§ 5.3.3 The Effect of the Existence of Other Remedies.

• Jurisdiction: Arizona

§ 5.3.3 The Effect of the Existence of Other Remedies. The federal and state versions of civil procedure Rule 57 provide, “The existence of another adequate remedy does not preclude a judgment for declaratory relief in cases where it is appropriate.” Judge Learned Hand’s comments on that statement represent the federal view of this factor:

It is true that Rule 57 provides that “the existence of another adequate remedy does not preclude a judgment for declaratory relief in cases where it is appropriate; but that has been construed not to mean that the action will lie whenever there is a pending controversy, regardless of the need for it. Whether to entertain the action rests in the discretion of the judge, whose exercise of it is reviewable as in other cases.”

Larson v. General Motors Corp., 134 F.2d 450, 453 (2d Cir. 1943). The federal courts accordingly have exercised their discretion and have refused to entertain actions for declaratory relief if the alternative remedy is better or more effective. See Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 57.42[2] at 57-88 ; Wright & Miller, supra, § 2758 at 509-511 , and the cases cited in those treatises. See, e.g., City of Tucson v. U.S. West Communications, 284 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2002) (ruling that the availability of another remedy, namely quo warranto, precluded declaratory judgment when quo warranto was the exclusive remedy for contesting a franchise under Arizona law).

An example of a federal court’s exercise of that discretion is MacMillan-Bloedel, Inc. v. Fireman’s Insurance Co., 558 F. Supp. 596 (S.D. Ala. 1983). There, the court ruled that the existence of a more efficient and comprehensive state court remedy precluded a federal court from taking jurisdiction of a declaratory judgment action. Id. at 599. A direct action against the insurer would be available in state court after the injured party established the tortfeasor’s liability. Id. at 600. The controversy between the parties might never arise, because the tortfeasor might not be liable to the injured party. Id. at 599.

The Arizona courts appear to have taken a more liberal view in that they rarely have denied the remedy because another remedy exists. Perhaps that greater liberality arises from A.R.S. § 12-1831, which has no federal analog and which provides, in part, “Courts of record within their respective jurisdictions shall have power to declare rights, status and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed.” Thus, the...