§ 6.3.5 INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS.

• Jurisdiction: Arizona

§ 6.3.5 Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. The Arizona Supreme Court first recognized this tort in 1954.⁴² Since then, Arizona courts have had numerous opportunities to analyze and refine the cause of action.

Intentional infliction claims must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis because the terms "outrageous conduct" and "severe emotional distress" are not capable of precise legal definition.⁴³ There are numerous factors to consider, including: (1) the relationship between the parties or the position occupied by the defendant; (2) whether the defendant had knowledge that the plaintiff was particularly susceptible to emotional distress due to some physical or mental condition; and (3) whether the defendant's conduct was privileged or served a legitimate business purpose.⁴⁴

The "conduct necessary to sustain an intentional infliction claim falls at the very extreme edge of the spectrum of possible conduct."⁴⁵ It must be "so outrageous in character" and "so extreme in degree" that it "go[es] beyond all possible bounds of decency, and [is] regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community."⁴⁶ In other words, "major outrage is essential to the tort; and the mere fact that the actor knows that the other will regard the conduct as insulting, or will have his feelings hurt, is not enough."⁴⁷ "Cases where there has been a sufficient finding of outrageousness contain stark and repulsive facts that strike at very personal matters, such as willful ignorance of rampant sexual harassment, . . . a doctor who hid the reason for an infant's death from its mother, . . . or conspiracy to hide a child from a father."⁴⁸

"The liability clearly does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities."⁴⁹ And tortious, criminal, unethical, willful, intentional, or malicious acts will not by themselves support an intentional infliction claim without the additional showing that the conduct was extreme and outrageous.⁵⁰ Harsh or callous conduct that falls within the realm of an acceptable business practice or purpose is not extreme and outrageous.⁵¹

In addition, the resulting emotional distress must be "severe."⁵² "A line of demarcation should be drawn between conduct likely to cause mere 'emotional distress' and that causing 'severe emotional distress.'"⁵³ "Complete emotional tranquility is seldom attainable in this world, and some degree of transient and trivial emotional distress is a part of the price of living among people."⁵⁴ "[T]he law intervenes only where the distress inflicted is so severe that no reasonable man could be expected to endure it."⁵⁵ A corporate entity cannot state a claim for intentional infliction because it cannot experience emotional distress of any kind.⁵⁶

In Midas Muffler, the Arizona Court of Appeals listed symptoms of emotional distress that were considered severe in various out-of-state cases, including a "heart attack and nervous exhaustion," "fright . . . result[ing] in premature birth of dead baby," "writhing in bed in a state of extreme shock and hysteria," a "state of anxiety [that] ultimately required hospitalization," and "such a breakdown of [plaintiff's] physical and emotional well being that she was unable thereafter to perform her job."⁵⁷ Other examples from Arizona include (1) anxiety that resulted in physical symptoms such as high blood pressure, a nervous eye tic, chest pains, weakness, fatigue, and dizziness⁵⁸ and (2) anger and depression coupled with headaches and hemorrhoids.⁵⁹

While the emotional...