Pronouncements of the U.s. Supreme Court Relating to the Criminal Law Field: 1980-1981
| Jurisdiction | United States,Federal |
| Citation | Vol. 10 No. 9 Pg. 2188 |
| Pages | 2188 |
| Publication year | 1981 |
1981, September, Pg. 2188. Pronouncements of the U.S. Supreme Court Relating to the Criminal Law Field: 1980-1981
A. Protected Expression
1. Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim2192
2. Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc2193
B. Public Trials
1. Chandler v. Florida2194
II. Fourth Amendment2. Fair Trial---Free Press, Cameras in the Courtroom 2197
A. New Dimensions for the Fourth Amendment
1. Investigatory Stops 2201
2. Reasonable Searches and Seizures---The Court's New "Bright Line" Rules 2201
3. The Future of the Exclusionary Rule 2204
B. Authority Under Arrest Warrant to Enter Third Party's Home
1. Steagald v. United States2206
C. Warrantless Administrative Searches
1. Donovan v. Dewey2208
D. Pre-arrest Seizure
1. Michigan v. Summers2210
E. Investigatory Stops
1. United States v. Cortez2212
F. Automobile Searches
1. Colorado v. Bannister2214
2. Robbins v. California2215
3. New York v. Belton2217
A. Self-Incrimination
1. Trial Court is Required to Give Requested Instruction on the Effect of the Defendant's Failure to Testify
a. Carter v. Kentucky2219
b. Instructions---Presumption of Innocence v. Failure to Testify 2220
2. Psychiatric Examinations
a. Estelle v. Smith2220
B. Miranda Rights
1. Waiver of Miranda Rights
a. Edwards v. Arizona2222
2. Adequacy of Miranda Warnings
a. California v. Prysock2223
C. Double Jeopardy
1. United States v. DiFrancesco2224
2. Hudson v. Louisiana2227
IV. Sixth Amendment3. Bullington v. Missouri2227
A. Right to Counsel
1. United States v. Morrison2228
B. Right to an Impartial Jury
V. Eighth Amendment1. Rosales-Lopez v. United States2229
A. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
VI. Fourteenth Amendment1. Rhodes v. Chapman2231
A. Due Process
1. Identification Evidence
a. Watkins v. Sowders2233
2. Due Process Right to Counsel
a. Lassiter v. Department of Social Services2234
3. Right to Blood Test in State-Initiated Paternity Suit
a. Little v. Streater2236
4. Effective Assistance of Counsel
a. Wood v. Georgia2237
5. Commutation of Sentence
a. Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat2239
B. Equal Protection
1. Statutory Rape
VII. Privilegesa. Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County2240
A. Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product
VIII. Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation1. Upjohn Co. v. United States2242
A. Federal Jurisdiction
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1257
a. Flynt v. Ohio2243
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1291
a. Arizona v. Manypenny2244
B. Securities Acts
1. Pledge of Stock Under 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)
a. Rubin v. United States2246
2. Standard of Proof in Administrative Disciplinary Proceedings
a. Steadman v. Securities and Exchange Commission2246
C. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 963
1. Albernaz v. United States2247
D. Interstate Agreement on Detainers
1. Cuyler v. Adams 2248
E. Habeas Corpus
1. Review of State Court Findings of Fact
a. Sumner v. Mata2249
F. Ex Post Facto Laws
1. Statutory Changes in Good Time Allowances
a. Weaver v. Graham2251
G. Right to Privacy
1. Parental Notification of Minor's Intent to Obtain Abortion
IX. Civil Rights Actionsa. H. L. v. Matheson2252
A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983
1. Negligent Deprivation of Property
a. Parratt v. Taylor2254
2. Collateral Estoppel
a. Allen v. McCurry2255
b. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts2257
A. PROTECTED EXPRESSION
1. Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, ___ U.S. ___, ___S.Ct. ___, ___ L.Ed.2d ___, 49 U.S.L.W. 4597 (June 1, 1981).
A zoning ordinance prohibiting all forms of live entertainment, including nude dancing, violates the First Amendment.
