§ 6-1 Identification

• Library: South Carolina Requests to Charge - Criminal (SCBar) (2023 Ed.)

§ 6-1 Identification

An issue in this case is the identification of the defendant as the perpetrator of the crime charged. The State of South Carolina has the burden of proving identity beyond a reasonable doubt. Identification testimony is an expression of belief or impression by a witness. You may consider the opportunity a witness had to observe the alleged offender at the time of the offense and to thereafter make an identification. It is for the jury to determine the accuracy of the identification of the defendant. You must consider the credibility of each identification witness in the same way as any other witness. You can consider his or her truthfulness as well as the capacity, opportunity and circumstances of the observation of the matters about which he or she testified.

? See United States v. Holley, 502 F.2d 273 (4th Cir. 1974); United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United States v. Levi, 405 F.2d 380 (4th Cir. 1968) (stating that when identification is an issue trial judge must instruct jury that burden of proof is upon prosecution with reference to every element of the crime charged and this burden includes burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt identity of defendant as perpetrator of crime charged); State v. Huber, 119 P.3d 388, 389 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005) ("It is axiomatic in criminal trials that the prosecution bears the burden of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt the identity of the accused as the person who committed the offense.").

For information purposes only, I include the Telfaire charge below with exactitude. However, in doing so, I emphasize some jury instructions that may be proper for use in a federal courtroom may not be proper for use in a South Carolina courtroom due to our state's constitutional prohibition on jury instructions commenting on the facts. Compare S.C. Const. art. V, § 21 ("Judges shall not charge juries in respect to matters of fact, but shall declare the law."); State v. Smith, 288 S.C. 329, 342 S.E.2d 600 (1986) ("The trial judge must refrain from all comment which tends to indicate his opinion as to the weight or sufficiency of the evidence, the credibility of the witnesses, the guilt of the accused or as to controverted facts."); and State v. Deas, 202 S.C. 9, 23 S.E.2d 820 (1943) ("Of course, under our Constitution and practice the jury are the sole judges of the facts in criminal trials and it is error for the Judge to communicate his views of them to the jury."); with Quercia...