Colorado's Central Panel of Aljs: the Hidden Executive Branch Judiciary
| Publication year | 1990 |
| Pages | 1307 |
| Citation | Vol. 19 No. 7 Pg. 1307 |
1990, July, Pg. 1307. Colorado's Central Panel of ALJs: The Hidden Executive Branch Judiciary
U.S. Senate Bill 1275(fn1) ("S.B. 1275"), introduced in 1983, concerned the creation of a federal central panel of administrative law judges ("ALJ"). Although S.B. 1275 was not enacted, a movement still exists to make a federal central panel a reality. This article by Colorado's chief ALJ presents a look at the "pros and cons" of such a central panel from his unique viewpoint.
The concept of a central panel of administrative law judges ("ALJ") differs from traditional notions of administrative law. Traditionally, hearing officers and referees (federal ALJs) were housed in the agencies they served. These agencies typically have been charged with investigating, prosecuting and adjudicating cases involving the citizens they regulate. The critical reason for establishing a central panel is to give ALJs independence from the agencies they serve.
This article is intended to familiarize practitioners with the central panel concept and structure. It looks at the issues that would be involved in establishing a federal central panel of ALJs and details the workings and results of Colorado's central panel.
Presently, there are thirteen state central panels, including Colorado's.(fn2) With one exception,(fn3) all of these central panels are located in the executive branch of government. Six are organizationally independent agencies. Colorado's central panel operates as part of another state agency.(fn4) All but one(fn5) of the central panels have a chief ALJ or a director or both. The chief judges are appointed by either the state's governor, an independent agency head or the chief justice of a state supreme court.(fn6)
Two of the central panels(fn7) are funded by general appropriations, while four(fn8) are funded strictly through agency user fees. In the user-fee states, the agencies that utilize the services of the ALJs provide the funding for the operation. Four states(fn9) fund their systems through a combination of general appropriations and agency user fees, and there is no available information for the remaining three states.(fn10) In all the states that have central panels, ALJs are salaried employees.
Although the central panel states vary significantly in their case jurisdiction, they share some common threads. All have jurisdiction over occupational licensing board cases, and the majority hear employee discipline cases. However, there are only three, including Colorado, which preside over worker's compensation cases.(fn11) In addition, only one state hears unemployment insurance compensation cases.(fn12)
In twelve of the states, including Colorado, ALJs issue final decisions only in selected cases, such as those concerning rate setting, mental health and minority business matters.(fn13) In Colorado, as mentioned above, final decisions are issued in worker's compensation cases (appealable to the Industrial Claims Appeal Panel in the Department of Labor and Employment) and in social services medicaid provider appeals.
The stereotypical image of administrative law is that of an agency hearing officer, with a tape recorder under his or her arm, heading for a windowless basement cell to conduct a hearing. According to the stereotype, the outcome of this hearing is a foregone conclusion. One critic of administrative law maintains that although the ALJ
may enjoy and exhibit an attitude completely independent from the agency and its staff, physical location and continuous relationships with
only the personnel of the employing agency may bias his analytical capacities, or they may contribute to an inclination to narrow his perspectives to only those social problems and regulatory objectives sought by this one agency.(fn14)
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