Appellants began operating an adult bookstore in a commercial zone of the Borough of Mount Ephraim, New Jersey, in 1973. They obtained amusement licenses permitting them to install coin-operated devices which allow customers to view dancers, who were usually nude, perform behind a glass panel. Shortly thereafter, complaints were filed against the appellants, charging that the store's exhibition of live dancing violated § 99-15B of Mount Ephraim's zoning ordinance. Section 99-15B listed the following "principal" uses of land located in commercial zones that were permitted by ordinance:
B. Principal permitted uses on the land and in buildings.
(1) Offices and banks; taverns; restaurants and luncheonettes for sit-down dinners only and with no drive-in facilities; automobile sales; retail stores, such as but not limited to food, wearing apparel, millinery, fabrics, hardware, lumber, jewelry, paint, wallpaper, appliances; barbershops and beauty salons; cleaners and laundries; pet stores; and nurseries....
Section 99-4 of the ordinance provided that "(a)ll uses not expressly permitted in this chapter are prohibited." Appellants were found guilty and fines were imposed(2) Motels.
On appeal, the Camden County Court conducted a trial de novo on the record, and appellants were again found guilty. The court construed the ordinance to prohibit all "live entertainment" without considering whether it also prohibited other forms of entertainment. While recognizing that live nude dancing is protected by the First Amendment, the court concluded that First Amendment guarantees were not involved, because the case "involve(d) solely a zoning ordinance" under which live entertainment of any kind "is simply not a permitted use in any establishment." The court relied upon the Supreme Court's statement in Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 62 (1976) that "(t)he mere fact that the commercial exploitation of material protected by the First Amendment is subject to zoning and other licensing requirements is not a sufficient reason for invalidating these ordinances." The Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court affirmed essentially for the reasons given by the county court, and the New Jersey Supreme Court denied review. On appeal to the Supreme Court, appellants' primary contention was that the ordinance's prohibition of all live entertainment, including non-obscene nude dancing, violated their rights of free expression guaranteed by the First Amendment.
Justice White wrote the majority opinion which reversed appellants' convictions. Applying a strict scrutiny standard of review, the Court held that Mount Ephraim's ordinance created an unjustified restriction of protected First Amendment activity and was not narrowly drawn so as to use the least intrusive means to accomplish its objectives. The Court concluded that appellants had standing to attack the ordinance on the grounds of overbreadth. The ordinance prohibits all live entertainment in the borough; no property may be principally used for the commercial production of plays, concerts, musicals, dance, or any other form of live entertainment. Overbroad laws deter privileged activities and, therefore, appellants are entitled to rely on the impact of the ordinance on the expressive activities of others as well as their own. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 114 (1972).
The Court accepted the county court's construction of the ordinance as prohibiting all "live entertainment" in the borough. Entertainment has long been recognized as falling within the First Amendment guarantee. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952), and nudity alone does not strip entertainment of that protection, Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 161 (1974).
Although a local government's zoning power is broad, it is not "infinite and unchallengeable." Zoning ordinances are ordinarily sustained when they are rationally related to a legitimate state objective. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926). However, when a zoning ordinance infringes upon a protected liberty, it must be narrowly drawn and further a sufficiently substantial state interest. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-377 (1968). The burden of persuasion on this issue is on the party seeking to uphold the ordinance.
Mount Ephraim failed to demonstrate an adequate interest in prohibiting live entertainment to justify the ordinance. First, the claim that permitting live entertainment would conflict with the borough's plan to create a commercial area that caters only to the "immediate needs" of its residents and that would supply them with only the few items they might forget to purchase outside the borough, was unsupported by the evidence and contradicted by the language of the ordinance. Virtually the only item or service that could not be sold in a commercial zone was live entertainment. Second, there was no evidence that live entertainment creates special problems that are not associated with other types of commercial uses. It is particularly unclear, the majority observed, how the bookstore's exhibition of live nude dancing might create unique problems that are not associated with the permitted display of adult films. The ordinance was also constitutionally defective because the borough failed to establish that its interests could not be protected by restrictions that are less intrusive on protected expression. There may be some forms of live entertainment, including nude dancing, which create unique problems; however, the ordinance did not address problematical...
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