§ 4.6 Constitutionality

• Library: Illinois DUI and Traffic-Related Decisions (2016 Ed.)

§ 4.6 Constitutionality

§ 4.6-1

Implied Consent Provision Pertaining to Restoration of Privileges and Procedures to Reinstate Privileges

People v. O'Donnell, 116 Ill. 2d 517, 508 N.E.2d 1066, 108 Ill. Dec. 489 (1987). The Supreme Court held the provisions set out in 625 ILCS 5/6-208.1(b) and (c) were constitutional and trial court was reversed.

§ 4.6-2 Implied Consent—Provision Pertaining to the Issuance of Driving Permits

People v. Inghram, 118 Ill. 2d 140, 514 N.E.2d 977, 113 Ill. Dec. 65 (1987). Supreme court held the provisions set out in 625 ILCS 5/6-206.1, which authorize a court to issue a judicial driving permit for employment during the statutory summary suspension period, was not a violation of the separation of powers clause, and the trial court was reversed.

§ 4.6-3 Implied Consent—Provisions Pertaining to Issues to be Decided in a Hearing to Rescind

People v. Hamilton, 118 Ill. 2d 153, 514 N.E.2d 965, 113 Ill. Dec. 53 (1987). The Supreme Court held the provision set out in 625 ILCS 5/2-118.1 did not violate due process nor did it violate the separation of powers doctrine. The circuit court had declared the statute unconstitutional because the statutory scheme prevented one from contesting the validity of a test. In reversing, the court stated that the dictates of 11-501.2 required that in order to admit a test result, there must be a showing of compliance with the Department of Public Health Standards.

§ 4.6-4 Implied Consents Suspension of Licenses

In re Summary Suspension of Driver's License of Ramos, 155 Ill. App. 3d 374, 508 N.E.2d 484, 108 Ill. Dec. 323 (4th Dist. 1987). The statutory suspension scheme does not violate either the equal protection clause or the due process clause. The equal protection argument concerned the failure of the scheme to apply to drivers under the influence of drugs, and the due process argument concerned the punishment of drivers who comply with the test. The trial court's determination that the law is constitutional was affirmed since the State's compelling interest in highway safety justifies suspending one's license for taking a chemical test and obtaining a result which showed legal intoxication. Additionally, the legislature was justified in focusing on those who use alcohol to excess because of the tremendous hazard drunk drivers pose to our society

§ 4.6-5 Implied Consent—Sections 218.1, 11-501.1, and 6-201.1

People v. Griffith, 153 Ill. App. 3d 856, 506 N.E.2d 430, 106 Ill. Dec. 723 (2d Dist. 1987). Defendant claimed sec. 218.1 and 11-501.1 was unconstitutional because they allowed a license to be revoked without a hearing. The court rejected this argument because there is no requirement of a pre-suspension hearing when a defendant's driver's license is sought to be suspended or revoked. See Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1 (1979) and People ex rel. Eppinga v. Edgar, 112 Ill. 2d 101, 492 N.E.2d 187, 96 Ill. Dec. 945 (1986). Additionally, the fact that a JDP does not come into effect until 30 days after the suspension is a proper deterrent upon drunk drivers.

People v. Esposito, 121 Ill. 2d 491, 521 N.E.2d 873, 118 Ill. Dec. 396 (1988). The trial court held the summary suspension procedure established in sec. 11-501.1 was violative of the equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article 1, sec. 2 of the Illinois Constitution. Defendant claimed because section 11-501.1 is only applicable to drivers on highways and not on private property, the legislature had acted arbitrarily. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the equal...