102 Days of War: Two Perspectives.

• Author: Cotter, Michael W.
• Position: Book review

From time to time, the Editors of our journal come across a new book that we believe merits a look from both a traditional diplomatic perspective as well as from the point of view of the military, intelligence or academic professional. This is one such volume.

102 Days of War: How Osama Bin Laden, Al Qaeda & The Taliban Survived 2001, by Yaniv Barzilai, Potomac Books, 2013, Hardcover ISBN: 978-1-61234-533-8, pp. 129, $17.06 Hardcover (Amazon), $13.99 E-Book (Kindle/Nook)

102 Days of War is a concise summary of the very first phase of the post-9/11 war in Afghanistan, from approximately September 11 to December 22, 2001. It includes a background chapter covering the period from the withdrawal of Soviet forces in December 1979 through the growth of Al Qaeda influence in Afghanistan prior to 9/11, and an epilogue describing the April 2011 raid that finally succeeded in seizing and killing Osama Bin Laden.

The book analyzes the political and military decision-making process that led up to the military effort to neutralize Al Qaeda, and the military operation itself. The author calls the former the "strategy" and the latter the "tactics." This review will assess the author's analysis of the strategy; a companion piece will assess the tactics.

The author, Yaniv Barzilai, now a Foreign Service officer in the Department of State, does a fine job covering this tumultuous period in American history. His analysis of the political decision-making process focuses largely on President George W. Bush, his National Security staff under Condoleeza Rice, and the civilian leadership in the Department of Defense under Donald Rumsfeld. The president and his senior advisors clearly and understandably felt themselves under immense pressure to react quickly and assertively to the attack. The result was much confusion. Barzilai accurately, if a bit harshly, tracks the confusion and its implications. Essentially, he argues, the administration was unable to define the purpose of the response: whether to expel Al Qaeda from Afghanistan, destroy that organization, or defeat the Taliban for refusing to hand Osama Bin Laden over to U.S. justice. The lack of a defined goal led in the end to the failure to catch Bin Laden.

In describing the lead up to and initial weeks of the military response, Barzilai provides an extensive discussion of the contrast between the CIA and the military. The former, with extensive experience working with the Afghan Mujahedeen during the effort to expel the Soviets, had the ability to react quickly. The military, still saddled with Cold War operational plans and having just been exposed to Secretary Rumsfeld's insistence on transforming it radically, was caught flat-footed. The CIA, still searching for a new raison d'etre after the disappearance of the Soviet Union, was only too happy to take up the challenge.

Beyond its value in providing an easily digestible timeline of events during this period, 102 Days of War will be of great value for...