§ 8.7 Evidence to Convict

LibraryIllinois DUI and Traffic-Related Decisions (2016 Ed.)

§ 8.7 Evidence to Convict

§ 8.7-1 Insufficient

People v. Jakupcak, 275 Ill. App. 3d 830, 656 N.E.2d 442, 212 Ill. Dec. 119 (3d Dist. 1995). The appellant court determined that the testimony of the State's expert concerning an accident reconstruction should have been stricken. The only evidence of speed, therefore, was defendant's admission that he was traveling slightly over the posted speed limit. This evidence was not sufficient to establish excessive speed on the part of the defendant. The appellate court reversed and remanded the matter for a new trial.

People v. Thomas, 277 Ill. App. 3d 214, 660 N.E.2d 184, 213 Ill. Dec. 927 (1st Dist. 1995). At a bench trial, evidence showed defendant was a prostitute who engaged in oral sex for $20 with the victim. The victim was dissatisfied because defendant insisted the victim use a condom. The victim asked for $10 back and grabbed defendant while holding a knife. Defendant got back into a car and locked the doors. As she drove off the victim jumped on the hood of the car. The victim was killed when he was pinned underneath the vehicle. The trial found defendant guilty of reckless homicide and failure to report an accident. The appellate court reversed finding defendant's actions to escape from the victim, who was armed with a knife, to be reasonable and as such did not constitute reckless homicide.

People v. Barham, 337 Ill. App. 3d 1121, 788 N.E.2d 297, 272 Ill. Dec. 993 (5th Dist. 2003). After a bench trial defendant was convicted of two counts of reckless homicide. Defendant, an employee of the Illinois Department of Corrections, was allegedly intoxicated when his vehicle went off the roadway and down an embankment before crashing into a tree. His passenger, a fellow employee, died as a result of massive injuries suffered in the accident. There was conflicting evidence regarding the amount of alcohol defendant had been served that evening. No one testified that defendant was intoxicated or that he was behaving erratically. Civilian witnesses that arrived at the scene of the accident did not note any odor of alcohol on defendant's breath. A sheriff's deputy who observed defendant on the ground near his vehicle did not note any odor of alcohol. A paramedic who attended to defendant did note an odor of alcohol and she obtained an admission to drinking alcohol. The paramedic also noted that defendant was alert and responsive and had no trouble speaking. An Illinois state trooper heard the conversation between defendant and the paramedic, noted an odor of alcohol, and placed defendant under arrest for DUI.

Count III of the indictment was premised on an allegation that defendant drove at a speed that was greater than reasonable and proper with respect to existing traffic conditions and the safety of persons on the roadway. Based upon accident reconstruction testimony, the evidence revealed that defendant's vehicle was traveling at a speed of 76 mph at approximately five seconds before the crash and an impact speed of 52 mph The appellate court found that other than the evidence of the vehicle's speed at the time of the accident, the record contained no evidence of other circumstances that would indicate recklessness on the part of the driver. The State did not establish the speed limit for that stretch of Route 147, there was no evidence the road was wet or slippery, no evidence that defendant was driving erratically or weaving in and out of traffic prior to the accident, and there was no evidence regarding traffic conditions at and near the place of the accident.

Evidence of excessive speed, by itself, is insufficient to sustain a conviction for reckless homicide. Excessive speed combined with other circumstances that would indicate a conscious disregard of a substantial risk likely to cause death or great bodily harm to others such at a reasonable person would act differently under the same circumstances, is sufficient to establish reckless homicide. The appellate court determined that evidence that defendant was driving a car 73 mph at the time and place of the accident, while perhaps negligent, was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that such action constituted a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise in the same situation. The appellate court reversed the conviction on Count III.

Count II was premised upon defendant operating a motor vehicle at a speed that was greater than reasonable and proper...

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