Land Use Decisionmaking: Legislative or Quasi-judicial Action
| Publication year | 1989 |
| Pages | 241 |
1989, February, Pg. 241. Land Use Decisionmaking: Legislative or Quasi-judicial Action
In 1975, the Colorado Supreme Court held that a small-scale rezoning of property constituted quasi-judicial action and that the exclusive method of judicial review was by certiorari review pursuant to Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure ("C.R.C.P.") Rule 106(a)(4). In Snyder v. City of Lakewood,(fn1) the court established a three-part test for determining whether a governmental decisionmaking process is quasi-judicial and, thus, subject to judicial review under Rule 106(a)(4). Recently, however, in Cherry Hills Resort Development Co. v. City of Cherry Hills Village,(fn2) the court seemed to overrule its holding in Synder with respect to the criteria for determining quasi-judicial action.
This article reviews the general rule concerning the characterization of land use decisionmaking processes and describes the law in Colorado as developed in Snyder and its progeny. The article then critically examines the Cherry Hills Resort decision.
The question of characterizing a specific land use decision as legislative or quasi-judicial is not an academic exercise. The characterization will affect (1) the standard of review that a court adopts in considering the legality of the decision; (2) the procedural due process requirements that attach to the decisionmaking process; (3) the type of immunity decisionmakers may have under federal civil rights laws; and (4) the amenability of the decision to the initiative and referendum processes. Although courts are not always consistent in their treatment of the above issues, the initial characterization of a land use decision will probably influence the outcome when the court is asked to resolve these issues.(fn3)
Traditionally, state and federal courts characterized zoning as a legislative function. This characterization applied not only to the initial zoning of property but also to rezoning.(fn4) Further, courts have struggled with the characterization of other land use decisionmaking processes, labeling some decisions as legislative(fn5) and others as administrative or quasi-judicial.(fn6)
In Fasano v. Board of County Commissioners,(fn7) the Oregon Supreme Court expressly rejected the traditional legislative rule and held that a single tract rezoning constituted quasi-judicial action. While Fasano has found favor with some state courts,(fn8) others have rejected Fasano by name.(fn9) In Snyder, Colorado adopted the Fasano doctrine, at least in part.(fn10)
In Snyder, the Colorado Supreme Court held that a single tract rezoning is a quasi-judicial decision for purposes of judicial review. It also held that the exclusive method of review is an action brought pursuant to Rule 106(a)(4).(fn11) The court identified three factors it considered essential to a finding that a certain government decision is quasi-judicial:
In order to support a finding that the action of a municipal legislative body is quasi-judicial, all of the following factors must exist: (1) a state or local law requiring that the body give adequate notice to the community before acting; (2) a state or local law requiring that the body conduct a public hearing, pursuant to notice, at which time concerned citizens must be given an opportunity to be heard and present evidence; and (3) a state or local law requiring the body to make a determination by applying the facts of a specific case to certain criteria established by law.(fn12) (Emphasis added.)
Since the Snyder decision, Colorado courts have addressed a number of issues involving Rule 106(a)(4) review of land use decisions.(fn13) In addition, the Colorado Supreme Court has addressed the characterization of various government decisions. In City of Aurora v. Zwerdlinger,(fn14) the court held that a city's decision concerning water rates was an administrative action not subject to the initiative and referendum processes. In City and County of Denver v. Eggert,(fn15) it held that a county resolution
purporting to contain a cease and desist order was a quasi-judicial act requiring prior notice and a hearing.
Perhaps the most interesting post-Snyder case is Margolis v. District Court.(fn16) In Margolis, the Colorado Supreme Court held that the decision to rezone property is subject to the initiative and referendum processes. However, the court expressly reaffirmed its holding in Snyder that a rezoning is quasi-judicial for judicial review purposes.(fn17)
In Cherry Hills Resort, the plaintiffs were the owners and the developer of a parcel of land located in the City of Cherry Hills Village ("City") and zoned RA-1 (Resort Area District). Under the relevant zoning regulations, the property could not be developed until the City approved a site-specific development plan. After extensive review, the City approved the general concept for a residential and resort hotel complex but imposed twenty restrictions on the development plan. The plaintiffs filed suit under Rule 106(a)(4), challenging the City's conditional approval. The trial court invalidated twelve of the conditions.
The City appealed the district court's decision to the Colorado Court of...
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