§ 4.14.6 Trial - Rules 18-23.

• Jurisdiction: Arizona

§ 4.14.6 Trial - Rules 18-23.

Rule 18.1 - Waiver of Jury Trial. An appellate court reviews de novo whether a defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived the right to a jury trial. See generally State v. Conroy, 168 Ariz. 373, 814 P.2d 330 (1991); State v. LaGrand, 152 Ariz. 483, 733 P.2d 1066 (1987); State v. Butrick, 113 Ariz. 563, 558 P.2d 908 (1976). The appellate court reviews for an abuse of discretion a trial court’s decision on a defendant’s request to withdraw from a waiver of jury trial, after first determining that the waiver was knowing, voluntary and intelligent. State v. Hooper, 145 Ariz. 538, 548-49, 703 P.2d 482, 492-93 (1985).

Rule 18.4(a) - Challenges To Jury Panel. A trial court’s rulings on voir dire of prospective jurors is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Medina, 232 Ariz. 391, 403, ¶ 36, 306 P.3d 48, 60 (2013); State v. Glassel, 211 Ariz. 33, 45, ¶ 36, 116 P.3d 1193, 1205 (2005) (excusing entire venire panel is reviewed for an abuse of discretion); State v. Montano, 136 Ariz. 605, 607, 667 P.2d 1320, 1322 (1983).

Rule 18.4(b) - Challenges For Cause. The matter of excusing jurors is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Lynch, 225 Ariz. 27, 34, ¶ 25, 234 P.3d 595, 602 (2010). An appellate court will not set aside a ruling upon a challenge to a juror absent a showing that the trial court abused its discretion. State v. Poland, 144 Ariz. 388, 398, 698 P.2d 183, 193 (1985). The trial court’s determination that a juror can render a fair and impartial verdict is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Lynch, 225 Ariz. at 34, ¶ 25, 234 P.3d at 602.

Rule 18.4(b) - Challenge For Cause; Death Qualification. The trial court has discretion in “death-qualifying” juries in capital cases. State v. Jones, 197 Ariz. 290, 302-03, ¶¶ 24-26, 4 P.3d 345, 357-58 (2000). Deference is to be accorded to the trial judge regarding removal of a prospective juror for cause, and the juror’s bias need not be proved with unmistakable clarity. See State v. Moody, 208 Ariz. 424, 450,
¶ 88, 94 P.3d 1119, 1145 (2004); State v. Milke, 177 Ariz. 118, 122, 865 P.2d 779, 783 (1993).

Rule 18.4(c) - Peremptory Challenges. A trial court’s erroneous denial of a challenge for cause that requires a defendant to use a peremptory strike is subject to review for an abuse of discretion and harmless error. State v. Payne, 233 Ariz. 484, 499 ¶ 24, 314 P.3d 1239, 1254 (2013); State v. Hickman, 205 Ariz. 192, 198, 201, ¶¶ 28, 39, 68 P.3d 418, 424, 427 (2003).

Rule 18.4(c) - Batson Challenges. In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection Clause forbids peremptory challenges made solely on account of a juror’s race. Batson objections require a three-part inquiry. First, the opponent of a peremptory challenge must establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767 (1995). Second, the proponent of the strike must come forward with a race-neutral explanation. Id. The explanation need not be persuasive, or even plausible. Id. at 768. The reason given may even be “silly or superstitious.” Id. “Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor’s explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360 (1991) (plurality opinion)). A legitimate reason for purposes of Batson “is not a reason that makes sense, but a reason that does not deny equal protection.” Id. at 769. Finally, if a race-neutral explanation is given, the trial court must decide whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful racial discrimination. Id. at 767. “Throughout the process, the burden of persuasion remains on the party alleging discrimination.” State v. Paleo, 200 Ariz. 42, 44, ¶ 6, 22 P .3d 35, 37 (2001); see also State v. Bustamente, 229 Ariz. 256, 261, ¶ 17, 274 P.3d 526, 531 (App. 2012).

When considering an appeal from a Batson challenge, the appellate court will defer to the trial court’s findings of fact unless clearly erroneous. State v. Harris, 184 Ariz. 617, 618, 911 P.2d 623, 624 (App. 1995). The court reviews de novo the trial court’s application of the law. State v. Gay, 214 Ariz. 214, 220, ¶ 16, 150 P.3d 787, 793 (App. 2007); State v. Lucas, 199 Ariz. 366, 368, ¶ 6, 18 P.3d 160, 162 (App. 2001).

An appellate court reviews the trial court’s decision on the initial prima facie showing of discrimination for an abuse of discretion. State v. Cañez, 202 Ariz. 133, 146, ¶ 23, 42 P.3d 564, 577 (2002). In deciding if a trial court correctly ruled on the ultimate question of purposeful discrimination, the appellate court gives great deference to the trial court’s ruling because it is based largely upon an assessment of the prosecutor’s credibility. Id. at 147, ¶ 28, 42 P.3d at 578; Bustamente, 229 Ariz. at 261, ¶ 15, 274 P.3d at 531.

On appeal, Arizona courts “review a trial court’s decision regarding the State’s motives for a peremptory strike for clear error.” State v. Roque, 213 Ariz. 193, 203, ¶ 12, 141 P.3d 368, 378 (2006) (citing State v. Murray, 184 Ariz. 9, 24, 906 P.2d 542, 557 (1995)). Reviewing courts “give great deference to the trial court’s ruling, based, as it is, largely upon an assessment of the prosecutor’s credibility.” Roque, 213 Ariz. at 203, ¶ 12, 141 P.3d at 378 (citing Cañez, 202 Ariz. at 147, ¶ 28, 42 P.3d at 578.

Rule 18.5 - Voir Dire of Jurors. The appellate court reviews a trial court’s rulings on voir dire of prospective jurors for an abuse of discretion. State v. Medina, 232 Ariz. 391, 403, ¶ 36, 306 P.3d 48, 60 (2013); State v. Glassel, 211 Ariz. 33, 45, ¶ 36, 116 P.3d 1193, 1205 (2005); State v. Chaney, 141 Ariz. 295, 304, 686 P.2d 1265, 1274 (1984).

Rule 19.1 - Conduct of Trials. Rule 19.1 expressly gives the trial court authority to direct the order of the trial. Accordingly, the order of conduct for a trial is within the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Guerrero, 159 Ariz. 568, 571, 769 P.2d 1014, 1017 (1989)...