The Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976
| Jurisdiction | United States,Federal |
| Citation | Vol. 11 No. 2 Pg. 324 |
| Pages | 324 |
| Publication year | 1982 |
1982, February, Pg. 324. The Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976
The decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society(fn1) catalyzed the Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976 ("1976 Act"), which amends 42 U.S.C. § 1988. In Alyeska Pipeline, the Court held that attorneys' fees generally may not be awarded absent express statutory authorization. A review of the legislative history of the 1976 Act indicates that its purpose is to "remedy anomalous gaps in our civil rights laws created by the United States Supreme Court's recent decision...and to achieve consistency in our civil rights laws."(fn2)
In pertinent part, amended § 1988 states: "The Court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs."(fn3) The constitutionality of the amendment with regard to the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution was upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in Hutto v. Finney(fn4)
During the past six years, a large and somewhat contradictory body of case law has developed with regard to the 1976 Act. In particular, the case law interpreting and applying § 1988 has been largely related to actions arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This is of importance now that actions against local governments under § 1983 are not barred by sovereign immunity.(fn5) This article is intended to provide a brief overview of the major issues and developments which have arisen as a result of the amendment to § 1988.
With regard to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, it is clear that § 1988 is applicable to actions brought in federal and state court, regardless of whether or not such actions are based purely on constitutional or statutory violations of federal law.(fn6) It should be noted, however, that the Seventh Circuit(fn7) held that the Education for All Handicapped Children Act's(fn8) provision for parents' enforcement of that statute through an exclusive remedy of injunctive relief not only precludes an action for damages under § 1983, but also bars recovery of attorneys' fees under § 1988.
At least one court has held that a case must advance the public interest in order to be awarded attorneys' fees under § 1988.(fn9) The reasoning is that the award of attorneys' fees to public interest litigants is in keeping with the concept that such litigants are acting as private attorneys general.(fn10)
The amendment to § 1988 will also be applied to cases that were pending at the time the 1976 Act was passed on October 19, 1976.(fn11)
As a general rule, attorneys' fees under § 1988 are awarded to a prevailing party, absent special or unjust circumstances.(fn12) Implicit in this expression of Congressional
intent is the requirement that a court which denies an award of attorneys' fees must issue findings of fact and conclusions of law identifying the special circumstances and explaining why it considers the award unjust.(fn13)
One criterion in deciding whether or not to award attorneys' fees is the interpretation of the statutory phrase, "The Court, in its discretion,..." In Young v. Kenley,(fn14) for example, the Fourth Circuit held that the discretion of the trial court is limited with regard to the issue of denying attorneys' fees under § 1988. If the movant is the prevailing party and there are no unjust circumstances, then attorneys' fees must be awarded.(fn15) However, in Zarcone v. Perry,(fn16) the Second Circuit held that attorneys' fees under § 1988 should not be routinely granted. Rather, the awarding of fees should be reserved for situations where, but for the award of attorneys' fees, the lawsuit might not have been brought by the plaintiff.(fn17)
A review of the case law indicates that the determination of whether or not a party has "prevailed" is based largely upon whether the party is a plaintiff or defendant.
A plaintiff will be awarded attorneys' fees if he or she is the prevailing party, absent special or unjust circumstances. The case law shows that "prevailing" is something less than an actual or successful win on the merits. For example, an award of attorneys' fees under § 1988 was authorized in an action where the plaintiff joined a constitutional claim with a statutory claim, and the case was settled without a judicial determination as to whether or not the plaintiff's constitutional claim was meritorious.(fn18) In another case, Oldham v. Ehrlich,(fn19) the Eighth Circuit held that welfare recipients were prevailing parties under § 1988 and entitled to attorneys' fees if the state policy which they had challenged would have been declared invalid, even though the policy was amended by the state before the trial on the merits.
With regard to preliminary injunctions, there appears to be a split of authority as to whether or not attorneys' fees under § 1988 may be awarded to the prevailing party. For example, in Howard v. Phelps,(fn20) the District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana held that plaintiffs, who obtained a preliminary injunction barring state officials from continuing practices which allegedly denied the constitutional rights of jail inmates, were entitled to an award of attorneys' fees as prevailing parties. However, in Planned Parenthood of Minnesota, Inc. v. Citizens for Community Action,(fn21) the Eighth Circuit held that the awarding of attorneys' fees under § 1988 to a party who was granted a preliminary injunction would not be considered until proceedings had advanced to a more mature stage.
Recent cases have indicated that a plaintiff in a civil rights' action will not be entitled to attorneys' fees unless he or she has substantially prevailed. For example, several courts have held that where the plaintiff has won a favorable ruling on only one subsidiary claim or issue of minor importance, and damages are minimal, that plaintiff is not entitled to attorneys' fees.(fn22) However...
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