Article Title: Update on Environmental Law
Publication year | 2001 |
Pages | 10-11 |
Citation | Vol. 2001 No. 10 Pg. 10-11 |
10-11 (2001). Article Title: Update on Environmental Law
October, 2001
Article Title: Update on Environmental Law
Author: Richard K. Rathbun1
Contact Info
Article Type
Utah Law Developments
Article
With the advent of the new Bush administration and the end of
the U.S. Supreme Court term, there is much to report in
environmental law. The President has already faced such
difficult issues as carbon dioxide emissions, arsenic levels
in drinking water, global warming and the Kyoto Protocol. His
administration is also reviewing EPA's enforcement
initiative against utilities under the Clean Air Act's
new source review program, and has proposed the devolution of
some of EPA's science and enforcement functions to the
states, to be assisted by new federal grants
The Supreme Court decided two Clean Water Act cases, in one
case rejecting an attempt to extend regulatory jurisdiction
to waters whose sole interstate connection was the occasional
presence of migratory birds, and in the other holding that a
developer's "takings" claim was not barred by
virtue of the fact that he bought the property after
restrictive wetlands regulations were enacted. Under the
Clean Air Act, the court also found no improper delegation of
legislative power in EPA's establishment of federal air
standards for ozone and particulate matter, and rejected a
claim that costs to the regulated community should have been
considered by EPA in setting those standards. Astounding
court-watchers, the latter opinion by Justice Scalia was a
unanimous decision, an alignment some insisted would never
happen in these fractious days
Air Quality
In Whitman v. American Trucking Associations,121 S.
Ct. 903 (2001), the court held that the Clean Air Act's
requirements for EPA to establish federal air standards at
levels "requisite to protect public health" were
within the constitutional scope of discretion that Congress
can delegate to a federal agency, rejecting the Court of
Appeals' finding of unconstitutional delegation because
the statute had provided "no intelligible
principle" to guide the agency. The court also ruled
that the Act "unambiguously bars" EPA from
considering the potential costs to regulated entities when
setting national ambient air quality standards.
Since the Clean Air Act requires that challenges to emission
or performance standards be filed in the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia, that court has been
busy as well. National Lime Association v. EPA, 2233
F.3d 625 (D.C. Cir. 2000) involved a challenge to a rule
covering hazardous air pollutant ("HAP") emissions
from Portland cement manufacturers. The court held that
EPA's failure to set maximum achievable control
technology ("MACT") standards for mercury, hydrogen
chloride and total hydrocarbons was contrary to the Clean Air
Act, and remanded to the agency for further proceedings. In
Arizona Public Service Co. v. EPA, 211 F.3d 1280
(D.C. Cir. 2000), the court upheld EPA regulations under the
Clean Air Act concerning tribal authority, specifically those
which: (1) asserted jurisdiction over fee lands owned by
non-members within a reservation's boundary; (2) included
tribal trust lands within the definition of
"reservation;" and (3) allowed tribes to issue
Tribal Implementation Plans and redesignations under the
prevention of significant deterioration program to both lands
within the reservations and to non-reservation areas over
which a tribe has demonstrated inherent jurisdiction (e.g.,
allotted lands and dependent Indian communities). And in
American Petroleum Institute v. EPA, 198 F.3d 275
(D.C. Cir. 2000), the court held that it was improper for EPA
to allow certain areas of the country (ozone standard
sub-marginal non-attainment and non-attainment because of
inadequate data) to opt-in to the reformulated gasoline
program.
Two other recent cases raise an issue best introduced here by
illustration. A statute is passed with general language,
followed by regulations of broad language, interpreted by a
guidance document with expansive language, enforced under
directive of a policy memo with firm, assertive language,
followed by a second policy memo of cautionary language,
carried then through a series of enforcement actions,
judicial and administrative, each with an agency
"official position," creating in turn a body of
letters, pleadings, administrative and judicial orders and
appellate opinions, all constituting a minefield of
contradictory language which compels us back, once again, to
the original statute, where each of us, we insist -as befits
our client's interests -finds clarity and comfort.
Such use of guidance or policy documents as the basis for
enforcement actions is a sore subject with the regulated
community, which finds itself asking the question: what
language is authoritative? Thus, in Appalachian Power Co. v.
EPA, 208 F.3d 1015 (D.C. Cir. 2000), the court held invalid
EPA's "Periodic Monitoring Guidance" document
because it effectively changed existing monitoring rules
without complying with rule-making procedures. The court
rejected EPA's boilerplate disclaimer that the guidance
was not intended to create legal rights, noting that the
guidance gave states their "marching orders" and
that "EPA expects the states to fall in line." And
closer to home, in Public Service Co. of Colorado v.
EPA, 225 F.3d 1144 (10th Cir. 2000), a power company
brought an appeal to challenge two EPA letters opining that a
proposed new power plant and an existing plant would together
constitute a single major source of air emissions for
permitting purposes. The appeal was dismissed because the
letters did not constitute final agency action from which an
appeal could be taken (they were written by EPA and not the
ultimate state permitting authority). Still, given the
complex nature of environmental regulatory schemes -not
limited to air quality, of course -the attempted enforcement
of policy or guidance documents is an issue which all
practitioners, on either side of the enforcement
"aisle," should be wary of.(fn2)
Bankruptcy
Several recent bankruptcy cases involved environmental issues
worth noting. In Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v
Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc., 252 B.R. 373 (E.D.
Tex. 2000), the proposed reorganization plan provided that
the bankruptcy court would have authority to approve any
settlements, between debtor and State, of CERCLA liability
issues for several contaminated sites. Upon objection by
Southern Pacific, the district court ordered withdrawal of
the case to district court under 28 U.S.C. 157(d). The court
held that CERCLA was the type of law covered by the mandatory
withdrawal language in the statute, i.e., that...
To continue reading
Request your trial