U.s. Supreme Court Decisions: 1975-1976
| Publication year | 1976 |
| Pages | 1274 |
1976, September, Pg. 1274. U.S. Supreme Court Decisions: 1975-1976
a. Inventory Search of Automobile
South Dakota v. Opperman, ___U.S.___, ___ S.Ct. ___, ___ L.Ed.2d ___, 44 U.S.L.W. 5294 (1976).
The defendant's car was impounded by the police for multiple parking violations. Following the police department's standard inventory procedures, the police made an inventory of the contents of the car and discovered marijuana in a closed, but unlocked glove compartment. The defendant was convicted of possession of marijuana after his motion to suppress was denied. The Court affirmed his conviction.
The Court held that the routine inventory search of the impounded automobile was not an unreasonable search and seizure. The search was primarily for the purpose of safeguarding valuables in plain view inside the car, and there was no indication that the standard procedure followed served as a pretext for a criminal investigation. Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 38 (1967); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
Justice Powell, concurring, emphasized that routine inventory searches are constitutionally permissible. They need not, moreover, be conducted pursuant to a warrant, in light of the fact that the owner of the vehicle is ordinarily absent. Furthermore, "no significant discretion" is given the officer as to the subject or scope of the search.
Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Stewart dissented. The Court's holding effectively subordinates Fourth Amendment privacy and security interests to "the mere possibilities" of property interests.
b. The Exclusionary Rule: Federal Civil Proceedings
United States v. Janis, infra, I.C.4.b.
c. Searches at Fixed Checkpoints
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, ___ U.S. ____, ___ S.Ct. ___, ___ L.Ed.2d ___, 44 U.S.L.W. 5336 (1976).
The defendants were arrested for illegally transporting aliens at permanent checkpoints operated by border patrols variously located from 66 to 90 miles from the United States border with Mexico. They sought to suppress as evidence fruits of the searches conducted at those checkpoints on the ground that such searches violated the Fourth Amendment. The Court held that stops may be made even in the absence of any "individualized suspicion" at "reasonably located" checkpoints. The Court further held that fixed checkpoint operations "need not be authorized in advance by a judicial warrant."
A reasonable-suspicion requirement would be impractical in the context of fixed checkpoints; the traffic flow is too heavy, and such a requirement would eliminate the deterrent effect of checkpoints. Furthermore, although the need to make routine stops is great, their intrusion on Fourth Amendment interests is "quite minimal"; the public interest in making checkpoint stops thus outweighs the Fourth Amendment interests of the private citizen. No warrant is required. The "visible manifestations of a field officer's authority" at a checkpoint stop are sufficient to assure motorists that the officer is acting lawfully. (Distinguishing Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented. They stated that this was the ninth decision of the Term "marking the continual evisceration" of Fourth Amendment safeguards. Permitting law enforcement officials to make "standardless" seizures of persons at fixed checkpoints cannot be reconciled with United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 872 (1975); and Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
d. Attorney's Incriminating Business Records
Andresen v. Maryland, ___U.S. ___, ___ S.Ct. ___,___ L.Ed.2d ___, 44 U.S.L.W. (1976).
The defendant attorney was under investigation for false pretences in connection with the sale of real estate (Lot 13T). A number of incriminating documents containing memoranda were seized from his office files under a warrant listing specified items pertaining to Lot 13T and "other fruits, instrumentalities and evidence of crime at [this] time unknown." The defendant was convicted and claimed that the admission of these documents at trial violated the Fifth and Fourth Amendments.
The Court held that the search and seizure of the defendant's business records pursuant to a valid warrant did not violate the privilege against self-incrimination; although his memoranda were included, he was in no way compelled to speak or to act against himself under penalty or sanction. Fisher v. United States, infra.
The terms of the warrant were not so broad as to make them "general" warrants: "The challenged ["other fruits. . ."] phrase must be read as authorizing only the search for and seizure of evidence relating to 'the crime of false pretenses with respect to Lot 13T.' " The seizure of documents pertaining to lots other than 13T did not violate the principles of Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), because "the special investigators reasonably could have believed that the evidence specifically dealing with [another lot] could be used to show [defendant's] intent with respect to. . . Lot 13T. . . ."
Justice Brennan dissented, stating that the seizure of private papers to be used in evidence against a defendant is no different from compelling him to stand witness against himself. Post hoc judicial construction of the warrants, moreover, cannot cure their unlawful generality.
Justice Marshall, dissenting, noted that he agreed with Justice Brennan's conclusions that the defects in the warrant were fatal to admissibility. He declined to address the Fifth Amendment claim.
e. Warrantless Arrest
United States v. Santana, ___ U.S. ___, 96 S.Ct. ___, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (1976).
Relying upon information that the defendant had marked money in her possession following an undercover heroin purchase, police drove to the defendant's house and observed her standing in the doorway holding a brown paper bag. As police approached, she retreated into the vestibule. The police followed her and seized several envelopes of heroin which the defendant sought to suppress.
The Court held that the evidence was admissible. First, the defendant was in a "public place" for Fourth Amendment purposes. She could have had no reasonable expectation of privacy when so exposed to "public view, speech, hearing and touch." The warrantless arrest of an individual in a public place does not violate the Fourth Amendment when based upon probable cause. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976). The validity of the arrest was not defeated, moreover, by the defendant's retreat into her abode. A delay might have resulted in the destruction of evidence. The "hot pursuit" exception of Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), therefore, applies.
Justice White, concurring, noted that he agreed with the Court's rationale. In his concurrence, he declined to accept the dissent's position that warrants should be required for all arrests except where exigent circumstances clearly exist.
Justices Stevens and Stewart concurred to emphasize that the failure to obtain a warrant was justifiable in light of the possible destruction of evidence. The failure to obtain a warrant was also harmless. Because surveillance of the defendant would have been proper while the warrant was being sought, and the defendant had ventured into plain view, a warrantless arrest would have been permissible before a warrant was procured.
Justices Marshall and Brennan dissented. They adhered to their dissenting position in United States v. Watson, supra, that a warrant is required to effect any arrest in the absence of exigent circumstances. They noted, however, that the Court's holding appeared to be applicable only to persons " 'exposed to public view, speech, hearing and touch,'. . . as though in the unprotected outdoors." It did not, therefore, establish a broad precedent supporting plain-view warrantless arrests on public property.
The dissent also noted that because the destruction-of-evidence exigency was wholly the result of police conduct, the circumstances could not automatically justify the arrest; where police activity is timed expressly to create exigent circumstances, any subsequent arrest and/or search should be held to be unlawful.
f. Bank Secrecy Act
United States v. Miller, ___ U.S. ___, 96 S.Ct. 1619, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (1976).
The defendant was charged with a series of bootlegging offenses and conspiracy to deprive the United States of tax revenues. He sought to suppress copies of checks and other bank records claiming illegal seizure prior to indictment because of the use of defective subpoenas and the privacy provisions of the 1970 Bank Secrecy Act. The issue of the defective subpoenas was bypassed when the Court held that a depositor has no protectable Fourth Amendment interest in information or materials voluntarily conveyed to banks and exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of business.
The decision is premised upon four grounds which are implicit in California Banker's Ass'n. v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974). First, the subpoenaed materials were business records of the bank and not the defendant's personal papers. Second, a depositor has no reasonable expectation of privacy within the ambit of Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Checks and deposit slips are not confidential communications, but negotiable instruments voluntarily conveyed to the bank and exposed to its...
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