§ 8.4 Court Action

LibraryIllinois DUI and Traffic-Related Decisions (2016 Ed.)

§ 8.4 Court Action

§ 8.4-1 Charge Dismissed

§ 8.4-1(a) Properly

People v. Raymond, 202 Ill. App. 3d 704, 560 N.E.2d 26, 147 Ill. Dec. 878 (2d Dist. 1990). Defendant was charged with DUI. He was subsequently indicted for reckless homicide. Prior to the indictment, defendant was told by the prosecutor that he would not be charged with reckless homicide. Based upon that promise, defendant gave testimony at a license revocation hearing held by the Secretary of State's office. The defendant moved to dismiss the reckless homicide charge. The trial court granted the dismissal finding that although there was no plea agreement, there was a material representation made to defendant by the state's attorneys office, that defendant relied upon the representation to his detriment and that such reliance was reasonable. The court further found the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights to due process of law were violated. The appellate court affirmed.

§ 8.4-2 Cross-Examination Restrictive

People v. Atteberry, 213 Ill. App. 3d 851, 572 N.E.2d 434, 157 Ill. Dec. 365 (3d Dist. 1991). A trial court committed reversible error when it refused to allow defense counsel to question the sole witness to this accident about her refusal to discuss her testimony with defense counsel or his investigator. This area of questioning may be used to demonstrate the bias, hostility, prejudice, or interest of the witness.

§ 8.4-3 Dismissal for Speedy Trial Violation

§ 8.4-3(a) Improper

People v. Crowe, 195 Ill. App. 3d 212, 552 N.E.2d 5, 141 Ill. Dec. 868 (4th Dist. 1990). Defendant was originally charged on 8/26/88 with four traffic offenses. They were DUI, failure to reduce speed to avoid an accident, driving in the wrong lane, and failure to wear a seat belt. On 9/6/88, defendant filed a written demand for trial on the DUI. On 9/12/88 an information charging defendant with reckless homicide was filed. On 4/14/89 the trial court dismissed both the traffic charges and the reckless homicide matter, based on the Speedy Trial Act. The appellate court reversed finding the defendant had not made a clear and unequivocal demand for trial on the reckless homicide case.

§ 8.4-3(b) Proper

People v. Smith, 207 Ill. App. 3d 1072, 566 N.E.2d 797, 152 Ill. Dec. 920 (5 th Dist. 1991). Defendant was arrested for reckless homicide on 6/12/89. Defendant's case was set for trial 12/23/89. The cause was continued to the next day. Defendant then filed a petition for discharge claiming she had not been brought to trial within 120 days. The trial court granted the dismissal.

The appellate court affirmed finding that delay could not be attributable to defendant when she indicated she was ready for trial but had sent a letter to the judge asking for a different public defender. Delay was not found because the same attorney remained as counsel and no action was taken on defendant's letter. Additionally, defendant made a request for supplement discovery which was not unduly burdensome and the State was readily able to provide the information. Thus no delay could be attributable to defendant based upon the discovery request. Also the fact defendant says, "fine" when a date is suggested for trial is not tantamount to an agreed date. Finally, the fact there were not enough jurors available is not a delay attributable to defendant.

People v. Vasquez, 311 Ill. App. 3d 291, 723 N.E.2d 984, 244 Ill. Dec. 96 (2d Dist. 2000). On 12/1/96, defendant was originally charged with DUI after his pickup truck struck a street light and his passenger was killed. On 4/9/97 defendant filed a written demand. On 5/1/97 the State was ordered to supply the defendant with additional discovery. By way of indictment, the defendant was charged with reckless homicide and DUI on 5/14/97.

Defendant was arraigned on 5/26/97 and on July 24, defendant moved to compel discovery. The State responded that it would comply with discovery "in a couple of weeks." Defense counsel stated that he would not agree to a continuance because of the prior speedy trial demand. The State indicated they would comply with the requested information "as quick as the 30th of July." The trial judge set the matter for trial on November 3, set an August 4 date for compliance with discovery, and a final pretrial conference for October 24. At the August 4 court, defense counsel informed the trial judge that the State indicated compliance with discovery would be within the next few days. Defense counsel suggested the matter be taken off the call and reset for an October date to see if the State had complied with discovery. The matter was reset for October 24.

On October 10, a second motion to compel was filed. At a hearing on October 17, defense counsel suggested the matter be continued to the final pretrial date of October 24. As of October 24, the State had failed to complete discovery. On October 29, the State indicated there were problems complying with discovery and they would be requesting a continuance of the trial date set for November 3. Defendant's counsel stated there would not be an agreement to the continuance.

From November 3, the State received continuances until December 8. The time from December 8 to December 15 was charged to the Defendant. The trial commenced on 2/2/98. Prior to trial, defense counsel moved to dismiss on speedy trial grounds claiming the period from August 4 through October 24 was not chargeable to the defendant. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss finding the continuance on August 4 was by agreement. The defendant was found guilty of reckless homicide and DUI and sentenced to three years at...

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