
In Martin v. Montezuma-Cortez School District, announced October 26, 1992, the Colorado Supreme Court held that public employees in this state have a right to strike under statutory law.(fn1) The legislation on which the Court based its decision (the Industrial Relations Act) was adopted by the Twentieth General Assembly in 1915.(fn2) The Court's ruling has important consequences for public sector labor relations in Colorado. First, it authorizes concerted activities by all state and local employees, subject only to limited regulation. Second, the decision invalidates ordinances providing for collective bargaining by designated municipal employees in several home rule cities. Third, Martin presents important public policy issues of substantial concern to Colorado citizens.
This article analyzes the Martin case and its implications for public sector employment. The article begins by examining the Court's opinion and the rationale used to justify legalizing public employee strikes. The article then explores the shortcomings of Martin from a labor relations perspective and considers some of the legal problems that the case raises for public sector employers and workers. Collective bargaining procedures in other states and principles developed under federal labor law offer some practical guidance in dealing with Martin. Finally, the article suggests that the General Assembly should address the Martin opinion and either clarify or overturn its new legal rule permitting strikes by public employees. This case could result in levels of labor relations conflict that may be detrimental to our governmental system.
In January 1981, a group of teachers in the Montezuma-Cortez School District struck to force the district to recognize and deal with their union, the Montezuma-Cortez Education Association ("MCEA"). The school district refused MCEA's recognitional demand, and the teachers subsequently contacted the director of the Division of Labor in the Colorado Department of Labor and Employment to request his intervention in the dispute. When the director declined to assume jurisdiction over the matter, the school district informed the striking teachers that if they failed to return to work, they would be deemed to have abandoned their employment. A number of teachers were eventually discharged.
The school district filed an action in state district court seeking injunctive relief and tort damages against the strikers. In response, the teachers brought suit against the school district claiming that the discharges violated their rights under the teacher tenure laws. In late 1984, the trial court ruled that the strike was legal under Colorado statutory law and granted summary judgment against the school district on its tort claim. Following a trial on the wrongful discharge issue, the jury found for the school district. Both parties appealed to the Colorado Court of Appeals.
The Colorado Court of Appeals held that the teachers' strike was unlawful.(fn3) Reviewing precedent from other states, the court concluded that "under the common law, strikes by public employees are illegal." The court declined to adopt the contrary rule of the California Supreme Court upholding a common law right to strike.(fn4) Further, according to the appellate court, the trial court incorrectly determined that existing Colorado statutes protected the strike. The appellate opinion states, "Even if we assume that this statute [§ 8-1-126] applies to public employees it is undisputed that the notice provisions of § 8-1-125 ... were not complied with by the teachers." Despite the strike's illegality, the Court of Appeals ruled that no tort liability attached to the teachers' work stoppage. The court explained that imposing tort liability against workers who unlawfully strike "may be counterproductive to resolving labor disputes."(fn5)
Reversing in part, the Supreme Court viewed the threshold question presented in the case to be whether public employees
The Industrial Relations Act, as mentioned, was passed by the Twentieth General Assembly, and it has a precise historical context which is essential to its meaning. It was adopted on April 10, 1915, slightly less than one year from the date of the infamous Ludlow Massacre in the coal fields of southern Colorado. Ludlow was the site of a tent colony occupied by mine workers engaged in a strike against the Colorado Fuel & Iron Company and other coal mining concerns in the state. The strike began in September 1913 and continued through early 1914 with sporadic episodes of violence. On April 20, 1914, Colorado militia attacked the Ludlow encampment, burning the miners' tents. Eleven children and two women died of suffocation after taking shelter in a hole beneath one of the tents.(fn6)
Reaction to the deaths at Ludlow was immediate. On April 21, the Colorado State Federation of Labor issued a "Call to Arms," which exhorted volunteers "to protect the workers of Colorado against the murder and cremation of men, women and children by armed assassins in the employ of coal corporations, serving under the guise of state militiamen." Armed conflict erupted throughout the state, effectively destroying the civil authority of the Colorado government. Within days, irate citizens forced Governor Ammons to request the assistance of federal troops in restoring order, and Ammons telegraphed President Woodrow Wilson on April 25 to inquire, "if we cannot control situation in Southern fields, can we have federal troops?" The federal militia was sent to Colorado and duly reinstated the power of state and local officials.(fn7)
The 1915 Act was designed to give the state legal authority to regulate industrial conflict such as the one precipitating the Ludlow Massacre. Its focus was on private sector employment, which, at that time, was subject to state rather than federal control. Toward the end of ensuring labor peace, the 1915 Act afforded the Industrial Commission of Colorado broad powers over industrial disputes. The Commission was directed to investigate the "general condition of labor in the principal industries in the State of Colorado, and especially in those which are carried on in corporate forms...." Also falling within the Commission's scope were other delineated matters; it inquired into
Pertaining to labor-management relations, the statute aimed at a scheme of state regulation encompassing, but not limited to, collective negotiations and industrial dispute resolution.the effect of industrial conditions on public welfare and into the rights and powers of the community to deal therewith;... into the growth of associations of employers and of wage earners and the effect of such associations upon the relations between employers and employees; into the extent and results of methods of collective bargaining; into any methods which have been tried in any state or in foreign countries for maintaining mutually satisfactory relations between employees and employers; into methods of avoiding or adjusting labor disputes through peaceable and conciliatory mediation and negotiations; into the scope, methods, and resources of existing bureaus of labor and into possible ways of increasing their efficiency and usefulness.(fn8)
After describing the Act's historical setting, the Colorado Supreme Court in the Martin case proceeded with the observation that from the Act's inception, the term "employer" has included the state, local governments and all public institutions. The meaning of "employee" likewise was broad and included all persons "in the service of the state or of any county, city, town, irrigation or school district." Under the statutory scheme, employees were required to give notice to the Industrial Commission before engaging in a strike or lockout. The Commission had jurisdiction to investigate disputes and to engage in arbitration of disagreements. Following various amendments, the Act was codified in Article I, Title 8 of the 1986 Colorado Revised Statutes.
According to the Martin Court, under the revised statutes, most of the provisions of the original 1915 Act are continued in force. Specifically, the definitions of "employer" and "employee" still include public sector employment. One important change was the substitution of the director of the Colorado Division of Labor for the Industrial Commission and the transfer of the Commission's regulatory functions to the director. Other provisions of the Act establish certain labor relations principles which are still in effect.
The Court determined that the director of the Division of Labor has jurisdiction over employment in the state. CRS § 8-1-125 provides that he or she can inquire into labor relations matters and adjust labor disputes "through peaceable and conciliatory mediation and negotiation" or promote voluntary arbitration. CRS § 8-1-125 also gives the director jurisdiction over "every dispute between employer and employee affecting conditions of employment," which...
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