Article Title: Ins v. St. Cyr:1 the Supreme Court and Draconian Congressional Criminal-immigration Laws

• Publication year: 2001
• Pages: 12-3

Utah Bar Journal Volume 12.

12-3 (2001). Article Title: INS v. St. Cyr:1 The Supreme Court and Draconian Congressional Criminal-Immigration Laws

December, 2001

Article Title: INS v. St. Cyr:1 The Supreme Court and Draconian Congressional Criminal-Immigration Laws

Author: Hakeem Ishola

Article Type

Articles

Article

On April 24, 1996, former President Clinton reluctantly signed the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"), and thereafter the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act ("IIRIRA") on September 30, 1996. Both enactments, hereinafter referred to as the "new law," wrought significant changes in immigration law,(fn2) particularly as it relates to criminal aliens.(fn3) These punitive laws included the expansion of the term "aggravated felony" to encompass garden variety crimes like simple theft and vehicular burglary which the states have traditionally regarded as "misdemeanors." Moreover, Congress made retroactive the "aggravated felony" definition, such that the term now applies to specified crimes regardless of when the conviction was entered (INA § 101(a)(43)). An alien who committed a misdemeanor crime in 1960 when the term "aggravated felony" was not even in the Act becomes deportable after the new law because the crime is now defined as a felony nearly four decades later. Other punitive aspects of the new law include Immigration and Naturalization Service's ("INS") right to detain in custody aliens who have committed specified crimes without the possibility of a hearing to determine whether they could be released on bond pending deportation proceedings;(fn4) the retroactive and prospective elimination of all forms of relief, including §§ 212(c) and 212(h) relief,(fn5) to convicted aggravated felons regardless of family ties and demonstrated rehabilitation (See INA § 240(a); the definition of "conviction" to reach traditional inconclusive criminal dispositions such as pleas in abeyance(See INA § 101(a)(48)); granting low-level INS officers the ability to solely reinstate prior deportation orders;(fn6) and the elimination of judicial review for criminal aliens who have administratively been ordered removed from the United States (See INA § 242(a)(2)(C)).

In St. Cyr II, the Supreme Court on June 25, 2001, joined the lower courts in striking down two of the most draconian aspects of the new law- one purporting to divest federal courts of all jurisdiction to review issues relating to aliens convicted of crimes, and the other attempting to retroactively apply the new law to prior criminal conduct by eviscerating former INA § 212(c) relief.

Enrico St.Cyr, a lawful permanent resident since 1986, pleaded guilty in 1996 to a charge of selling a controlled substance in violation of Connecticut law. That conviction, without doubt, rendered him deportable/removable from the United States. Under pre-new law, St. Cyr would have been eligible in an administrative deportation proceeding before an immigration judge for relief from deportation under §212(c).(fn7 )But removal proceedings were not commenced against him until April 10, 1997, after the new law came into effect. Therefore, the Attorney General interpreted the new law as divesting her of jurisdiction or discretion to grant such relief to St.Cyr.

St. Cyr then filed a habeas corpus action contending that the restrictions on § 212(c) relief in the new law do not apply to proceedings brought against an alien who pleaded guilty to a deportable crime before the law came into effect. The District Court granted the habeas, rejecting the Government's procedural claim that the new law divested it of habeas corpus jurisdiction, and its substantive defense that, even if jurisdiction exists, the new law retroactively apply to bar St. Cyr's § 212(c) application. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.(fn8) Because of the importance of the issues raised and conflicts among the circuits, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the Second Circuit.

On the question whether the new law divested federal district courts of habeas jurisdiction, Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, first canvassed the historical background of § 212(c) relief, noting that the history "is relevant to our appraisal of the substantive and procedural issues raised by the Government." Justice Stevens then considered whether the new law, as the Government argues, indeed bars federal courts from habeas review of St. Cyr's substantive § 212(c) claim. After examining in detail the new law, Justice Stevens concluded, like the overwhelming majority of the circuit courts,(fn9) that none of the statutes revokes federal courts' habeas jurisdiction under § 2241. In reaching that conclusion, Justice Stevens noted that the Government had failed to overcome the strong presumption in favor of judicial review of administrative actions and the long-standing common law rule requiring Congress to make clear its intent to repeal habeas jurisdiction which, "[a]t its historical core, . . . has served as a means of reviewing the legality of executive detention."

With respect to the substantive retroactivity claim, Justice Stevens applied the famous Landgraff analysis(fn10) and the age-old presumption against retroactive legislation:

[This] presumption against retroactive legislation is deeply rooted in our jurisprudence, and embodies a legal doctrine centuries older than our Republic. Elementary considerations of fairness dictate that individuals should have an opportunity to know what the law is and to conform their conduct accordingly; settled expectations should not be lightly disrupted. For that reason, "the principle that the legal effect of conduct should ordinarily be assessed under the law that existed when the conduct took place has timeless and universal human appeal." In a free, dynamic...